On the Historical Relationship Between Military Technology and Industrial Production
Discussion
Burak GÜREL* & Eylem TAYLAN:
"(In) William H. McNeill’s book on the relationship between military-related technology and proto-industrial and industrial production from A.D. 1000 onwards, ... gathered empirical evidence (which) clearly shows that military-led production has been the primary source of large-scale industrial production from the Song dynasty of China (from 10th to 13th century) and Latin Christendom’s age of military expansion to Italy and England in the 16th century and Sweden in the 17th century. McNeill’s evidence finds further support in historical examples that point toward the increasing industrialization of arms production in early modern Europe due to the demands of warfare. Artisanal production of weapons in Dutch workshops, as well as gun production and trade in Birmingham, underwent significant transformations in terms of specialization and standardization of production during the 18th century (Torres-Sánchez, Brandon and Hart, 2018: 8-9). The expanding industrial production of arms in private enterprises in this context depended on the frequent wars which, in turn, created demand for specific military-related technologies and a growing export market for military products (Torres-Sánchez et al., 2018: 8). McNeill (1982: 27-87) also indicates that armaments production was one of the primary sources of the development of wage labor and market activity among different geographies.
In his analysis of the capital goods-phase of the Industrial Revolution, McNeill singles out military-related production as the primary source of the whole process:
- “Thus both the absolute volume of production and the mix of products that came from British factories and forges, 1793-1815, was profoundly affected by government expenditures for war purposes. In particular, government demand created a precocious iron industry, with a capacity in excess of peacetime needs, as the postwar depression 1816-20 showed. But it also created the condition for future growth by giving British ironmasters extraordinary incentives for finding new uses for the cheaper product their new, large-scale furnaces were able to turn out. Military demands on the British economy thus went to shape the subsequent phases of the industrial revolution, allowing the improvement of steam engines and making such critical innovations as the iron railway and iron ships possible at a time and under conditions which simply would not have existed without the wartime impetus to iron production. To dismiss this feature of British economic history as ‘abnormal’ surely betrays a remarkable bias that seems to be widespread among economic historians.” (McNeill, 1982: 211-212)."
Moreover, as McNeill points out, the connection of military and industrial
development intensified especially between 1884 and 1914. As a result of
ongoing vigorous industrial research in relation to arms trade in that period,
technical innovations took place in areas such as steel metallurgy, industrial
chemistry, electrical machinery, radio communications, turbines, diesels, optics,
calculators, and hydraulic machinery. These innovations changed the course of
industrial production and transformed the everyday lives of millions of people all
over the world in the 20th century (McNeill, 1982: 292-293). Extensive research
on military aircraft during the World War I was later put in the service of
technological developments witnessed in civil and commercial aircraft (Buzan
and Sen, 1990: 332). Likewise, as notably documented by Flamm (1987),
developments in the technology of computers during the World War II, as well
as the emergence of a civil computer industry in the United States after the war,
were dependent on the research brought about by governmental spending on
military defense. In order to underline this ongoing relationship between military
interests and industrial development, Flamm (1987: 173) goes as far as
suggesting that the existing computer technology would not have developed as
fast as it did if military demand for the information-processing technologies had
not increased. Civil actors did not possess deployable resources or even interest
to initiate this line of research (Flamm, 1987: 173). Buzan and Sen (1990: 334)
make a similar point about the initial military research on atomic power that
provided the base for a civil industry of nuclear energy, emphasizing that only
the reason of war alone could compel the states to invest in such costly research.
Finally, military competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union in the Cold War context indicates the military roots of industrial
development. Expenditure on military research triggered by the Cold War paved
the way for the emergence of new industries (Markusen and Serfati, 2000: 272).
One of the most notable examples of such industries is space industry since, as
Flamm (1987: 51) points out, research program on space was initiated in the
United States only after the Soviet Union’s Sputnik project. As indicated by
Buzan and Sen (1990: 335), the emergence of space industry, and various
scientific and commercial activities associated with it (such as surveillance and
broadcasting), were dependent on the output of this initially military line of
research. In short, it seems evident that McNeill’s thesis on the link between
military development and industrial capitalism remained significant throughout
the 20th century.
In ASB, Arrighi makes his overall argument on the warfare-led nature of the Industrial Revolution with reference to McNeill’s work:
- “McNeill, among others, attributes a crucial role to military demands on the British economy during the Napoleonic Wars in making the improvement of steam engines and such epochmaking innovations as the iron railway and iron ships possible at a time and under conditions which simply would not have existed without the wartime impetus to iron production. In this sense, the Industrial Revolution in the sectors that really mattered –i.e., the capital-goods industries- was largely a byproduct of the European armaments race. Very soon, however, the application of the products and processes of modern industry to war-making activities –what McNeill calls ‘the industrialization of war’- gave an unprecedented impulse to that race.” (Arrighi, 2007: 268)."