Nondominium

= Nondominium – reflects the fact that no country or combination of countries has the power of dominant control over the relevant territory and resources.

Definition

Chris Cook:

the consensual legal framework agreement within which value may be created, shared and exchanged (P2P) on credit terms by reference to a unit of account (note that a unit of account is NOT a currency).

Description

Chris Cook:

"Many indigenous peoples, such as American Indians and Australian Aborigines, find it impossible to understand how anyone can own land. Whereas, most religious traditions - including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism - were all founded upon a belief that absolute ownership, particularly of land, is God's alone, and that a tribute should be paid accordingly, such as a tithe.

I believe that an apt term to describe this proposal's essentially Gandhian approach to the property relationship is as a Nondominium - and my instinct is that such a framework could revolutionize international economic relations." (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/MI24Dj01.html)

Discussion

Valnora Leister and Mark Frazier:

"A new legal framework – Nondominium – offers an approach for sharing revenues from resource development in arenas beyond the effective actual (or de jure) control of national jurisdictions. Building upon ideas advanced by Chris Cook, a fellow of the Institute for Security and Resilience Studies at the University College of London, the new framework focuses on veto rights – rather than recognized ownership claims – to ensure development of common pool resources (or resources with conflicting national ownership) on a basis of mutual benefit. The nondominium approach may have special applicability as a framework for developing space and ocean sea-bed resources to benefit humanity in the near and far future.

Under a nondominium framework for economic development of CHM resources, each country interested in receiving benefits could appoint a representative to an association of beneficiaries.

A trustee (custodian) for the CHM would be elected by the representatives to oversee the legal operation of a collective entity. The representatives would also appoint a Manager, for a parallel partnership venture, to identify opportunities to develop the common pool resource in accord with a transparent revenue-sharing formula. Each representative would have power to exercise a veto with regard to the resource development proposal(s) circulated by the manager.

Once an agreed formula (non-vetoed by the countries) emerged for recognizing needed inputs, and for overall revenue-sharing, the manager of the nondominium partnership would arrange open tenders to seek economic partners to maximize the value of the common pool resources.

These tenders would be neutral with regard to the nationality or domicile of service providers and investment partners. Revenues from ensuing activities would be distributed to the association members on the originally-agreed basis. Oversight of compliance would rest with the nondominium’s trustee, who could apply Ostrom’s key principles of successful collective choice agreements and monitoring by independent auditors.

The nondominium framework, in these ways, would conform with the requirements of international law that no country or combination of countries has the power of dominant control over relevant common pool resources.

It seems particularly suited for easing disputes in highly polarized or contentious settings.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, for example, conflicting claims have arisen among what are now five Caspian-littoral nations (including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). The Nondominium framework as originally advanced by Cook envisions that the littoral Caspian nations “should form a Caspian Foundation legal entity, and commit to that entity all existing rights in respect of the use, and the fruits of use (usufruct) of the Caspian Sea, and everything on it, in it or under it. The Caspian Foundation would act as custodian or steward and the Caspian nations would have agreed governance rights of veto.”

As Cook has noted, “the proposed negative or passive veto right of stewardship differs fundamentally from conventional property rights of absolute ownership and temporary use under Condominium. Moreover, it does not confer the active power of control held under common law by a Trustee on behalf of beneficiaries, and the legal complexities and management conflicts which accompany that status.”

In parallel with the Foundation’s custodial role, a Caspian Partnership framework agreement would be established by the member countries to maximize the value of developing the resources. It would “simply be an associative framework agreement within which Caspian nations self-organize to the common purpose of the sustainable development of the Caspian Sea,” Cook’s has stated. “The Caspian Partnership agreement would comprise a master framework agreement within which a myriad of associative agreements between the Caspian littoral nations individually or severally would be registered.”

A similar transnational opportunity for application of the nondominium framework exists in the Sudan, with regard to disputed oil reserves between the original country of Sudan and the new breakaway nation of South Sudan. There, a nondominium framework would sidestep the question of ownership of disputed oil resources, in favor of a balanced (i.e. non-vetoed by either side) revenue-sharing system within which private sector investors and partners could then operate. This legal innovation for development of common pool resources could encourage Ostrom’s user association-based systems of economic governance to more rapidly advance in outer space, the oceans, and other Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) areas." (http://www.lund2012.earthsystemgovernance.org/LC2012-paper94.pdf)

More Information

• https://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/resilience/2012/01/09/a-stock-answer/
• Essay: Using Nondominion to Evolve from Local to Global Commons‎‎