Elite Overproduction

= concept used by Peter Turchin et al. in the landmark book: Secular Cycles

Contextual Quote

"This is the basic thesis of Secular Cycles. Pre-industrial history operates on two cycles: first, a three-hundred year cycle of the rise-and-fall of civilizations. And second, a 40-60 year cycle of violent disorder that only becomes relevant during the lowest parts of the first cycle."

- Scott Alexander [1]

Description

1. Summary by ChatGPT:

"Peter Turchin, a scholar specializing in historical dynamics, has extensively analyzed the concept of "elite overproduction" and its role in societal instability. This phenomenon occurs when the number of individuals aspiring to elite status surpasses the available positions, leading to intensified intra-elite competition and potential political turmoil.

Key Explanations by Peter Turchin:

Intra-Elite Competition: Turchin emphasizes that excessive growth in the number of elite aspirants heightens competition within the elite class. This internal rivalry can erode cooperation and contribute to societal discord.

Historical Patterns: He identifies elite overproduction as a recurring factor in the decline of various societies, including late-period Chinese dynasties, the Roman Empire, and pre-revolutionary France. Turchin's research suggests that surplus elites often engage in self-serving behaviors, exacerbating inequality and fostering conditions ripe for instability.

Contemporary Implications: In his book End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration, Turchin applies this framework to modern contexts, arguing that current political unrest can be traced back to elite overproduction and the resulting societal strains."

2. From the Wikipedia:

"Elite overproduction is a concept developed by Peter Turchin that describes the condition of a society that is producing too many potential elite members relative to its ability to absorb them into the power structure. This, he hypothesizes, is a cause for social instability, as those left out of power feel aggrieved by their relatively low socioeconomic status.

However, Turchin's model cannot foretell precisely how a crisis will unfold; it can only yield probabilities. Turchin likened this to the accumulation of deadwood in a forest over many years, paving the way for a cataclysmic forest fire later on. It is possible to predict a massive conflagration, Turchin argues, but not what causes it.[4] Nor does it offer definitive solutions, though it can clarify the trade-offs of various options. For Turchin, history suggests that non-violent end of elite overproduction is possible, citing the two decades after World War II in the United States, a time of economic redistribution and reversal of upward social mobility.

According to Turchin and Jack Goldstone, periods of political instability have throughout human history been due to the purely self-interested behavior of the elite. When the economy faced an expansion in the workforce, which exerted a downward pressure on wages, the elite generally kept much of the wealth generated to themselves, resisting taxation and income redistribution. In the face of intensifying competition, they also sought to restrict the window of opportunity in order to preserve their power and status for their descendants. These actions exacerbated inequality, a key driver of sociopolitical turbulence[8] due to the proneness of the relatively well-off to radicalism. In the modern Western world, the popularity of progressive political beliefs among university graduates, for instance, may be due to widespread underemployment rather than from exposure to progressive ideas or experiences during their studies Turchin has said that elite overproduction explains social disturbances during later years of various Chinese dynasties, the late Roman empire, the French Wars of Religion, and France before the Revolution. Turchin correctly predicted in 2010 that this situation would cause social unrest in the United States during the 2020s.

Turchin's model also explains why polygamous societies tend to be more unstable than monogamous ones. Men of high status in a polygamous society tend to have more children and consequently produce more elites."

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elite_overproduction?)

Typology

The Broad Elite Hypothesis vs the Narrow Elite Hypothesis

Yascha Mounk:

"The Broad Elite Hypothesis: Elites are defined by high income or wealth. America is currently experiencing a period of elevated instability because the number of people who aspire to elite status is much larger than the number of people who can achieve these hallmarks of material prosperity.

The Narrow Elite Hypothesis: Elites are defined by their elevated social status, as conferred by inherently rival “positional goods”5 such as elected office. America is currently experiencing a period of elevated instability because the number of people who aspire to elite status is much larger than the number of people who can occupy these kinds of special positions."

(https://yaschamounk.substack.com/p/there-is-no-surplus-elite-in-america)

Discussion

Scott Alexander:

"First, some positions are absolute rather than relative, eg “King” or “Minister of the Economy”. Second, noble numbers may sometimes increase faster than peasant numbers, since nobles have more food and better chances to reproduce. Third, during boom times, the ranks of nobles are swelled through upward mobility. Fourth, conspicuous consumption is a ratchet effect: during boom times, the expectations of nobility should gradually rise. Fifth, sometimes the relevant denominator is not peasants but land: if a noble only has one acre of land, it doesn’t matter how many peasants he controls. Sixth nobles usually survive famines and plagues pretty well, so after those have done their work, there are far fewer peasants but basically the same number of nobles. All of these factors contribute to excess noble population – or as T&N call it, “elite overproduction”)

…and the nobles form “rival patronage networks” to fight for the few remaining good spots. The state goes from united (or at least all nobles united against the peasants) to divided, with coalitions of nobles duking it out (no pun intended). This can lead either to successful peasant rebellion, as some nobles support the peasants as part of inter-noble power plays, or just to civil war. Although famine and plague barely affect nobles, war affects them disproportionately – both because they are often knights or other front-line soldiers, and because killing the other side’s nobles was a major strategic goal (think Game of Thrones). So a civil war usually further depletes the already-depleted peasant population, and finally depletes noble populations, leading to a general underpopulation and the beginning of the next cycle.

Combine these two processes, and you get the basic structure of a secular cycle. There are about a hundred years of unalloyed growth, as peasant and noble populations rebound from the last disaster. During this period, the economy is strong, the people are optimistic and patriotic, and the state is strong and united.

After this come about fifty years of “stagflation”. There is no more room for easy growth, but the system is able to absorb the surplus population without cracking. Peasants may not have enough land, but they go to the city in search of jobs. Nobles may not have enough of the positions they want, but they go to college in order to become bureaucrats, or join the retinues of stronger nobles. The price of labor reaches its lowest point, and the haves are able to exploit the desperation of the have-nots to reach the zenith of their power. From the outside, this period can look like a golden age: huge cities buzzing with people, universities crammed with students, ultra-rich nobles throwing money at the arts and sciences. From the inside, for most people it will look like a narrowing of opportunity and a hard-to-explain but growing sense that something is wrong.

After this comes a crisis. The mechanisms that have previously absorbed surplus population fail. Famine and disease ravage the peasantry. State finances fall apart. Social trust and patriotism disappear as it becomes increasingly obvious that it’s every man for himself and that people with scruples will be defeated or exploited by people without.

After this comes the depression period (marked “intercycle” on this graph, but I’m going to stick with the book’s term). This graph makes it look puny, but it can last 100 to 150 years. During this period, the peasant population is low, but the noble population is still high. This is most likely a period of very weak or even absent state power, frequent barbarian invasions, and frequent civil war. The peasant population is in a good position to expand, but cannot do so because wars keep killing people off or forcing them into walled towns where they can’t do any farming. Usually it takes a couple more wars and disasters before the noble population has decreased enough to reverse elite overproduction. At this point the remaining nobles look around, decide that there is more than enough for all of them, and feel incentivized to cooperate with the formation of a strong centralized state.

This cycle is interwoven with a second 40-60 year process that T&N call the “fathers-and-sons cycle” or “bigenerational cycle”. The data tend to show waves of disorder about every 40-60 years. During the “integrative trend” (T&N’s term for the optimistic growth and stagflation phases), these can just be minor protests or a small rebellion that is easily crushed. During the “disintegrative trend” (crisis + depression), they usually represent individual outbreaks of civil war. For example, during the Roman Republic, the violence around the death of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC was relatively limited, because Rome had not yet entered its crisis phase. 40 years later, in the depths of the crisis phase, there was a second outbreak of violence (91 – 82 BC) including the Social War and Sulla’s wars, which escalated to full-scale (though limited) civil war. 40 years later there was a third outbreak (49 – 27 BC) including Caesar and Augustus’s very large civil wars. After that the new integrative trend started and further violence was suppressed."

[2]

More information

• a critique of the concept by Yascha Mounk: https://yaschamounk.substack.com/p/there-is-no-surplus-elite-in-america