Hegemonic Cycles

= closely related, and perhaps interchangeable, to War Cycles

Contextual Quote

"Hegemony cycles, unlike long waves, seem to be completely inaccessible to quantitative statistical analysis."

- Joshua Goldstein [1]

Source

Essentially, chapter 13 and 14, of Joshua Goldstein's book, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age

Description

Joshua Goldstein:

"Hegemony essentially consists of being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations, political and economic, are conducted (see chapters 5 and 6).

• Economic hegemony implies the ability of one country to center the world economy around itself.
• Political hegemony means being able to dominate the world militarily. Marxist analyses tend to emphasize the economic side of hegemony.

Wallerstein (1974, 1980) and Braudel (1977, 1984) give predominant emphasis to the economic sphere, with less emphasis on war. In Wallerstein's framework, the "core" dominates the "semi-periphery" and "periphery," imposing unequal terms of exchange and thus extracting surplus value (wealth) toward the core, where capital accumulation is concentrated (see chapter 1). A hegemonic power is a core country that temporarily dominates all other core powers economically (Wallerstein 1983).

Braudel's (1984:27–39) definitions are similar but narrower. He stresses the single city at the center of every world-economy around which is a narrow "core" (the country containing the central city), a broad "middle zone," and a large periphery. Dominant cities do not remain dominant forever; they replace one another in sequence. But there is room for only one center at one time; the rise of one means the downfall of another, according to Braudel.

More traditional Marxists also see hegemony in economic terms but concentrate on the core itself rather than core-periphery relations.

Mandel (1980:31) sees hegemony within the core as necessary for capitalist stability: "Only a high degree of international concentration of economic and political-military power makes it possible to impose on the capitalist world currently pragmatic solutions in times of crisis."

Realist and peace-research approaches focus more on military than economic hegemony.

Organski (1958) stresses the pyramidlike structure of international power—one country at the apex and others trying to maintain or improve their position in the political hierarchy.

Modelski (1978) emphasizes military capabilities and sees hegemony in terms of preponderant "global reach" capabilities.

In my approach, consistent with my theory of the reciprocal influence of war and economics (chapter 12), the military and economic aspects of hegemony receive equal billing. I am particularly interested in the connections between the two aspects. In my conception of the hegemony cycle, countries rise and decline in relative position within the hierarchical international structure in the core.

The hegemony cycle is defined by the succession of countries that occupy the very top position in the international hierarchy. At the end of each hegemony cycle, and the beginning of the next, is a period of very intense great power war, out of which emerges a new hegemonic power with a predominant share of world capabilities (economic and military). This war period ends with a restructuring of the world order around the new hegemonic power. I refer to this war period as "hegemonic war."

The overwhelming predominance that emerges at the end of, and as a result of, a hegemonic war is temporary. Gradually other powers rebuild from the war, and the gap begins to narrow.3New technologies underlying the hegemonic power's economic advantage are imitated in other countries. Countries rebuilding from war incorporate a new generation of technology, eventually allowing competition with the hegemonic country. For these reasons, each period of hegemony gradually erodes. Recurring wars, on several long wave upswings, eventually culminate in a new hegemonic war,4bringing another restructuring of the core and a new period of hegemony.

Each new hegemonic power emerges from the leading position in the winning coalition in hegemonic war. Among the winners are countries heavily damaged by war and others relatively insulated from war damage. The new hegemonic power comes from the latter group. After each hegemonic war, the winning coalition has fragmented. The next challenger has come from within the ranks of the winning coalition in the last hegemonic war. This outline of the hegemony cycle has been cast in general terms and is largely consistent with both Wallerstein's (1983) and Modelski's (1978) approaches."

(http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgcyc13.pdf)

History

The Problem of Dating

Joshua Goldstein explains:

"I adduce a dating scheme for hegemony cycles based on three hegemonic wars and the corresponding rise and decline of three hegemonic powers—the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States. I discuss the idea of "structural history" and give the background of European political economy around 1500 (the starting point for the study). I then present a historical reconstruction of the first era (the first hegemony cycle), lasting through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The historical period since 1648 is left for chapter 14."

(http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgcyc13.pdf)

Thus, we obtain:

• Cycle 1. From 1495 until about 1618/1648

• Cycle 2. From about 1618/1648 to 1793/1815

• Cycle 3. From about 1793/1815 to 1914/1945

and hypothetically:

• Cycle 4: From about 1945 to 2008

• Cycle 5: From about 2008 to ?

As Joshua Goldstein explains:

On the Historical Dating of Hegemony Cycles:

Wallerstein's dating concentrates on war periods about 150 years apart, which have recurred three times since 1618. Modelski stresses war periods about 100 years apart, recurring five times since 1500. I have chosen Wallerstein's datings as the basis of hegemonic wars and periods of hegemony in the scheme adduced below. There area number of reasons for this choice. First, of course, this dating of hegemony cycles fits with the shifts in economic hegemony described by both Braudel and Wallerstein. Maddison (1982:29) comes to parallel conclusions in terms of economic leadership in the world: "Since 1700 there have been only three lead countries" the Netherlands until the 1780s, then Britain until around 1890, then the United States. He documents these changes in terms of productivity (gross domestic product[GDP]per worker-hour)6and elaborates them with interpretive historical narrative for each case.? It seems to me that three is indeed the correct number of identifiable shifts in world leadership since the sixteenth century and that even Modelski acknowledges this (but reconciles it with his dating by having two British cycles in a row).

...

These three shifts also line up with the most cataclysmic wars.

Looking back over the past five centuries, three great war peaks stand out above all the others:

• The Thirty Years' War, 1618—48
• The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, 1793—1815
• World Wars I and II, 1914—45

These are empirically (see chapter 11) the most severe wars, corresponding with the highest peaks of inflation and hence presumably the most "costly" wars. "

(http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgcyc13.pdf)