Dynamics of the West

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* Book: La dynamique de l'Occident. Par Norbert Elias.


From the reading notes of Michel Bauwens, 2005:

Second part of reading notes, first part not found yet.

In the previous chapters, Elias reviews the process of monopolisation in feudal France, up to the Hundred Year War, which would isolate the Plantagenet in Britain, and lead to the domination of the Capetian king in Paris.

But the ouster of London would lead to renewed rivalry within the Capetian dynasty itself. Principally with the Burgondy/Flanders nexus, who are trying to resurrect Lotharinge.

Chapter IV: Victory of the royal monopoly at the end of the XVth to the XVIth cy.

Elias stresses that the political and the economical were still fused and that production was subject to violence, not yet a 'free competitive activity'. Follows a recapitulation of the inevitability of the monopolistic process. In a a context of limited chances, competition leads to domination by the few, and standing still is impossible. Stagnation means decay.

But Elias stresses that this monopolisation creates the security of a regulated competition, which in the end allows for more interdependence and cooperation. But the potential losers do not accept their defeat and loss of independence, and would fight hard in the second half of the 14th cy, to prevent royal concentration. After describing the elimination of all rivals of Paris within France, we arrive at the early XVIth cy. It is now France against the Habsburg dynasty of Charles V.

Chapter V: Le mechanisme absolutiste

Elias has distinguished 2 phases in monopolisation. The first phase of free competition leads to private monopolies; in the second phase they are 'socialized' into 'public' monopolies. Monopolies can only harden and stabilize themselves when financial property overtakes land.

There are two aspects in the growth of central power:

   - 1) the already discussed competition between units of domination ('foreign affairs'), but also
   - 2) interior tensions within a unit

The latter is a function of a growing division and interdependence of functions, which on the one hand permits a strong state system, but also renders the sovereign dependent on that system, i.e. we see an evolution towards 'public' forms of power ("la fonctionarisation du pouvoir central").

But how then to explain absolutism ?

In societies of low dependence, such as the early Middle Ages, relations are simple, i.e. friendship or enmity. But in situations of high and complex dependence, relations are multiple and ambivalent. (“on a plus rarement l’occasion de nourrir une hostilité implacable que n’adoucit aucune ambivalence”, p. 108).

This process is an important driver of civilized behaviour. For Elias, central power grows when social groups are in struggle, but cannot achieve full dominance because of their interdependence, and they have to rely on the masters of the central coordination organs (the forces are in conflict, but want to maintain the existing system.

- Le mécanisme absolutiste: “L’heure d’un pouvoir central fort dans une société à haut niveau de différenciation approche, quand l’ambivalence des groupes fonctionnelles les plus importants est si marquée; quand les centres de gravité se répartissent si également entre eux, qu’il n'y ne peut y avoir, de quelque côté que ce soit, ni compromis, ni combats, ni victoire décisive." (p 111)).

Elias stresses that the central authority cannot be equated with its social origins (feudal lord and bourgeois functionaries), that it has its own agenda and interests, congruent with the current configuration of society on which powers depend, and it imposes its culture ('socializes') its members.

The central power cannot side with one social force, it needs the tension, and will most likely seek the support of a less important secundary force. In the period of absolutism, the nobility was strong but losing influence, while the bourgeoisie was in ascendance. The bourgeois of this epoch did not want to abolish feudalism, but rather to become a new branch of the nobility themselves ("la noblesse de robe vs la noblesse d'epee"). They were most often government officials, in service of the king. Like the other orders, they were also dependent on privileges. (The French Revolution occured through new sectors opposed to privileges and who were enemies of the nobility, the corporations, and the 'corporated bourgeoisie'!)

The king was strong because the conflicting parties were in equilibrium, unable to deal a critical blow to the other, as they all relied on the same system. In a disgression on the Xth cy., he shows how the Capetian royalty had allied itself with the clergy, the second social force at that time. In every society there is a 'central' tension and it moved from the feudal warrior class vs the clergy, towards the feudal lords vs. the city bourgeoisie. The latter succeeded in dominating the administration (in France especially), and the kings saw in the monetized cities a trend they could rely on.

Elias describes ow the royal household functions gradually became public and how the sons of the bourgeoisie specialized in such functions through elite struggles. Describing the regulation of activities, Elias describes how bourgeois activities were forbidden to the nobles (or they had to temporarily relinquish their privileges). Under Louis XIV, a courtly aristocracy is created, characterized by its 'proximity to the king', which gives a new lease of life to a 'aristocracy of the court'.

The latter would be used when the bourgeoisie became too strong. Because many of these positions had to be bought ("les charges venales"), hey were increasingly out of reach of aristocrats, and this is when the king started reserving these posts to the nobility (they kept being excluded from political posts).

- “La cour absolutiste est à la fois instrument d’asservissement et d’entretien de la noblesse.” (p. 139)

Chapter VI: La sociogenese du monopole fiscale

Context: this is the last chapter in part I, before Elias' theory of civilization described in part II

Elias insists on how new absolutism was, as a break with medieval feudalism. In that epoch, taxes were an occasional and hated occurence. It was considered a form of theft, and ruined many in a system without much money. The growth of cities in the XIIth cy would bring the first financial contributions, sometimes in the form of 'paying for mercenaries'. They would be gradually transformed into a system of taxes. The 14th cy would see taxes becoming regular instead of exceptional, as well as the emergence of a specialized administration in charge of it.

Describing the role of the cities, Elias shows how the internal antagonism between the top and the other layers led to royal intervention, eventually making municipalities an extension of the central administrative apparatus.

A crucial transition was Charles VII after the close of the Hundred Year War: having regularly received 'aides' (taxes), for the war effort, he decided to make them permanent, without consultation. This was a proof of growing royal power, which showed fiscal, and therefore also military monopolies. For contemporaries, this growth of royal power was a source of surprise - and indignation, it was seen as a loss of freedom. It was from the people then, faced with royal monopoly, that the call came to make royalty into a 'public institution'. Thus we see the gradual emergence of the 'state'. The king now has money to compensate for services and no longer has to give away land. In any case, in the absolutist period, the king starts resting on the nobility again, through the courtisans, which he maintains purposely as a top layer.

A dual system exists

   - the landed layer of poor peasants middle nobility, and courtisans, and
   - a city-based system of poor workers, middle artisans and high bourgeois, including the high functionaries.

It is the system of privileges that would be destroyed by the French Revolution, as the bourgeoisie saw no real function for the courtisans.