A. F. K. Organski's Power Transition Theory: Difference between revisions
unknown (talk) (Created page with " =Discussion= Joshua Goldstein: "While Toynbee's generation cycle embodies the psychological elements in Quincy Wright's approach, other scholars have been more interested i...") |
(No difference)
|
Revision as of 11:17, 20 January 2023
Discussion
Joshua Goldstein:
"While Toynbee's generation cycle embodies the psychological elements in Quincy Wright's approach, other scholars have been more interested in the material or economic elements that might lead to a regular recurrence of war. These approaches have drawn on the "power transition" theory of A. F. K. Organski in which the relative growth of national economic capabilities is seen to affect the conditions for war. While Organski's theory is not explicitly cyclical, it becomes integral to later cyclical theories.51 The power transition theory is an offshoot from the general approach of "realism" in the study of international politics, of which Hans Morgenthau became the preeminent spokesperson after World War II. Realism "maintains the autonomy of the political sphere" from economics (Morgenthau [1948] 1967:14). The purpose of realism is to contribute to the development of the study of politics in terms of its own standards, based on interests and power and not on either economic or moral standards (p. 14). Power, according to Morgenthau, derives from three psychological influences of one actor over another: expectation of benefits, fear of disadvantages, and respect or love for people or institutions (p. 27). Elements of national power include such economic factors as resources, industrial capacity, and population ([1948] 1967:chap. 9). Thus, as in classical mercantilism, national wealth and economic strength serve politics.52A nation's wealth directly affects its ability to wage war as well as to give or respond to other incentives and threats short of war. Organski (1958)53follows on Morgenthau and the realist tradition in emphasizing power:"Shifts in the international distribution of power... create the conditions likely to lead to at least the most important wars, and power is the most important determinant of whether a war will be won or lost. And power, again, is the resource that leaders hope to preserve or to increase by resorting to armed conflict (Organski and Kugler 1980:4). And like other realists, Organski sees economic factors as crucial in building national power.54 But Organski parts company with the traditional realist balance of power theory. Balance of power theory assumes a set of roughly equal nations that form alliances based on power considerations and that maintain peace by maintaining the "balance" and preventing predominance by one nation. Organski, however, finds this to be historically inaccurate. "Balance" is unusual; it is more common for one country to dominate the international system.55Thus Organski assumesahierarchicalworld order in which there is a "most powerful nation" at the "very apex of the pyramid" (Organski and Kugler 1980:19). Just below are other great powers that have less ability to influence other nations and that receive fewer benefits from the international order.
Organski argues that differentials in national economic growth affect the rise or fall of different countries'relative capabilitiesin this international hierarchy and that these changes underlie major wars:
- "The manner and speed of national growth and development change the pools of resources available to nations.... If one nation gains significantly in power, its improved position relative to that of other nations frightens them and induces them to try to reverse this gain by war. Or, vice versa, a nation gaining on an adversary will try to make its advantage permanent by reducing its opponent by force of arms. Either way, changes in power are considered causae belli (Organski and Kugler 1980:8, 13)."