Conspiracy Theory
Typology
Peter Limberger:
“In “Of Conspiracy Theories” (1999), philosopher Brian Keely defines conspiracy theory as: A proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons, the conspirators acting in secret.
He makes the following distinction:
• Warranted Conspiracy Theories: have credible evidence, display epistemic openness (beliefs are open to change), and are scope-limited, meaning they guard against conspiratorial scope creep (the idea that everything is part of the conspiracy).
• Unwarranted Conspiracy Theories: lack credible evidence, exhibit epistemic closeness (being guarded against all refutation), and show ever-expanding skepticism that undermines trust in all truth-validating institutions. Keely sees conspiracy theories as existing on a spectrum, with one’s epistemic stance determining where a theory is situated.”
(https://lessfoolish.substack.com/p/conspiracy-theory-vs-coincidence? )
Scope Taxonomy
Peter Limberger:
“In A Culture of Conspiracy (2003), political scientist Michael Barkun offers the following taxonomy based on the scope creep Keely referred to:
• Event Conspiracies: These explain well-defined events, such as the assassination of JFK, 9/11, or the moon landing.
• Systemic Conspiracies: These involve deep conspiracies in which a cabal infiltrates existing institutions for its own ends, such as ZOG, the Deep State, or Big Pharma.
• Superconspiracies: These weave multiple plots into a full-spectrum domination narrative driven by an ultimate evil force, such as the Jews, Reptilian Overlords, or the demiurge.”
(https://lessfoolish.substack.com/p/conspiracy-theory-vs-coincidence? )
Institutional Knowledge vs Stigmatized Knowledge
Peter Limberger:
“Another helpful distinction from Barkun is between “stigmatized knowledge” and institutional knowledge.
The former refers to knowledge claims not accepted by institutions traditionally relied upon for truth validation (for example, universities). This category includes most conspiracy narratives and all forms of “woo,” such as alternative medicine, parapsychology, and ufology.”
(https://lessfoolish.substack.com/p/conspiracy-theory-vs-coincidence? )
Motive Taxonomy
Peter Limberger:
“In their paper “The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories” (2017), psychologists Karen Douglas, Robbie Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichocka identify three psychological motives that explain why people believe in conspiracy theories:
1. Epistemic motive: The need for certainty in uncertain or complex situations.
2. Existential motive: The need for safety and a sense of control when feeling powerless.
3. Social motive: The need to belong within a group that shares similar beliefs. According to the authors, all of these motives offer a sense of stability in a world that feels increasingly unstable.”
(https://lessfoolish.substack.com/p/conspiracy-theory-vs-coincidence? )
Theories about Causal Factors
Peter Limberger:
“There are a range of theories that expand upon the above taxonomies and seek to explain why people engage in conspiratorial thinking.
They include:
• Conspiracy Society (Popper, 1945): The tendency to falsely attribute intentional conspiracies to major social events rather than recognizing the unintended consequences that arise from the complexity of human behaviour and social systems. • Paranoid Style (Hofstadter, 1964): A recurring mode of political thinking that emerges during periods of social upheaval and status anxiety, characterized by totalizing suspicion and apocalyptic overtones. • Social Contagion (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009): The spread of “informational cascades” through closed epistemic networks (“echo chambers”) is based not on solid evidence, but on social trust. • Cognitive Biases (Brotherton, 2015): Cognitive biases such as agency detection (assuming intent where there is none) and proportionality bias (assuming that large events must have “large causes”) evolved to help humans navigate complexity. • Secular Theodicy (Lepselter, 2016): In a secular and disenchanted world, modern myths, such as conspiracy narratives, serve to provide meaning amid collective suffering or social disenfranchisement. • Epistemic Pathologies (Cassam, 2019): A breakdown in how people evaluate knowledge leads to epistemic pathologies that are exploited by “conspiracy entrepreneurs” who capitalize on these vulnerabilities. • The Conspiracy Money Machine (Imperati, 2023): A lucrative online industry has emerged in which conspiratorial beliefs are monetized and perpetuated.”
Discussion
Why the Academic Coincidence Theory is Wrong
Peter Limberger:
“I see the problems with the academic theories above as threefold:
1. The presupposition that conspiracy theories are wrong.
2. The weaponization of the phrase “conspiracy theory.”
3. The implication that those who believe in conspiracies are inherently ignorant.
Many of the works mentioned above are presented with the underlying presupposition that conspiracy theories are false. Furthermore, their adherents are often portrayed as being motivated by something other than sound psychology or epistemology. This risks committing the appeal-to-motive fallacy: assuming that if someone’s motives are corrupt or misguided, their truth claims must also be false, which, of course, is not necessarily the case.
Hence, the academics flirt with being doubly wrong: first, in assuming that conspiracy theories possess an a priori falsity, and second, in committing the fallacy of assuming that people who operate with unconscious motives must therefore hold false beliefs. In addition, they offer no perspective on the unfair weaponization of the phrase “conspiracy theory,” which occurs frequently today and was on full display during the COVID moment.
For example, if someone in good faith questioned any official narrative position on:
• Lockdowns • Mask efficacy • School closures • Lab leak origins • Natural immunity • Erosion of civil liberties • Pharmaceutical profit motives • Vaccine efficacy and side effects
They were either labeled conspiracy theorists or censored outright. In hindsight, two and a half years after the end of the pandemic, many of these questions now seem reasonable to those who once thought them unreasonable. Yet during the COVID moment, stigmatization and censorial overreach were directed at anyone who held such views, leading to the conspiratorial blowback we see today.”
(https://lessfoolish.substack.com/p/conspiracy-theory-vs-coincidence? )
Beware of ‘Protective Conspiracy Framing’
Peter Limberger:
“Psychologist Nicolas Vermeulen is changing this and offers an important insight with his Protective Conspiracy Framing. In his recent paper “Seeing conspiracy theorists everywhere as a conspiracy paradox” (2025), Vermeulen argues that believing false conspiracies (a Type 1 error) is well studied in academia, whereas the opposite error, dismissing all conspiracies (a Type 2 error), remains largely understudied.
Yet, possibly in response to the proliferation of Type 1 conspiracy theories, another epistemic error exists, using similar processes but operating in the opposite direction: a reflex to dismiss and to label uncomfortable or deviant ideas or hypotheses as conspiracy theories, even in the absence of clear evidence of irrationality or mistake. I call this Protective Conspiracy Framing or Type 2 conspiracy. Protective Conspiracy Framing aligns with Type 2 errors: rejecting untested or unfalsified hypotheses. Protective Conspiracy Framing can be understood as a cognitive and rhetorical overreaction, where labelling an argument as a “conspiracy theory” may function as a social signal, potentially serving to uphold dominant norms, ideological orthodoxy, or institutional trust. The coincidence theorist wants to maintain the epistemic status quo, partly for status reasons. In other words, they seek to preserve their position within a prestige hierarchy and avoid considering dissenting views that are coded as low status. They are not truth seekers but status seekers. Or, more charitably said, their pursuit of status narrows the truth they can seek. Additionally, maintaining the status quo supports their psychological safety, since accepting one conspiracy as true can lead to accepting others. This risks further social ostracism or a cascade into seeming insanity if proper epistemic care is not taken. The conspiracy theorist commits Type 1 errors, and the coincidence theorist commits Type 2 errors. Both are fools, epistemically blind in their own way, and in need of one another.”
(https://lessfoolish.substack.com/p/conspiracy-theory-vs-coincidence? )
Conspiracy and Power
Peter Limberger:
“t power is misunderstood, and both types of theorists help maintain the power status quo. Conspiracy theorists display a form of theoretical impotence that reaffirms existing power structures by neutralizing their own agency. Even when they identify centers of power, they do so in a fatalistic way: the distant elites are so powerful, well resourced, and organized that they can orchestrate highly elaborate plots. In light of this, no genuine expressions of agency are made, because resistance is felt to be futile.
This relates to what author Jasun Horsley calls the “Second Matrix.” The conspiracy theorist escapes the “First Matrix,” the official narratives that produce power blindness, yet constructs another system of ideas, the Second Matrix, that provides a sense of superior understanding while leading to a kind of agentic paralysis.
Moreover, the dumbing down of conspiracy theories by the “conspiracy entrepreneurs” (Cassam) within the “conspiracy money machine” (Imperati) undermines their credibility among those who remain stuck within the First Matrix, as Horsley argues:
- This has to do with the different standards and values of 1st vs 2nd Matrix. The 1st Matrix (the official, mainstream reality construct) is designed to hide the truth of these things. The 2nd Matrix (alternate, marginal reality construct) is designed to over-simplify, streamline, and propagate the truth of these things, in a way that lacks basic credibility within a 1st Matrix framework. In turn, coincidence theorists play their part by reacting against conspiracy theorists and maintaining the epistemic status quo. In doing so, they inadvertently preserve the power status quo, ensuring that dissent is delegitimized and the very power structures being questioned remain hidden.
Both types of theorists are engaged in an implicit, unconscious dance that conceals and maintains power. Yet with a proper understanding of both, we have a chance to move beyond their limitations and grasp where real power is actually held.
To restate my earlier claim:
Conspiracy theories are true in spirit but often wrong in theory.
In other words, conspiracy theorists correctly intuit that a status–power gap exists, but they move too quickly to fill that gap with speculative theories. Despite their flaws, they attempt to close the gap and may even point toward the true locations of power. Given enough time, they sometimes turn out to be right.”
(https://lessfoolish.substack.com/p/conspiracy-theory-vs-coincidence? )