Three Forms of Society According to Auguste Comte

Source

• Article: Société politique et société religieuse. Essai de politique positive. Michel Bourdeau. Commentaire, # 169, Printemps 2020.

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Excerpts

Michel Bourdeau:

The Three Societies

"The System invites us to distinguish three types of society: the family, the city or state, and the church. The city is composed of families, just as the Church is composed of cities. That social science should begin with a theory of the family is a constant teaching of Comte, as it is through the family that sociology touches biology. However, one would search in vain for any mention of religious society in the Cours. This silence reflects the fact that these three layers are not only superimposed but also successive, and that, unlike the first two, religious society is essentially yet to come.

This gives rise to two difficulties. In moving away from the factual domain to focus on a reality still in formation, Comte exposed himself to the criticism later expressed by Durkheim: that his sociology lacked positivism. Furthermore, whether or not this critique is justified, it is undeniable that the use of the term religious in this context leads to misunderstandings. To many of our contemporaries, religion belongs far more to the past than to the future. While it is true that religion is one of the oldest forms of human life, the decline of religious practices in modern societies raises the question of whether the best days of religion are not behind it. Thus, the phenomena we commonly call religious do not always correspond to what Comte meant by the term (for example, how can we understand his assertion that humanity is becoming increasingly religious?). In particular, due to what he calls "the ancient adherence of the church to the state," the various churches that exist or have existed are merely very imperfect anticipations of the religious society to come.

Domestic and Political Society

Although the positive theory of the family does not concern us directly, it is worth mentioning a few points, as it helps highlight what is specific to political society. Comte's hostility toward those who claim that society originates from a contract between individuals is well known. He considers such an analysis anarchic, dissolving social existence instead of explaining it. "A society is no more decomposable into individuals than a geometric surface into lines or a line into points. The smallest society, namely the family—sometimes reduced to its fundamental couple—thus constitutes the true sociological element" (S. 3, 180).

To understand what characterizes social life proper, that is, belonging to political society, one must turn to the division of labor. As both a principle of spontaneous order and a sine qua non condition of progress, it "constitutes, in fact, the fundamental characteristic of human operations when one rises from the simple domestic point of view to the true social perspective" (C. 50th lesson, 191). The end of this phrase, often overlooked, is crucial: recognizing the fundamental nature of the division of labor is inseparable from distinguishing between domestic and social life.

This distinction allows for a much more nuanced judgment of social contract theories than is usually attributed to the founder of positivism. Admittedly, their advocates made "a fundamental error in attributing to this principle the very creation of the social state, since, on the contrary, it is evident that cooperation, far from having been able to produce society, necessarily presupposes its prior spontaneous establishment" (C. 50th lesson, 193). The sociological comparison of humans with other animals irrefutably shows "how entirely natural the main social relationships are" (C. 48th lesson, 145). However, if we examine the causes of such an error, we must attribute it to "a radical confusion between domestic and social life, all too common in metaphysical speculations. For, by properly distinguishing these two very different modes of association, this assertion, carefully restricted to the most complex combination, would certainly appear much less shocking" (C. 50th lesson, 192).

The question then arises as to how to justify this distinction, which brings us back to the relationship between sociology and biology. The error of the social contract theorists lies in their neglect of "this elementary part of sociology, which almost merges with intellectual and moral biology" (C. 48th lesson, 145). Had they done so, they would have ceased "to regard the fundamental bonds of the human family as artificial and arbitrary, recognizing them instead with the same essential character among animals, and even more pronounced as the organism becomes more advanced and closer to the human organism" (Ibid.).

Political and Religious Society

The emergence of political society coincides with "the invariable reconciliation of the separation of tasks with the cooperation of efforts" (C. 50th lesson, 191), which constitutes the division of labor. Comte attributes this discovery to Aristotle, who had already noted that "a community of interest does not arise between two doctors, but rather between a doctor and a farmer, and, in general, between different and unequal contractors who must nevertheless be equalized" (Nicomachean Ethics, V 8). It is in this context that Comte examines the contributions of economics to social science.

As with social contract theories, Comte’s critiques of economic theories are often highlighted, but it is often overlooked that his early career as Saint-Simon’s secretary gave him a deep appreciation for economics. His admiration for Adam Smith and the Scottish School (Hume, Ferguson) remained consistent throughout his life. He credited economists with being the first to recognize the existence of a spontaneous order in social phenomena. It is surprising that Hayek, who made spontaneous order the cornerstone of social science, failed to see that the author of the Cours thought similarly. The title of the 50th lesson is explicit: Preliminary Considerations on Social Statics or General Theory of the Spontaneous Order of Human Societies. In a passage that Hayek found surprising in Comte’s writings, the latter even attributes the existence of this spontaneous order to an invisible hand (C. 50th lesson, 261).

Once the existence of this order is established, the question arises of how to approach it, and here the two thinkers diverge. Positivism believes it is possible and desirable to modify this natural order to replace it with an artificial one that better aligns with human aspirations. This, in fact, is the function of politics, understood as the art of governance: to prevent or mitigate crises and ensure that the progress of civilization occurs without too much turmoil. However, Comte harbored no illusions about the extent of political control: we do not govern social phenomena as we wish, and artificial order is merely an extension of natural order.

The Religious Society

If the government were able to fully perform its duties, religious society would be superfluous. However, even if large states were broken down to enable the kind of governance positivist politics envisions, temporal power would still ultimately rest on force, which "always needs to be complemented and regulated to serve as a durable foundation for political government" (S. 2, 301). Force needs a spiritual guide for decision-making and a moral consecration to maintain social cohesion. Finally, any power prone to abuse must itself be regulated.

This triple necessity justifies the creation of religious society, which must fulfill these functions without existing merely for its own sake. The church, as a social institution, does not serve itself but the city, the preeminent site of social life.

It must break the “ancient adherence” that once bound it to the state, and it is this necessity that calls for the creation of a new type of society that will be superimposed on the previous ones. Whether rightly or wrongly, Christianity is often criticized for diverting believers from the here and now: in the light of the eternal bliss that awaits them in the heavenly city, earthly life becomes nothing more than a vale of tears. Positivism not only questions the existence of this future life but also argues that the higher extension of the Church does not grant it any superiority, proclaiming instead that the predominant place irrevocably belongs to the State. “It is, therefore, to the city, the essential organ of active cooperation, that man must be primarily related, while always conceiving it as being prepared by the family and completed by the Church” (S. 2, 341).

This subordination has significantly contributed to the long-standing confusion between the Church and the State, despite the fact that their separation is indispensable if religious society is to fulfill its functions. Until recently, the Church was poorly distinguished from political society, and although it had an existence of its own, this existence hardly corresponded to Comte’s description. Although the great monotheistic religions have partially freed themselves from it, the ancient adherence of the Church to the State still prevailed. Even if the gods were no longer gods of the city, in practice, the principle cuius regio, eius religio continued to apply.

In exercising its first two functions, the Church did not fare too badly under this arrangement. No political society can do without an intellectual guide and moral consecration; these functions must always be fulfilled, and guiding as well as consecrating presupposes a certain proximity to power. While positivists actively worked toward the separation of Church and State, much of what they intended by it was overlooked by the legislator of 1905, since they saw it as the only way to bring about a religious society. The key to this somewhat perplexing idea lies in the Church's final function. It is difficult to see how a regulatory body tasked with curbing abuses of power could effectively fulfill its role without being independent of what it is meant to regulate, given that its mission is “at once repressive and directive, though always consultative” (S. 2, 308). The outcome of conflicts likely to arise would be predetermined if one entity were subordinated to the other from the outset. The best guarantee of this independence lies in the strictest separation: religious society can thus freely pursue its tendency toward universality, with its superior extension ensuring a form of extraterritoriality that protects it from the reach of political power.

The Most Extensive and Least Complete Society: A Planetary Society

The distinction between the three types of society is related to considerations of scale. It appears as though there are thresholds that the operational mode of the family or the city prevents them from surpassing. The emergence of monotheism, for its part, has made evident the universalizing tendency of religious society. However, it is not the only force aiming to expand across the planet, and a useful way to understand the specificity of this new form of social life is to compare it with other similar attempts, especially since they seem to have been more successful.

One can first contrast it with empires. Trying to differentiate the Church and the State based on their respective extensions would overlook the spontaneous tendency of states to expand indefinitely. The answer has already been outlined above: the existence of empires is contrary to the nature of political bonds. Domination without tyranny requires a close relationship between rulers and the governed, which imposes size constraints. If such a tendency exists, it falls under the very abuses of power that religious society is intended to combat.

While conceding to Comte the necessity of both limiting the size of nation-states and creating supranational entities, one might still criticize him for being mistaken about the direction in which this expansion should occur. It is evident that social ties extend far beyond political bonds, but they are found more in the economic sphere than in religion. Comte’s alleged failure to recognize the specificity and autonomy of the economic sphere would have led him to miss the fact that supranational integration has occurred through the global market rather than through religious society.

This criticism, however, is based on a double misunderstanding. Firstly, just because Comte does not explicitly mention the global market does not mean he was unaware of its existence. As a disciple of Saint-Simon, he understood the significance of industrial development so well that he incorporated it into his law of three stages, which has both spiritual and temporal versions: the first stage is both theological and military, while the final one is positive and industrial. The contrast between military and industrial societies, which runs through his work, applies here as well.

All cities were naturally rivals in the military age, either striving for unique domination or separately resisting forced incorporation. In contrast, the industrial state makes them spontaneously converge, assigning each a goal that can become universal because it remains external. The common exploitation of the earth entails, among the various republics, a division of tasks equivalent to that which coordinates the different classes within each people. This recognition highlights that peaceful activity leads spontaneously to universal association, the only source of its systematization, whereas military expansion allowed only civic society.

Thus, there is a link between the advent of religious and industrial society; however, to object to Comte’s view that the economy can unify the planet is to misunderstand his point. It is simply not in this direction that we should look for answers to the problems calling for the creation of religious society. On the contrary, to reverse a famous phrase, the market is not the solution, but the problem. The constitutive phenomenon of political society is none other than the division of labor, and the need for social regulation, therefore, applies to economic life.

The Intellectual Nature of Religious Bonds

Explaining what is meant by completeness would require an exposition of Comte’s second philosophy, which might bore the reader. It suffices to note that this term refers to an omnipresent set of tripartite divisions in his writings: family, city, and church are founded, respectively, on affectivity (the heart), activity (the character), and intelligence (the mind); similarly, the motto “order and progress” gives way to “love as a principle, order as a foundation, and progress as an aim.” No idea is more constant in Comte’s thought than the weakness of our intelligence, which is doubly subordinate to activity and affectivity. As he puts it, “one grows weary of thinking, one even grows weary of acting, but one never tires of loving.”

However, the fact that intelligence is the least energetic of our faculties does not mean it has no role to play. Presenting religious society as the least complete is thus a way of emphasizing its primarily intellectual character: the church is a community of believers, defined by its creed. Unlike conventional approaches that focus on the irrational basis of religion, the faith that will unite believers in this vision is a positive faith. The dogmas of the new religion are merely a restatement of the key findings of science, which guarantees the universal reach of religious society: every rational person should assent to them.

This intellectual nature allows religious society to fulfill its functions. Its role as a spiritual guide follows directly from it; the other functions—curbing abuses of power and legitimizing its use—are complementary. Since temporal power ultimately rests on force, it is perpetually at risk of being overthrown by force. Hence, it needs voluntary assent, which a scientifically grounded spiritual order can provide. This is particularly true in economic life, where market mechanisms, governed by blind forces, require completion through freely consented association."

(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278619359_Societe_politique_et_societe_religieuse)