Non-Economic Mission-Oriented Governance Mechanisms in Ledger Systems

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Discussion

Nathan Schneider:

"This kind of design could enable cryptoeconomic networks to serve purposesnot reducible to economic feedback loops. 1Hive does so with its combi-nation of a values-laden Community Covenant and enforcement through acryptoeconomic dispute-resolution system; the community proposes this as areplicable model, known as “Gardens,” for other communities to adopt (sacha,2021). Protocols could also incorporate “golden share” mechanisms, by whicha purpose-focused foundation or member-governed cooperative could holdveto power to ensure a network does not stray from a predefined purpose(Purpose Foundation, 2020). Governments have also used golden shares toretain some control over companies managing privatized services (Pezard,1995–1996). Enforceable mission orientation can counteract plutocracy andmake externalities more visible to the system.Temporal modulationIn their quest for “people-first” governance, the founders of Orca Protocoldo not want to depart from economic incentives altogether. But by creating“pods” of users with economic skin in the game, they hope to elevate longer-term thinking over short-term (and potentially short-sighted) feedback loops.Temporal mechanisms can make visible certain externalities that would beless salient under short-term decision-making. The conviction voting systemthat 1Hive uses, for instance, rewards prolonged commitment. Outside ofcryptoeconomics, the US-based Long-Term Stock Exchange is an effort tocreate an equity market that encourages executives to plan around a moredistant horizon than the quarterly cycle that dominates conventional markets.National constitutions generally seek to balance short-term and long-termelected offices, alongside career officials and lifetime appointments. Mech-anisms such as term limits, sunset provisions, and reporting requirementscan be used to modulate the time-frames around incentives, thereby placingthem in the foreground or background, as appropriate.Long-term incentives are not intrinsically better than short-term ones. Butintroducing diverse temporal frames can enable diverse inputs, making asystem responsive to a wider range of concerns."

(https://osf.io/wzf85/?view_only=a10581ae9a804aa197ac39ebbba05766)