Hegemonic Destabilization Theory
* Article: Pieterse, Jan Nederveen (2003) "The trouble with hegemony: hegemonic destabilization theory," Asian Review: Vol. 16: No. 1, Article 4. DOI: 10.58837/CHULA.ARV.16.1.3
Available at: https://digital.car.chula.ac.th/arv/vol16/iss1/4
Abstract
"This paper revisits [[Hegemonic Stability Theory to examine whether hegemony, in terms of its major justifications, applies to the United States in the present period. The paper finds that over time, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the role of the United States has increasingly changed from hegemonic stabilization to destabilization. While hegemonic destabilization such as the unleashing of finance capital and military preparedness out of proportion to existing threats, has been noticeable since the Reagan period, recent American policies of aggressive unilateralism and deficit spending have been increasingly destabilizing. This holds implications for how we understand hegemony: should we replace hegemonic stability theory with a theory of hegemonic destabilization? If hegemonic stability made for a "relatively open and stable" global economy, what kind of world does hegemonic destabilization create? This raises the question of hegemonic transition and the configurations emerging as hegemony unravels."
Excerpt
Jan Niederveen Pieterse:
"International hegemony carries several meanings. One definition of hegemony is a state exercising unrivaled leadership in economic, financial, political, and military spheres. Thus Wallerstein defines hegemony as a situation where "one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, and even cultural arenas" (Wallerstein, 1984: 38). The three instances in recent history when according to Wallerstein all these overlapped were the United Provinces (1620-70), the British Empire (1820-50), and the United States (1948-71). A definition from the viewpoint of international relations holds that hegemony means the control by a state over the foreign policy but not the domestic policy of another political entity, in contrast to empire which means control over domestic policy as well (Doyle, 1986). A further dimension of hegemony is legitimacy. Robert Cox (1991) and others have extended Gramsci's idea of hegemony as moral leadership to the international domain. Hegemony in this sense exists "when the hegemonic state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent" (Cox, quoted in Cohn, 1999: 440).
An influential notion is hegemonic stability theory, formulated by Keohane (1980) following Charles Kindleberger (1973); this holds that "a relatively open and stable international economic system is most likely to exist when there is a hegemonic state with two characteristics: it has a sufficiently large share of resources that it is able to provide leadership, and it is willing to pursue policies necessary to create and maintain a liberal economic order" (Cohn, 1999: 439). Hegemonic stability theory has long been in dispute. One consideration is that the hegemon's actual behavior may range from benevolent to exploitative or coercive (Cohn, 1999: 439). There are more fundamental problems as well. What does it mean to say that the global economy has been "relatively open and stable" if hegemonic stability has come with a growing North-South inequality gap (clearly so since the 1980s)? Relative openness may hold true from the viewpoint of the interlinked economies of the North but for the global South hegemonic stability has meant structural adjustment under the auspices of the Washington consensus. The agricultural subsidies in the North (presently at $ 1 billion per day) don't add up to openness. Hegemonic stability theory privileges the global economy and upholds the fiction that economics and politics are separate domains, or more precisely, it reduces the effects of power to benign, stabilizing effects. Hegemonic stability theory involves several components: hegemonic capacity, intent (benevolent), and impact (stability). Since the United States is not a unitary formation there is no single or homogeneous intent. Without capacity, intent will not deliver and impact will not materialize. Intent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for hegemonic stability to materialize, which also involves other parties than the United States.
Hegemonic stability theory is per definition a top -down perspective.
The world's underprivileged have little store in stability and their proposals for reform, such as a new international economic order, have come to naught; indeed, what prevails is a hegemonic stability. Hegemonic compromise would be a more straightforward and less candy-colored terminology (cf. Nederveen Pieterse, 2001). Along the lines of hegemonic compromise, European Union countries and Japan grosso modo accept American policies in the context of the G8, OECD, WTO, and IMF because they share overall benefits, such as concessions on trade and agricultural policies in the case of the EU, find shelter under the US military umbrella, and benefit from American economic growth. This doesn't rule out disputes but the differences are not large enough to upset the applecart.
For all its bias, hegemonic stability theory seemed to describe a postwar constellation in which developing countries were kept from exit through the financial discipline of the IMF and which seemed to hold sufficient promise, or insufficient frustration, as long as assorted promises of reform provided a silver lining, such as the WTO Doha round (which promises to cut back agricultural subsidies in the North) and the Road Map to peace in the Middle East. Yet somehow the promises of reform never quite seem to materialize, as if they primarily serve as decorative elements to cheer up the status quo. Besides over time the cracks in hegemonic stability have been widening. What of hegemonic stability in view of recurrent crises (Tequila, Asian, Russian, Turkish, and Latin American crises, Argentina, Brazil), American withdrawal from international treaties, and enduring stalemate in the Middle East? What of hegemonic stability in view of the American doctrine of preventive war? Is the United States still a "benign hegemon" and is this still an era of hegemonic stability?
Here I review the components of hegemonic stability theory to examine whether they apply to the United States in the present period. This is worth examining because it means scrutinizing hegemony in terms of its major justification: its stabilizing effect. I find that
over time,vparticularly since the end of the Cold War, the role of the United States has increasingly changed from hegemonic stabilization to destabilization.
Elements of hegemonic destabilization have been noticeable since the Reagan period, such as the unleashing of finance capital and military preparedness out of proportion to existing threats, but the Bush II administration's aggressive unilateralism, deficit financing, and growing current account deficit are increasingly destabilizing.
This holds implications for how we understand hegemony. Should we replace the theory of the benign hegemon with that of the malign hegemon? Should we replace hegemonic stability theory with a theory of hegemonic destabilization? And if hegemonic stability made for a "relatively open and stable" international economy, what kind of world does hegemonic destabilization create? This leads to a third question: that of hegemonic transition and the configurations emerging after hegemony.
Are we entering a new phase of hegemonic rivalry? What kinds of realignments are now taking shape? "