Open Source Warfare

Definition

"Open source warfare, like what we see in Iraq and increasingly in other locations, relies on networks of peers rather than the hierarchies of command and control we see in conventional militaries. This structure provides an open source movement with levels of innovation and resilience that rigid hierarchies can't match. Unfortunately, these attributes are likely not constrained to merely local tactical activity. Open source movements can exhibit emergent intelligence that guides the movement's collective actions towards strategic goals." (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/02/emergent_intell.html)

Characteristics

John Robb

Global Guerillas on how Open Source Warfare takes on a "Bazaar" format:

The decentralized, and seemingly chaotic guerrilla war in Iraq demonstrates a pattern that will likely serve as a model for next generation terrorists. This pattern shows a level of learning, activity, and success similar to what we see in the open source software community. I call this pattern the bazaar. The bazaar solves the problem: how do small, potentially antagonistic networks combine to conduct war? Lessons from Eric Raymond's "The Cathedral and the Bazaar" provides a starting point for further analysis. Here are the factors that apply (from the perspective of the guerrillas):

• Release early and often. Try new forms of attacks against different types of targets early and often. Don’t wait for a perfect plan.

• Given a large enough pool of co-developers, any difficult problem will be seen as obvious by someone, and solved. Eventually some participant of the bazaar will find a way to disrupt a particularly difficult target. All you need to do is copy the process they used.

• Your co-developers (beta-testers) are your most valuable resource. The other guerrilla networks in the bazaar are your most valuable allies. They will innovate on your plans, swarm on weaknesses you identify, and protect you by creating system noise.

• Recognize good ideas from your co-developers. Simple attacks that have immediate and far-reaching impact should be adopted.

• Perfection is achieved when there is nothing left to take away (simplicity). The easier the attack is, the more easily it will be adopted. Complexity prevents swarming that both amplifies and protects.

• Tools are often used in unexpected ways. An attack method can often find reuse in unexpected ways."

(http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/09/bazaar_dynamics.html)

Sean Gourley

Via [1]:

1. Many body: There are many more autonomous insurgent groups operating within conflicts than we had previously thought. For example there are 100+ autonomous groups operating in Iraq (as of 2006).

2. Fluidity: The insurgents are loosely grouped together to form fluid networks with short half-lives. This is very different from the rigid hierarchical networks that have been proposed for insurgent groups.

3. Redundancy: If we remove the strongest group from the system another group will rise to replace the previous strongest group

4. Splinter: When a group is broken it does not generally split in half but instead shatters into multiple pieces

5. Redistribute: When a group is broken the components are redistributed amongst the other groups in the system. The redistribution is biased towards the most successful remaining groups.

6. Snowball: The strongest groups grow fastest

7. Tall poppy: The strongest groups are the predominant targets for opposition forces Internal competition: There is direct competition amongst insurgent groups for both resources and media exposure. They are competing with each other in addition to fighting the stronger counterinsurgent forces.

8. Independent co-ordination: Autonomous groups act in a coordinated fashion as a result of the competition that exists between them.

9. Emergent structure: Attacks in both Iraq and Colombia become 'less random' and more coordinated over time

10. Evolution: The strategies employed by the groups evolve over time where successful groups/strategies survive and unsuccessful strategies/groups are replaced.

11. High dimensional: Connection occurs over high dimensions (i.e. Internet, cell phone etc) and is not dominated by geographic connections.

12. Non-linear: It is approximately 316* times harder to kill 100 people in an attack than it is to kill 10 people. (*Results for a conflict with alpha=2.5).

13. Independent clones: the fundamental structure and dynamics of insurgent groups is largely independent of religious, political, ideological or geographic differences." (source: http://seangourley.com/2009/12/successful_insurgency/)

More Information

1. http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/opensource-warfare