Context

Jack Qiu:

“The following discussion demonstrates that within classic Chinese philosophy there are divergent civilizational roots opposing Confucianism; that new critical thinking and radical praxis can germinate from these roots unconstrained by paternalism or authoritarianism. Foremost among these implications is the capacity of alternative Chinese paradigms like Mohism to illuminate pathways towards digital futures that are more egalitarian, peaceful, and sustainable — an antidote to digital capitalism as well as actually existing socialism. Chinese rulers and intelligentsia have consigned Mohism to oblivion for more than two millennia, making it arguably the most subjugated among Chinese philosophies. Yet, the naming of the Micius satellite makes one wonder: Are these quantum scientists attempting to edify us in the ongoing debate about “the China model”, within the realm of digital media and communication scholarship?”

Discussion

Henry Tam:

Confucius "was not the only moral teacher to have a lasting impact on China, and his ideas did not go unchallenged. For a start, we should take a closer look at Mo Tze (c. 479-399 BC), who studied under Confucian scholars but came to the conclusion that their philosophy was fundamentally flawed. People – and for him, that term denoted the general population, not the privileged few – did not have a better life when they meekly carried out the roles laid down by the powerful: the ruler over the ruled, husbands over wives, fathers over children, masters over servants. On the contrary, lives improved only in so far as people genuinely cared for others as they would wish others to care for them. He explained that, for example, if we wanted other people to help look out for our parents or children when our abilities to do so were limited by circumstances beyond our control, we needed to be ready to offer our support to other people’s parents and children.

Mo Tze’s doctrine of Universal Love was not an idealistic entreaty to give the same care and attention to everyone when no one could afford to stretch one’s time and resources in such a manner, but a pragmatic proposal to promote social solidarity so that together people could be confident of attaining a decent quality of life which would be denied to many if they were left to struggle on their own.

Unlike Confucius who looked exclusively to ancient aristocratic texts he favoured to justify his ideas, Mo Tze maintained that any policy proposition should be subject to three tests. First came the test of past experience. He found that many of the proposals on elaborate rituals championed by the Confucians were not in fact always valued. For example, the people of the earlier age of Hsia recorded favourable accounts of much simpler rites which allowed people to show respect without having to use up scarce resources, especially amongst the poor, on showy ceremony. The second test consisted of current testimony. What people said, regardless of their social background, should be considered in deciding if any proposal was beneficial or not overall. To allow someone to declare any policy or custom as indisputable solely on account of their status would distort the truth. Finally, the third test built in checks from future experience. Even if past records and current testimony suggested that a particular policy or practice would deliver improvements for people, it still would not rule it out from being changed if its impact in the future should prove to be negative. For Mo Tze, policies must be adaptable in the light of their actual consequences.

Within a single generation, Mo Tze’s school had become the main rival to the Confucians. Mohist adherents travelled extensively in China to spread their reform message. The Confucians detested them for suggesting the needs of all should be responded to with equal respect, instead of bowing down to the hierarchical establishment. Leaders of competing states found much to irritate them in the Mohist practice of providing armed protection where necessary to defend the weak from attempted invasions by the strong.

In time, Mo Tze was acknowledged even by his Confucian critics as someone who was honourably dedicated to pursuing the goal of a better life for all. They admired his courage in standing up to princes and their armies, and recognised the potency of his arguments – even if they ultimately disagreed with them. Mo Tze’s teachings have remained alongside Confucianism in Chinese intellectual and political history. Dissuading people from wasting resources so that none would be deprived. Reining in the powerful so the weak would not be at their mercy. Exposing the selfish so that real cooperation could be promoted for the common good. These are Mohist motifs which have been weaved into China’s heritage. To understand China, you need to appreciate Mo Tze’s place in it."

(http://henry-tam.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/in-praise-of-mo-tze.html)

The Ideas of Mohism

Mozi’s thought

Impartial Concern

Jack Qui:

“Mozi’s foundational idea is jian’ai, often translated into “universal love” (Mei, 1927; Watson, 1963) or “mutual love” (Johnson, 2010). Some, however, thought these translations are too literal and limiting. Graham (1989, pp. 41-42) contends that the connotation of jian is more about impartiality than universality or mutuality; and that the Mohist ai is not about emotional feelings, neither in the sense of “love God” nor “love his brother”. It means, more precisely, “concern for everyone”. Karyn Lai on the other hand suggests using the phrase “impartial concern” (2016, p. 79), which is a better contextualized interpretation given the emphasis of The Mozi on a single ethical standard applied to all.

What is “impartial concern” or “mutual love”? Why is it necessary? In explaining this primary concept, Mozi starts from the situation when jian’ai is absent: “A robber loves himself but not others. Therefore, he robs others in order to benefit himself…… Feudal lords each love their own state but do not love other states. Therefore, they attack other states in order to benefit their own states. Disorder in the world is entirely this and nothing else. If we examine this, from what source does it arise? In all cases it is due to lack of mutual love”. “So, if there is universal mutual love in the world, then there is order [whereas], if there is exchange of mutual hatred, then there is disorder” (Johnson, 2010, pp. 133, 135). Note the initial premise of Mozi’s argument is “disorder in the world”, under which circumstances selfish lords attack others like robbers pilfer. Mohism is not alone with this reality check. Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and most other schools at the time recognize the turmoil. Like Mohism, they share two more assumptions: “that, at certain periods in the past, enlightened rulers had appeared in China to order the nation and raise Chinese society to a level of peace, prosperity, and moral vigor unparalleled in later days” and that “it is still possible to discover…… how these rulers had acted and why — that is, to determine ‘the way of the ancient sage kings’ — and to attempt to put it into practice in the present day” (Watson, 1963, p. 4).”

(draft)

Mozi's view on 'Impartial Concern'

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"Whether “Heaven’s will” or “good consequences for the world” forms the ultimate criterion of the morally right, the most salient first-order ethical injunction in Mohist doctrine remains that of “impartial concern” (jian’ai). This is an injunction that is argued for both on the basis that it exemplifies Heaven’s Will (in the “Heaven’s Will” triad) and that it is conducive to the order and welfare of the world (in the “Impartial Concern” triad). In addition, the presentation of the doctrine (in all versions of “Impartial Concern”) strongly suggests that it is meant to be the panacea for all that is seriously wrong with the world and, to that extent, identifies the main substance of the Mohists’ Way.

As earlier indicated, “impartial concern” might be stated as the injunction that people ought to be concerned for the welfare of others without making distinctions between self and others, associates and strangers. Scrutiny of the core chapters, however, suggests both more and less stringent interpretations of what it entails by way of conduct. At one extreme, the injunction seems to require that people ought (to seek) to benefit strangers as much as they do associates, and others, as much as they do themselves. At the other extreme, it only requires that people refrain from harming strangers as much as they do associates, and others, as much as they do themselves. A third, intermediate possibility says that people ought (to seek) to help strangers with urgent needs as much as they do associates, and others, as much as they do themselves.

The least stringent interpretation is implied by passages (in all versions of “Impartial Concern”) where the injunction is argued for on the basis that adopting it will put a stop to the violent inter-personal and inter-group conflicts that beset the world, since on the Mohist account, it is people’s tendency to act on the basis of a greater regard for their own welfare over that of others, and that of their associates over that of strangers, that led them to have no qualms about benefiting themselves or their own associates at the expense of others and even to do so using violent means. The injunction of “impartial concern” is meant to be a reversal of this tendency. On the other hand, the more demanding interpretations are suggested especially by “Impartial Concern C,” in which it is said that if the doctrine is adopted b people, then not only will people not fight, the welfare of the weak and disadvantaged will be taken care of by those better endowed.

Whichever interpretation is taken, the basic injunction points toward an underlying notion of impartiality. We can take “impartial concern” as making explicit the notion that the common benefit of the world is, in some sense, impartially the benefit of everyone.

In “Impartial Concern” C, the Mohists put forward an interesting thought experiment ostensibly to show that even people who are committed to being more concerned for the welfare of self that for that of others, and associates than strangers have some reason to value impartial concern. They described a scenario in which the audience is asked to imagine that they are about to go on a long journey and need to put their family members in the care of another. The Mohists claim that the obvious and rational choice would be to put one’s family members in the care of an impartialist rather than a partialist (that is, someone who is committed to “impartial concern” as opposed to someone who is committed to the opposite).

There are several problems with this argument. It seems to involve a false dilemma since the options of impartialist and partialist hardly exhaust the range of possible choices. Even if the Mohists were correct to claim that the impartialist is the obvious and rational choice, all it shows is that partialists have good reason to prefer that other people conduct themselves according to the dictates of impartial concern, rather than that they have reason to so conduct themselves, as Chad Hansen and Bryan W. Van Norden have pointed out. In defense of the Mohists, however, it might be the case that they are ultimately only concerned to establish that even partialists have reason to propagate the Mohists’ doctrine of impartial concern, a conclusion that could follow from their argument."

(https://iep.utm.edu/mozi/)

Feigong: Against Aggression

Jack Qiu:

“The worst manifestation of partiality, according to Mozi, is warfare. Books 17-19 of The Mozi are dedicated to laying out the rationale for feigong, i.e. “against aggression”. Other books in the collection elaborate how this cardinal doctrine of Mohism is carried out through Mozi’s personal conduct and extensive engineering and communication techniques (e.g., Books 52-71). These techniques, including how to coordinate through the use of flags, drums, and passwords, were likely accumulated from hands-on experiences in military defence.

Mozi’s logic is again utilitarian (Johnson, 2010, p. 169): “The killing of one person is spoken of as unrighteous and certainly constitutes one capital offence. Reasoning on this basis, killing ten people is ten times as unrighteous, so certainly constitutes ten capital offences…… Now when something small is a crime, people know and condemn it. When something great is a crime, like attacking states, then they don’t know and condemn [it], but go along with it and praise it.” Mozi enumerates the costs of war: casualties, injuries, livelihoods, material loss of all kinds. He then compares these with the supposed gains: territory, wealth, jobs, added fame for rulers. He concludes, “states start wars, depriving the people of their livelihood and stripping the people of benefit, all to a very great degree” (ibid, p. 173). “The world is,” as a result, “wearied by prolonged attack and reduction like a young boy playing at being a horse” (ibid, p. 195).

It is imperative to fight against military aggressions, Mozi reckons. Another world is possible if there is an army of peacekeepers. “If attack and reduction were replaced by good order in our state, the efficacy would certainly be multiplied. If we calculated the cost involved in raising an army to protect against the evils of the feudal lords, then [we could see that we] would certainly be able to obtain substantial benefit (from avoidance of warfare)” (ibid, p. 197). Finally, “it would be possible to have no enemies in the world. This would be of incalculable benefit to the world” (ibid).

Book 50 of The Mozi (ibid, pp. 724-729) best illustrates Mohism’s pacifist praxis, backed by some of the most advanced defensive technology of the time. “

Jieyong: Moderation in Use

Jack Qiu:

“Books 20-22 of The Mozi are entitled Jieyong, 1-3 (Moderation in Use, I-III). Unfortunately, the last of them, Jieyong 3, is lost; only the first two are preserved. Ideas about moderation in use, however, can be found throughout The Mozi, for instance, in Books 23-25 Moderation in Funerals and Books 32-34 Condemning Music. By “moderation in use”, Mozi means “[d]oing away with useless expenditure” (Johnson, 2010, p. 203). This simple definition would surprisingly shed light on today’s digital industries in the era of the Anthropocene.

In arguing for moderate expenditures that deliver use value without waste, Mozi refers frequently to the moral authority of past kings. Book 20 begins as such: “When a sage governs a single state, that one state’s [benefits] can be doubled. On a larger scale, when [a sage] governs the world, the world’s [benefits] can be doubled. His doubling [of benefits] does not come through acquiring land beyond the borders, but by doing away with useless expenditure in his own state…… the use of resources is without waste, the people are not over-burdened, and the increase in benefit is considerable” (Johnson, 2010, p. 199). This general principle is then applied to the supply of clothing, housing, transportation vehicles, and defensive weaponry. Then, in Book 21, the argument starts again with past kings: “the sage kings of ancient times……said: ‘Through the world all the many artisans — wheelwrights and car makers, tanners and salters, potters and metal workers, and carpenters — should each do the work they are capable of.’ They [also] said: ‘Everywhere they should provide enough for the people’s use and then stop.’ Anything over and above this is wasteful and does not add to the benefit of the people so the sage kings did not do it.” Ditto for food and drink: “[Provide] enough to fill what is empty and to aid the spirit, to give strength to the legs and arms, to make the ears and eyes sharp and keen, and then stop. Do not go to great lengths to blend the five flavors or to harmize the various aromas and do not look to distant lands for things that are rare, strange and different.” (ibid, p. 205). These warnings against overproduction and excessive accumulation ring a bell nowadays: Do consumers really need a new smart phone every year? How much wealth is enough for Big Tech billionaires? At a time when malnutrition in the Global South remains widespread?

A goal for Mohist “moderation in use” is the doubling of population, a human-centric view, limited to its time-space as China was sparsely populated back then. Yet, as discussed earlier, such a view concerns future generations as much as it concerns past and present people. This rudimentary idea about sustainable development serves as a basis for Mozi’s contentions against wasteful practices, for instance, in funerals and music-making, which the contemporary reader would find eccentric.”

Mohism

Contents

Context

Discussion

The Ideas of Mohism

Impartial Concern

Mozi's view on 'Impartial Concern'

Feigong: Against Aggression

Jieyong: Moderation in Use

More information

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