Two Options for Fighting Global Warming as a Tragedy of the Commons
* Article: O'Gorman, Maebh, "Global Warming: A Tragedy of the Commons" (2010). Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy. Research Paper No. 32/2010.
URL = https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/232618203.pdf [1]
Abstract
"This paper scrutinises two of the leading models for dealing with so‐called ‘tragedy of the commons’ issues as to their suitability to tackle the problem of global warming;
- the polycentric model favoured by Ostrom, and
- the Leviathan approach as advocated by Ophuls.
The paper then sets out a hybrid approach which it argues is the only viable solution to the current crisis of global warming. It proposes that,
while agreement setting out goals for reductions in GHG emissions must be reached on the international arena, such an agreement should confer on each individual nation the choice of the manner of implementation,
and that each nation, and also each region or locality, should devise their own strategy for achieving their required reduction. Such decentralised implementation would not only reduce the costs of both formulation and enforcement of solutions, but also permit more broad‐based input by the local community, thereby resulting in an enhanced solution. Furthermore, local solutions would enable the development of a more responsive framework of rules and also facilitate regulatory competition.
While legal rules will necessarily constitute a large proportion of the governmental response, this paper also addresses the role that non‐legal rules such as social norms may play. Such norms can be altered through the use of taxation, which can effect “carefully biased options,” as well as education as to the consequences of certain everyday actions. As Charny noted, systems of non‐legal sanctions for the violation of the rules of conduct specified by the norm system help to explain, “in terms of ‘rationality’” why individuals often act in ways that ostensibly depart from rational self‐interest. Such departure from rational self‐interest is exactly what is required to counteract the rational actions which result in ‘the tragedy of the commons.’ That efficient norms may evolve among members of a close‐knit community is yet another argument in favour of decentralisation of the implementation of centrally agreed goals."
Excerpt
Maebh O'Gorman, from the conclusion:
"The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is not a modern occurrence. As Aristotle noted, “that which is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care.”48 However, its current manifestation in the form of global warming constitutes the playing out of ‘the tragedy’ on possibly its grandest scale yet. Neither a local solution nor a global solution alone will be sufficient. As such it requires a new approach, a fusion of the models developed thus far, in order to enable the tackling of the crisis on all fronts. Such a hybrid solution therefore should entail international agreement on a framework goal for emissions reductions, followed by decentralised local implementation, at least regarding individuals. Further, such local implementation, in the case of firms, may be sectorally local as well as geographically local, and in this regard the increased research being undertaken into networks theory may be immensely beneficial.
It can be expected that, within the next ten if not five years, agreement will have been reached on the international stage, providing for concrete and binding goals regarding emissions reduction. Such a prediction is based on the fact that awareness of the crisis and its consequences is steadily increasing. However, the fear is that, due to the global nature of the problem, and the necessity for international agreement as to the guiding framework, that the possibility for locally devised solutions to a global problem will be overlooked. Professor Ostrom, following her Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, recently gave a presentation to the World Bank, in which she focused on the importance and benefits of such local solutions. My hope is that she maintains her presence in this arena so that her proposals can, whenever solid and binding international agreement is finally reached, form part of the implementation framework. However, while Ostrom has much to teach us, Garrett Hardin’s article, written over forty years ago, and constituting only five pages, also contains a vast array of advice which is immensely pertinent for the current generation faced with tackling this global crisis. Finally, Hickman and Bartlett have noted that crises “often compel new thinking about political institutions, and the necessity to respond to the shared threat of global warming may be the reason that we devise something more workable than the nation‐state.”49 Such a statement is true and it is possible that a more effective international structure will result from the current crisis. While nations have experimented with many forms of governance, from monarchy to dictatorship to democracy, our experimentations with global governance are in their infancy. The United Nations has certainly not been an unqualified success and, while the European Union has had significant success, it appears to be now facing its own crisis. Global warming may well be the catalyst for a new approach."