New Approaches to Cyber-Deterrence

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  • Article: Jeff Cooper. New Approaches to Cyber-Deterrence: Initial Thoughts on a New Framework” (2009)

URL = http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/law_national_security/new_approaches_to_cyber_deterrence.authcheckdam.pdf


Excerpts

Via [1]:

Jeff Cooper:

"“Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict. Among the most important of the circumstances mandating a new logic is an international system that is no longer dominated by a bipolar structure, in which both non-state actors and networks of actors (among them ““virtual communities””) have emerged as important factors in international relations. As part of reformulating deterrence for this new environment, this research effort introduces two concepts as key components for cyber-deterrence. The first is a new framework that we term the “Three Cs”— Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict. This framework explicitly recognizes that both we and our potential adversaries (as well as friends, allies, and other actors) now conduct multiple but distinct, relationships with each other across numerous and diverse channels of interaction; and as we participate in networks with a wide range of other parties, we perform different functions, can assume different personas, and often exhibit substantially different behaviors at the same time. ..."


Jeff Cooper:

Networked Deterrence. The second key concept in this approach — the “networked deterrence” concept — argues that networks themselves are increasingly the key underpinning of international power and influence and, therefore, represent the real source of value.” (2009, pp. 4-5)

“... It [the 3Cs framework] recognizes that actors can pursue different objectives in different networks and that these three types of relations can exist contemporaneously or simultaneously, resulting in complex “mixed-motive games.” Importantly, such “mixed-motive” games do not, unlike Nash equilibria, produce stable optimum solutions. In fact, for assessing decisions by these actors, the decision space may resemble the sets of multiple attractors produced by complex systems in which predicting the choice among them is impossible.” (pp. 121-22)

“[I]t is now a reality that all players — including states, as well as individuals and other non-state actors, regardless of whether or not they are terrorists or terrorist groups — are entangled in multiple types of relationships. The first key aspect of the “networked deterrence” concept rests on an understanding that these relationships powerfully affect every actor’s motivations and behaviors, and hence their decision calculus. This concept argues consequentially that affecting (or threatening to affect) those relationships can influence the behaviors of an actor; and it should be generally applicable to forestalling a wide range of potential threats.” (p. 129)

“Implicit in the results of this research is a conclusion that a policy of “engagement,” if it is to yield any benefits for the U.S., must create a set of conditions in which all parties to the relationship understand that reciprocity is important. Engagement may imply cooperation, that is, seeking a mutually beneficial outcome, but that does not mean the relationship has to be “friendly.” 160-161

(http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2012/09/strategic-multiplexity-revisited.html)