Third Reorganization of Global Capitalism
Discussion
Stephen Maher et al. :
"We are now living through a third reorganization of global capitalism since World War II. Each phase was precipitated by crisis and followed by a restoration of the power of capital. Yet each also intensified capital’s tendency to undermine the conditions of its own political legitimation. By generating inequality, unemployment, and insecurity, capitalism strains the state’s capacity to represent society as a community of equal citizens whose will it embodies. The successive reorganizations of global capitalism have sharpened this tension between accumulation and legitimation. Even as profits recovered from the crises of the 1970s and 2008, the U.S. state became increasingly unable to legitimate an economic order whose strength was bound up with the deterioration of living conditions and security for broad sections of the population. Substantial reform has therefore come to require moving beyond class compromise to take on capital as a whole, while sustaining any gains requires linking struggles for reform to a broader project of socialist transition.
The first wave of reorganization emerged after World War II as the American state took the lead in establishing a global monetary and trade order linking formally independent states into an informal empire bound together by cross-border flows of trade and investment. At home, this was accompanied by the incorporation of unions into a “productivist” settlement in which wage gains were tied to productivity growth. When productivity growth slowed in the 1970s, wage increases squeezed profits and imposed the need for a second reorganization. The transition to neoliberalism was inaugurated by the Federal Reserve’s crushing of defensive rebellions by workers with an iron fist through the “Volcker Shock”—raising interest rates to unprecedented heights and leading to skyrocketing unemployment. The constraints on capital mobility embedded within the Bretton Woods regime were then cast aside for a new era of global financial integration. As capital was freed to circulate globally in search of the highest profits and lowest costs, workers and states were forced to compete for investment and jobs by offering the most favorable conditions for accumulation.5
Rising wages, social programs, and formal democracy had helped legitimate capitalism during the postwar “Golden Age.” The restoration of accumulation after the prolonged 1970s crisis, however, devastated working class communities through deindustrialization, growing precarity, and wage stagnation and led to the formation of a more authoritarian state. Power was centralized within an “independent” Federal Reserve insulated from “political” intervention, affording it the flexibility to act as necessary to support accumulation. This meant enforcing class discipline by setting interest rates to maintain levels of unemployment sufficient to contain wage demands and combat inflation. Meanwhile, technocrats within the trade apparatus assumed a growing role in shaping policy through negotiations conducted far from public scrutiny. Politics was thus increasingly removed from legislatures and locked away in inaccessible bureaucracies. Legitimation was constrained by the imperatives of accumulation even as profits grew and wealth concentrated at the top. The constraints on redistribution and the deterioration of workers’ living conditions were not symptoms of capitalist decline but conditions of its strength.
Many saw the financialization that accompanied this reorganization as “hollowing out” the “real” economy and undermining industrial competitiveness. Workers and industrial capitalists, in this view, shared an interest in reining in finance, which, it was claimed, would return “good jobs” and lead to shared prosperity.6 Yet the decline such accounts anticipated never materialized. The rise of finance instead strengthened industry, restoring profits and providing the infrastructure for the global circulation of investment. There was no division between an industrial sector victimized by globalization and a financial sector that benefitted from it. Both were united in an alliance around liberalization. As the power of capital grew alongside its ability to “exit,” the capacity of workers to compel it to accept the kinds of class bargains that had underpinned the rising wages and social programs of the “Keynesian” era steadily eroded—what Leo Panitch defined as “the impasse of social democratic politics.” Workers were instead faced with what Sam Gindin calls “the polarization of options”: either make inroads toward democratizing investment or face the perpetuation of the status quo.
The third reorganization followed the 2008 financial crisis, as state intervention sharply exacerbated the “accumulation of wealth at one pole” and the “accumulation of misery” at the other. On the one hand, this produced an unprecedented concentration of ownership, record profits, and a resurgent financial-industrial bloc; on the other, workers endured the destruction of millions of jobs, the loss of savings and homes, and the deterioration of wages and working conditions with little state support. Consequently, as the state intervened massively to rebuild the power of capital, the crisis was displaced from the terrain of the economic onto the political. Simmering discontent with a half-century of neoliberalism erupted into a full-blown crisis, as both parties were wracked by insurgencies from the MAGA right and democratic-socialist left. Yet capital remained unwilling to countenance even limited reforms that might have partially restored legitimacy, as evidenced in its near-total opposition to Bernie Sanders, and even to a lesser extent Elizabeth Warren, as well as in the subsequent limits of Bidenomics. In this context, Trump was able to channel widespread anger into a populist revolt expressed within a formally democratic state.
The new finance capital was consolidated through the unprecedented concentration and centralization of corporate ownership in the hands of the so-called “Big Three” asset management firms—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard—which emerged as the most powerful institutions within contemporary finance. They owned not merely specific groups of firms but rather the market itself, collectively becoming the largest shareholders in practically every publicly traded U.S. corporation. Far from sapping the competitiveness and dynamism of the corporations they owned, this unprecedented financial concentration coincided with U.S. corporate profits soaring to historic heights and facilitated the ascent of dynamic new economic sectors, above all Big Tech and AI. This belied the persistent depiction of finance as a mere rentier parasite, along with longstanding claims that its rise was necessarily linked with a decline of productive investment.12 That the dynamism of the tech giants has been fuelled by what may be the largest investment boom in the history of capitalism should hammer the final nail in the coffin of such arguments."
(https://nonsite.org/triumph-of-capital-crisis-of-democracy/)