Peer Governance

If peer to peer is the relational dynamic at play in distributed networks, and peer production the process whereby common use value is produced, then peer governance refers to the way peer production is managed.

See also the related concept of Panarchy

Description

Steve Weber on the Governance of Peer Production projects

Steve Weber:

"When I use the term "governance" in this discussion, I am using it in the way it is used in international relations. In that context "governance" is not government, it is typically not authoritative, and in fact it is not about governing in a traditional sense as much as it is about setting parameters for voluntary relationships among autonomous parties. Given that perspective, the central question becomes, How has the open source process used technology along with both new- and old-style institutions of governance to manage complexity among a geographically dispersed community not subject to hierarchical control?

More generally, there has been a dramatic shift in what it means to be a leader in a religious community. Change the foundations of property, and you change the network of relationships that radiate outward from that which is owned, in fundamental and unexpected ways.

I will come back to this point later when I discuss power and communities; but for the moment, recognize an interesting corollary. In nonauthoritative settings -- that is, in relationships primarily characterized as bargaining relationships -- power derives in large part from asymmetrical inter dependence. Put simply, the less dependent party to the relationship (the one who would be harmed least by a rupture) is the more powerful. In the kinds of modern religious communities I am talking about here, it is the leader who is dependent on the followers more than the other way around. This dependence changes the dynamics of power. Leaders of open source projects understand the consequences intuitively -- the primary route to failure for them is to be unresponsive to their followers. In Hirschman's terms, this is a community that empowers and positively legitimates exit while facilitating voice." (http://www.sauria.com/blog/2006/Jun/04)

Felix Stadler on the Meritocratic Leadership in Peer Production

= leadership/hierarchy in peer production is not egalitarian, but meritocratic

Felix Stadler:

"The openness in open source is often misunderstood as egalitarian collaboration. However, FOSS is primarily open in the sense that anyone can appropriate the results, and do with them whatever he or she wants (within the legal/normative framework set out by the license). This is what the commons, a shared resource, is about. Free appropriation. Not everyone can contribute. Everyone is free, indeed, to propose a contribution, but the people who run the project are equally free to reject the contribution outright. Open source projects, in their actual organization, are not egalitarian and not everyone is welcome. The core task of managing a commons is to ensure not just the production of resources, but also to prevent its degradation from the addition of low quality material.

Organizationally the key aspects of FOSS projects are that participation is voluntary and – what is often forgotten – that they are tightly structured. Intuitively, this might seem like a contradiction, but in practice it is not. Participation is voluntary in a double sense. On the one hand, people decide for themselves if they want to contribute. Tasks are never assigned, but people volunteer to take responsibility. On the other hand, if contributors are not happy with the project’s development, they can take all the project’s resources (mainly, the source code) and reorganize it differently. Nevertheless, all projects have a leader, or a small group of leaders, who determine the overall direction of the projects and which contributions from the community are included in the next version, and which are rejected. However, because of the doubly voluntary nature, the project leaders need to be very responsive to the community, otherwise the community can easily get rid of them (which is called ‘forking the project’). The leader has no other claim for his (and it seems to be always a man) position than to be of service to the community. Open Source theorist Eric S. Raymond has called this a benevolent dictatorship.[11] More accurately, it is called the result of a voluntary hierarchy in which authority flows from responsibility (rather than from the power to coerce).

Thus, the FOSS world is not a democracy, where everyone has a vote, but a meritocracy, where the proven experts – those who know better than others what they are doing and do it reliably and responsibly – run the show. The hierarchical nature of the organization directly mirrors this meritocracy. The very good programmers end up on top, the untalented ones either drop out voluntarily, or, if they get too distracting, are kicked out. Most often, this is not an acrimonious process, because in coding, it’s relatively easy to recognize expertise, for the reasons mentioned earlier. No fancy degrees are necessary. You can literally be a teenager in a small town in Norway and be recognized as a very talented programmer.[13] Often it’s a good strategy to let other people solve problems more quickly than one could oneself, since usually their definition of the problem and the solution is very similar to one’s own. Thus, accepting the hierarchical nature of such projects is easy. It is usually very transparent and explicit. The project leader is not just a recognized crack, but also has to lead the project in a way that keeps everyone reasonably happy. The hierarchy, voluntary as it may be, creates numerous mechanisms of organizational closure, which allows a project to remain focused and limits the noise/signal ratio of communication to a productive level.

Without an easy way to recognize expertise, it is very hard to build such voluntary hierarchies based on a transparent meritocracy, or other filters that increase focus and manage the balance between welcoming people who can really contribute and keeping out those who do not." (http://publication.nodel.org/On-the-Differences)

Characteristics of successfull collaborative projects

" characteristics of successful free software/open source communities:

• open and widespread membership based upon participation

• geographically distributed, asynchronous, networked collaboration

• project transparency, particularly open, recorded dialog and peer review of project materials,

• discussion and decisions

• a compelling foundational artifact to organize participation and build upon

• collaborative, iteratively clarified, living documents and project artifacts

• a mechanism for institutional history

• a community–wide sense of project ownership

• a hybrid political system based upon meritocracy

• a trusted benevolent dictator, typically the project founder

• foundational developers and early adopters who, along with the benevolent dictator, set project ethos

• consensus as a decision–making tool

• upholding the right to fork."

(http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue11_6/coffin/)

Discussion: Peer Governance in General

Bob Jessop on Governance and Meta-Governance

Bob Jessop uses the similar term of 'governance', but I believe we should distinguish peer governance as the management of bottom-up peer groups, from the extension towards multiple stakeholders of the governance of existing institutions. A further cause of confusion is that the general literature uses governance often in a generic way, often barely distinguishable from “government" but also in specific ways that have no relationship with peer governance such as in the case of ‘corporate governance’. It is therefore preferable to use “peer governance".

Bob Jessop clearly distinguishes governance, as peer governance, from the market and the state:

“Even on this minimal definition, governance can be distinguished from the ‘invisible hand’ of uncoordinated market exchange based on the formally rational pursuit of self-interest by isolated market agents; and from the ‘iron fist’ (perhaps in a ‘velvet glove’) of centralised, top-down imperative co-ordination in pursuit of substantive goals established from above … Political theorists now suggest that governance is an important means to overcome the division between rulers and ruled in representative regimes and to secure the input and commitment of an increasingly wide range of stakeholders in policy formulation and implementation. In this sense governance also has normative significance. It indicates a revaluation of different modes of co-ordination not just in terms of their economic efficiency or their effectiveness in collective goal attainment but also in terms of their associated values. Thus ‘governance’ has acquired positive connotations such as ‘middle way’, ‘consultation’, ‘negotiation’, ‘subsidiarity’, ‘reflexivity’, ‘dialogue’, etc., in contrast to the anarchy of the market or the state's ‘iron fist’." (http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/lnc/papers/JessopGovernance.htm)

More commentary by Bob Jessop:

- Generalized peer governance in the context of asymmetrical capital-labour relations, Jessop

“the apparent promise of symmetry in social partnership as a form of reflexive self-organisation may not be realized. For there are marked structural asymmetries in the capital-labour relation and in the forms of interdependence between the economic and the extra-economic conditions for accumulation." (http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/lnc/papers/JessopGovernance.htm)

- Failures of peer governance/state interrelationships, Jessop

“The second set of potential sources of governance failure concerns the contingent insertion of partnerships and other reflexive, self-organising arrangements into the more general state system – especially in terms of the relative primacy of different modes of co-ordination and access to institutional support and material resources to pursue reflexively-arrived at governance objectives. There are three key aspects of this second set of constraints. First, as both governance and government mechanisms exist on different scales (indeed one of their functions is to bridge scales), success at one scale may well depend on what occurs on other scales. Second, co-ordination mechanisms may also have different temporal horizons. One function of contemporary forms of governance (as of quangos and corporatist arrangements beforehand) is to enable decisions with long-term implications to be divorced from short-term political (especially electoral) calculations. But disjunction's may still arise between the temporalities of different governance and government mechanisms. Third, although various governance mechanisms may acquire specific techno-economic, political, and/or ideological functions, the state typically monitors their effects on its own capacity to secure social cohesion in divided societies. It reserves to itself the right to open, close, juggle, and re-articulate governance arrangements not only in terms of particular functions but also from the viewpoint of partisan and overall political advantage … First, governance attempts may fail because of over-simplification of the conditions of action and/or deficient knowledge about causal connections affecting the object of governance. This is especially problematic when this object is an inherently unstructured but complex system, such as the insertion of the local into the global economy. Indeed, this leads to the more general ‘governability’ problem, i.e., the question of whether the object of governance could ever be manageable, even with adequate knowledge … Second, there may be co-ordination problems on one or more of the interpersonal, interorganisational, and intersystemic levels. These three levels are often related in complex ways. Thus interorganisational negotiation often depends on interpersonal trust; and de-centred intersystemic steering involves the representation of system logic's through interorganisational and/or interpersonal communication. Third, linked to this is the problematic relationship between those engaged in communication (networking, negotiation, etc.) and those whose interests and identities are being represented. Gaps can open between these groups leading to representational and legitimacy crises and/or to problems in securing compliance. And, fourth, where there are various partnerships and other governance arrangements concerned with interdependent issues, there is a problem of co-ordination among them." (http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/lnc/papers/JessopGovernance.htm)

Meta-Governance

- The problem of metagovernance, by Bob Jessop

“The most cursory review of attempts at governance, whether through the market, imperative co-ordination, or self-organisation, reveals an important role for learning, reflexivity, and metagovernance. Indeed, if markets, states, and governance are each prone to failure, how is economic and political co-ordination for economic and social development ever possible and why is it often judged to have succeeded? This highlights the role of the ‘meta-structures’ of interorganisational co-ordination (Alexander 1995: 52) or, more generally, of ‘metagovernance’, i.e., the governance of governance. This involves the organisation of the conditions for governance in its broadest sense. Thus, corresponding to the three basic modes of governance (or co-ordination) distinguished above, we can distinguish three basic modes of metagovernance and one umbrella mode.

First, there is ‘meta-exchange’. This involves the reflexive redesign of individual markets (e.g., for land, labour, money, commodities, knowledge – or appropriate parts or subdivisions thereof) and/or the reflexive reordering of relations among two or more markets by modifying their operation and articulation.

Second, there is ‘meta-organisation’. This involves the reflexive redesign of organisations, the creation of intermediating organisations, the reordering of inter-organisational relations, and the management of organisational ecologies (i.e., the organisation of the conditions of organisational evolution in conditions where many organisations co-exist, compete, co-operate, and co-evolve).

Third, there is ‘meta-heterarchy’. This involves the organisation of the conditions of self-organisation by redefining the framework for heterarchy or reflexive self-organisation.

Fourth, and finally, there is ‘metagovernance’. This involves re-articulating and ‘collibrating’ the different modes of governance. The key issues for those involved in metagovernance are ‘(a) how to cope with other actors’ self-referentiality; and (2) how to cope with their own self-referentiality' (Dunsire 1996: 320). Metagovernance involves managing the complexity, plurality, and tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes of co-ordination. It is the organisation of the conditions for governance and involves the judicious mixing of market, hierarchy, and networks to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those engaged in metagovernance.

Thus metagovernance does not eliminate other modes of co-ordination. Markets, hierarchies, and heterarchies still exist; but they operate in a context of ‘negotiated decision-making’." (http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/lnc/papers/JessopGovernance.htm)

Paul B. Hartzog on Panarchy

Paul B. Hartzog at http://panarchy.com/Members/PaulBHartzog/Writings/Features

"Governance in Panarchy is characterized by the primacy of relational behaviors among governance organizations. Some of these organizations may be traditional nation-states, at least for a while. It is likely that nation-states will be replaced by numerous other governance organizations that demonstrate a better "fit" with their constituents' needs than do today's national governments. Numerous political scholars (Rosenau, et al) have noted trends towards micro- and macro- governance. In addition, governance is becoming increasingly transnational. Through these trends, the distinction between "governmental" and "non-governmental" organizations, particularly in international politics, will become increasingly less apparent, and probably will ultimately be reduced to the possession of military might on the part of "governments". As this function, too, becomes internationalized into a global peace force, even that distinction will fade." (http://panarchy.com/Members/PaulBHartzog/Writings/Features)

"What is governance without government? How does it work? Government is enforcement by coercion backed up by force or the threat of force. Governance involves voluntary compliance by the governed because of shared norms and values. Governance without government only becomes possible in an Information Age, because it relies entirely on accurate information and transparency. The key feature of the following examples is that there is no higher authority enforcing compliance. Rather, the benefits of participation themselves enforce compliance." (http://panarchy.com/Members/PaulBHartzog/Writings/Governance)

Examples

European Internet Self-Regulation Proposal

A concrete example of a proposed peer governance scheme for the European internet:

The proposal is from a series of internet players and advocacy groups, who have gotten together in order to promote, and practice, peer governance of the internet in Europe, and aim to convince the EU of the value of this approach:

“Flexible, decentralized, evolving, the network is very similar to the internet in its way of functioning.

- A decentralized network

In this peer network, all organizations will be associated at the same level, without any hierarchy between them.

- Flexibility, a core concept

This network will operate in a very flexible way. For some members, the network will essentially be a resource centre, allowing them to gather information, to be in touch with other members. For others, it will facilitate cooperation at an European level on subjects of common interests, feeding the Commission with proposals. Density and configuration of the network will vary according to the demands of its members and also to the issues. The working groups will be created with the interested members and will publish recommendations accordingly.

- Openness

The network is built as an open structure, as regards new members willing to join, or non members it wants to work with. Other organizations in other European countries are welcome to participate in this new process. The network also aims at building a structured dialogue with other international players on subjects of common interest.

- A progressive construction by its members

The launch of the network in December 2003 is just a beginning. The network will be built progressively under the impulse of its members (see next page). The first meeting of the European internet coregulation network will take place in March 2004 in Paris. It will be the opportunity for the members to set its priorities for next months. The launch of the first working groups will take place in June 2004. This website is an immediate illustration of the common will of its participants. It already presents the network, its projects, its members and proposes links to their websites. It will include later more functionalities, like a collaborative work platform." (http://network.foruminternet.org/article.php3?id_article=20)

Co-regulation (peer governance) and the state, cited from a co-regulation proposal:

“Through this cooperation process, the players have the opportunity to reach a consensus point on each subject, facilitating the respect of the adopted rules. It also allows to implement aside of the state regulation (rules, laws, international agreements) new means coming from self regulation like best practices, technical means, efficient networks to share information, etc. This process does not aim at discrediting States intervention. States remain the preferred players as they are the only entities able to decide and enforce public rules. “ (http://network.foruminternet.org/article.php3?id_article=20)

Examples

1. Linux - Governance
2. Fetchmail - Governance

Discussion

Open Source Software projects are not self-governing

Charles Connell:

"Being self-organizing and having central control are not completely incompatible--sort of. Imagine a group of random castaways marooned on a desert island. Initially there is no hierarchy to this group. But the group may choose to elect a leader or committee to guide them. They would choose as leaders the people who seem most able to help them survive. The castaways would be self-organizing, yet have established some central control. This is analogous to an open-source project allowing one member to serve as project leader, because it is in everyone's best interest.

However, the argument only goes so far. Over time, leaders get stuck on certain ways of doing things and become accustomed to their power. They are resistant to change. The group's ability to organize itself diminishes, even though it began in an egalitarian way. Similarly, open-source projects are not very self-organizing two years after they start. From a newcomer's point of view, things are not as democratic as they once were.

Of course, as Raymond points out, unhappy newcomers are free to fork the project if they don't like what the leaders are doing. However, this only proves the project is no longer self-organizing--it is now two projects." (http://www.softpanorama.org/OSS/webliography.shtml)

=More Information

1. The Emergence of Governance in an Open Source Community

Also:

1. The Economist on the place of hierarchy in open source projects, at http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5624944
2. Writings, by Paul Hartzog of panarchy.com on the related concept of panarchy are here [1] and here [2]

Key Books to Read

Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. L. H. Gunderson, C. S. Holling. Island Press, 2001

The Future of the Capitalist State. Bob Jessop. 2001

"offers a series of key conceptual distinctions - between types of capitalist state and types of state in capitalist society and discusses the process of de-territorialisation and its impact on governance and meta-governance."