Metatheory
Description
Nicholas Hedlund:
1.
"Following the prefix ‘meta,’ I define metatheory (as stated above) broadly as theory about or beyond theory—a systematic descriptive-explanatory lens about or beyond a systematic descriptive-explanatory lens. It is important to note, however, that there is no generally agreed upon overarching theoretical definition of metatheory that encompasses the major types of metatheory in practice. Anyone who explores the field will quickly learn that—rather ironically—there is a sprawling pluralism of definitions and practices employed under the auspices of the signifier ‘metatheory,’ often fragmented and isolated from each other, and invoking divergent referents. In a review of over 20 social scientific definitions of metatheory, Steven Wallis (2010) observed that many authors had divergent definitions: “while some were describing the broader field of metatheory, others were describing related, yet subordinate, areas of metatheory such as evaluation or categorization of metatheory” (p. 76). While in some sense such pluralism could be understood as perfectly healthy and valid, in my view, its related fragmentation also inhibits the consolidation and advancement of the field as a coherent meta-discipline. The field would arguably benefit from a more encompassing definition and understanding of the nature of metatheory that is inclusive of the plurality while beginning to link the various approaches in an overarching taxonomic framework. To sift through all the usages of metatheory exhaustively and systematically would be a daunting project, however, and one that is well beyond my scope here. I will suffice to offer a provisional construal that can encompass what I see as the major types in an integrative understanding."
2.
"The prefix ‘meta-’ (from the ancient Greek) refers to that which is “after, behind, between, or beyond” (OnlineEtymologyDictionary, 2020a), with ‘beyond’ arguably standing out as its primary early connotation. In the early twentieth century, ‘meta’ took on a self-reflexive or recursive connotation (i.e., ‘an X about X’). It is also worth noting that ‘theory’ (from the Greek theōria) originally meant a “view, seeing, or looking at” (OnlineEtymologyDictionary, 2020b)—essentially, a lens or perspective. In the modern period, ‘theory’ has come to generally be understood as a system of explanatory suppositions or ideas—a descriptive-explanatory lens.
Taken together, metatheory can be understood as a systematic descriptive-explanatory lens (theory) about or beyond a systematic descriptive-explanatory lens (theory). This definition is similar to that of Vandenberghe (2022), who usefully defines it as “theory about, above or beyond theory” (p. 3). Vandenberghe specifies an understanding of metatheory in a three-fold sense: “as an overarching worldview (metatheory1), as a mapping device (metatheory2) and as a propaedeutic to substantive theorizing (metatheory3)” (p. 3). His distinction of these three types of metatheory is useful indeed. However, I offer an account that emphasizes the distinction between philosophical and scientific types of metatheory, as we will see below. For Vandenberghe, however, his three types are conceived of as fusions of science and philosophy, with the key distinction between critical realism and integral theory, in his view, being found not at the level of the philosophy-science fault line, but, following the insightful analyses of Hans Despain (2013; 2014), at the level of what Bhaskar (1993/2008) calls ‘metacritique.’ Because critical realism includes axiological and political metacritique, Vandenberghe argues, critical realism constitutes a “metatheory 2.1” (p. 4). I argue that it is important to differentiate philosophical and scientific modes of metatheory, given their differences on the level of methodology and validity criteria. In the wake of such differentiation, they can be convincingly integrated. Otherwise, a fused or ambiguous blend of philosophy and science deficient in nuanced methodological self-reflection—what Edwards calls ‘traditional scholarship methods’—can reasonably invoke scepticism and critique, thereby potentially undermining the methodological rigour, validity, and cultural stature of metatheory." (footnote)
(https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10169200/7/Hedlund_10169200_thesis_revised.pdf)
Typology
1. According to George Rizter, from the Wikipedia:
"Metatheory can be defined as the attainment of a deeper understanding of theory, the creation of new theory, and the creation of an overarching theoretical perspective. There are three types of metatheorizing: Mu, Mp, and Mo. Through the application of the three subsets of metatheory, Ritzer argues that the field of sociology can create a stronger foundation, experience "rapid and dramatic growth", and generally increase not only the knowledge of metatheory but social theory in general.[39]
The first category of metatheory (Mu), aims at being a means of attaining a deeper understanding of theory. Within the greater category of Mu, Ritzer establishes four other subsets: internal-intellectual, internal-social, external-intellectual, and external-social. The internal-intellectual sector of Mu identifies the "schools of thought" and the structure of current sociologists and social theories. The internal-social subtype identifies connections between sociologists and connections between sociologists and society. The last two subsets of Mu are looking more at the macrolevel of sociology than the other two subsets. The third subtype of Mu is the external-intellectual view of sociology; it looks at different studies and their concepts, tools, and ideas in order to apply these aspects to sociology. The fourth, and final, subset is external-social where the impact of social theory in a larger societal setting is studied.[39]
The second (Mp), aims at being a prelude to theory development. New social theory is created due to the complex study and interpretation of other sociologists. For example, Karl Marx's theories are based on Hegel's theories. The theories of the American sociologist, Talcott Parsons, are based on the theories of Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, and Alfred Marshall.[39]
The last (Mo), aims at being a source of perspectives that overarch sociological theory.[39] Influenced by Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Ritzer has long advocated the view that social theory is improved by systematic, comparative and reflexive attention to implicit conceptual structures and oft-hidden assumptions.[40]
Key works include Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science (1975), Toward an Integrated Sociological Paradigm (1981), Metatheorizing in Sociology (1991), and Explorations in Social Theory: From Metatheorizing to Rationalization (2001). See also Ritzer’s edited Metatheorizing (1992)."
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Ritzer)
2. Nicholas Hedlund:
"There are at least two major architectonic genres of metatheory: philosophical metatheory and scientific metatheory. Generally speaking, philosophical metatheory addresses the ground or foundations of empirical-scientific inquiry, while also playing a normative-adjudicating role in relation to it, while scientific metatheory refers to a kind of overarching or global super theory that operates on, coordinates, and integrates more local, discipline-bound empirical theories.82 I will delineate these in turn, beginning with philosophical metatheory, before articulating a provisional integrative taxonomic framework that highlights the important and complementary role that each can play in the disclosure of reality as a whole and the advancement of an integrative metatheory apt for the metacrisis."
(https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10169200/7/Hedlund_10169200_thesis_revised.pdf)
Positivist Metatheory VS Integrative Metatheory 1.0
According to Hedlund, synthesized by DeepSeek:
The 19th century saw the emergence of modern positivist metatheory within the social sciences, particularly sociology. Its primary ambition was to produce a grand, systematic, and unified "big-picture" knowledge of society. It sought to achieve this by moving beyond what it saw as the unjustified, dogmatic, and speculative thinking of premodern metaphysics, aiming to ground its claims in a more rigorous, methodologically transparent process.
In principle, this positivist metatheory (or what we can term Integrative Metatheory 1.0) represented an advance. Its claims were open to a form of procedural rationality, being subject to epistemological evaluation and social validation through peer-review. Its goal was a discursive, rather than a purely subjective and dogmatic, form of knowledge production.
However, critical realism, particularly through the transcendental arguments of Roy Bhaskar, reveals that this progress was incomplete. While positivist metatheory constitutes a notable step beyond its premodern predecessors, it harbors a critical flaw: an implicit and unjustified ontology or metaphysics. Beneath its commitment to empirical verification lies a "flat" ontological framework (empirical realism) that is not itself empirically justified and remains vulnerable to transcendental critique.
* The Problem of Theoretical Monism
Positivist metatheory, while aspiring to an open, rational discourse, often exhibited a "modified recapitulation of the totalizing tendencies of premodern metaphysics." This is exemplified by the work of Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism and modern sociology. Comte developed sweeping, speculative theories of social evolution, like his "law of three stages," which proclaimed a unilinear and triumphalist progression from "primitive" to "civilized" society.
Comte’s approach, which he initially called "social physics," was modeled on the mechanistic worldview of Newtonian physics. Its aim was to discover universal causal laws governing society, characteristic of a "theoretical monism." This ambition was common to much of modernist social science, which sought to synthesize all knowledge into a single, overarching system.
* The Inadequacy of Positivist Metatheory
This type of metatheorizing has been criticized on several fronts:
- Reductionism and Oversimplification: It is insensitive to the open-systemic complexity, heterogeneity, and contingency of social life. It seeks universal laws and an abstract "monism" that flattens the nuanced reality of the sociosphere.
- Lack of Procedural Rationality: Its "grand theories" were often not grounded in a transparent and democratic methodology for social validation. As Mark Edwards notes, a key reason for its lack of scientific credibility is its "lack of a solid methodological basis."
- Unjustified Metaphysics and Ideology: It often covertly imports a specific and flawed metaphysics (empirical realism), which is not justified via transcendental or empirical procedures, making it vulnerable to critique. In Bhaskar's terminology, such oppressive and unreflective "metatheory" is better classified as ideology.
* The Postmodern Critique and Its Legacy
The postmodern critique of modernity has been instrumental in exposing the hidden ideologies, power dynamics, and Eurocentric biases embedded within these "positive" social sciences. For instance, it has shown how neo-classical economics, underlabouring for a system of extractive capitalism, peddles its claims under the guise of neutral "science" and "reason."
However, these critiques are a double-edged sword. While they shed light on genuine oppressions, they can also be weaponized to discredit the very notion of truth, reality, and big-picture knowledge itself. This has contributed directly to our current "post-truth" culture and the rise of regressive, ethno-nationalist movements that tout "alternative facts" and deny established scientific realities (like climate change).
* The Vacuum and the Need for a New Approach
The cumulative effect of modernity's rejection of premodern metaphysics and postmodernism's skepticism of all grand narratives has left a profound vacuum. We find ourselves in a culturally exhausted, disenchanted, and confused state, lacking a shared, overarching metanarrative to provide coherence and direction. The dominant default "metanarrative" has become an interlocking ideology of positivism, consumerism, and capitalism, which is now being challenged by ethno-nationalist and authoritarian movements.
A key paradox is that postmodernism itself, despite its anti-meta stance, has become a dominant metanarrative, producing radical epistemic fragmentation and anomie. The problem of our age, as many scholars have pointed out, is less about the oppression of a singular monolithic ideology and more about the deficiency or absence of any adequate, shared, big-picture metatheory.
We are at a cultural crossroads. We can either regress to premodern metaphysical or ideological metanarratives to fill the void, or we can forge a higher-order, sophisticated "post-postmetaphysical" or metamodern metatheory. This latter path is the one that Integrative Metatheory 2.0 seeks to chart, aiming to revindicate strong notions of truth and reality while remaining critically self-aware and epistemologically humble.
Integrative Metatheory 2.0
< "Integrative metatheory 2.0 has three distinct and interdependent modes: metatheory α (alpha) and metatheory β (beta)—or philosophical and scientific metatheory, respectively—as well as a third synthetic mode, or metatheory γ (gamma), representing their explicit integration." >
( [1] )
According to Nicholas Hedlund, synthesized by DeepSeek:
After nearly being eclipsed in the post-1960s academy by the dominance of postmodernism, big-picture metatheory began to re-emerge in the 1990s (Walsh, 2016). This revival, however, was marked by a crucial maturation. It carried with it a new appreciation for the social, historical, and linguistic complexities of knowledge production, a reflexive awareness of its own potential to harbor hidden ideologies, and a deep respect for theoretical pluralism and diversity.
In contrast to the "old school" monistic metatheory of modernity (Integrative Metatheory 1.0) and its ideological pitfalls, I propose the notion of Integrative Metatheory 2.0. This term designates a broad category of metatheorizing that is fit for the challenges of the twenty-first century and, most importantly, for addressing the planetary metacrisis.
Integrative Metatheory 2.0 can be defined as a form of big-picture theory, operating at the nexus of philosophy and science, that is grounded in four core principles:
- Methodological Transparency & Judgemental Rationalism
- Epistemic Reflexivity & Relativity
- Ontological Realism & Comprehensiveness
- Integrative Pluralism
The Four Core Principles
1. Methodological Transparency & Judgemental Rationalism
This principle requires a reflexive disclosure of the methodology and methods (or injunctions) from which knowledge claims are derived. Integrative Metatheory 2.0 adheres to a rigorous procedural rationality, meaning its methods are open to ongoing assessment and criticism based on clearly defined validity criteria. This transparency is a prerequisite for judgemental rationality—the capacity to rationally adjudicate between better or worse (true or false) knowledge claims. While this is made possible by acknowledging the fallibility of our knowledge, it remains dependent on ethical reflexivity and responsibility.
2. Epistemic Reflexivity & Relativity
This principle enacts a "researching the researcher" approach, asking metatheorists to critically examine their own assumptions and epistemic structures. By situating one's knowledge claims in this way, it helps to mitigate problems of personal bias and inter-individual variability. Combined with methodological transparency, epistemic reflexivity enriches the crucial final stage of the research process: social validation and peer review. Without such reflexive transparency, it becomes difficult to move beyond an assumed, but ultimately unsustainable, "view from nowhere."
3. Ontological Realism & Comprehensiveness
Ontological Realism is the critical realist view that the object of inquiry exists independently of our knowledge of it—it is "referentially detached" or "existentially intransitive." Ontological Comprehensiveness means that one's metatheorizing must account for all key dimensions of reality (subjective, social, and natural), including their real structures and mechanisms. This does not necessarily require integrating theory from all domains, but it demands that all are considered and that one's work is situated within this expansive context.
4. Integrative Pluralism (vs. Integrative Monism)
This principle stands in direct opposition to the integrative monism of Integrative Metatheory 1.0. Monism sought a singular, totalizing, and universal theory, often suppressing competing perspectives and flattening the diversity of the world. In contrast, integrative pluralism has two complementary declensions:
Epistemological Pluralism (emphasized by Integral Theory): retains an appreciation for the multiplicity of valid perspectives while weaving them together to build more expansive and coherent frameworks (M. G. Edwards, 2010).
Ontological Pluralism (emphasized by Critical Realism): is, at its most fundamental, a philosophical ontology that grasps the world as asymmetrically stratified, dynamic, and interconnected (Bhaskar, 1986/2009).
A Metamodern Synthesis
It is by virtue of these four principles—methodological transparency, epistemic reflexivity, ontological realism, and integrative pluralism—that Integrative Metatheory 2.0 goes beyond (or "sublates") the philosophical discourses of both modernity and postmodernity. It can therefore be justifiably considered a truly metamodern approach—one that is equipped to navigate the complexities of our current planetary moment.
More information
* Book: Metatheory for the Twenty-First Century: Critical Realism and Integral Theory in Dialogue (Ontological Explorations. Ed. by Roy Bhaskar and Sean Esbjörn-Hargen. Routledge, 2015
* Volume 1: Big Picture Perspectives on Planetary Flourishing: Metatheory for the Anthropocene: Volume 1
"This book, split across two volumes, is a follow-up and companion to Metatheory for the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2016). All three of these volumes are the dialogical outcome of a multi-year symposia series wherein critical realists and integral theorists deeply engaged each other and their distinct but complementary approaches to integrative metatheory. Whereas Metatheory for the Twenty-First Century is primarily theoretical in its focus, Big Picture Perspectives for Planetary Flourishing: Metatheory for the Anthropocene aims to more concretely and practically address the complex planetary crises of a new era that many scholars now refer to as ‘the Anthropocene.’
In this first of two new volumes, participants of the symposia series articulate a variety of ‘big picture perspectives’ and transformative interventions in the domains of society and economics, social psychology, and education. Together, these chapters demonstrate how integrative metatheory and its application can make powerful contributions to planetary flourishing in the Anthropocene.
With one of the defining characteristics of the Anthropocene being the sheer complexity and multi-valent nature of our interconnected global challenges, these volumes crucially present new forms of scholarship that can adequately weave together insights from multiple disciplines into new forms of metapraxis. As such, this book will be of interest to students, scholars, and practitioners in the areas of philosophy, social theory, critical realism, integral studies, metamodernism, and current affairs generally."
- Volume 2: Integrative Responses to the Global Metacrisis: METATHEORY FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE, Vol 2
URL = https://www.eudaimoniainstitute.org/post/integrative-responses-to-the-global-metacrisis
"This book, split across two volumes, is a follow-up and companion to Metatheory for the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2016). All three of these volumes are the dialogical outcomes of a multi-year symposia series wherein critical realists and integral theorists deeply engaged each other and their distinct but complementary approaches to integrative metatheory. Whereas the latter is primarily theoretical in its focus, Metatheory for the Anthropocene aims to more concretely and practically address the complex planetary crises of a new era that many scholars now refer to as ‘the Anthropocene.’
In this second of the two new volumes, participants of the symposia series apply the powerful sensemaking and meaning-making frameworks of critical realism and integral theory to forge integrative responses to the global metacrisis—or the multiple causally interconnected large-scale crises occurring simultaneously. Together these chapters demonstrate how integrative metatheory and its application can make crucial contributions to addressing our global metacrisis in the domains of climate change, integrative research, religion and spirituality, and what could be termed ‘metaintegrations’.
Both volumes together highlight the important role that metatheory can play in the Anthropocene. With one of the defining characteristics of the Anthropocene being the sheer complexity and multivalent nature of our interconnected global challenges, these volumes crucially present new forms of metatheory that can adequately weave together insights from multiple disciplines into new forms of metapraxis that accord with such complexity. As such, this book will be of interest to students, scholars, and practitioners in the areas of philosophy, social theory, critical realism, integral studies, metamodernism, and current affairs generally."
(https://www.eudaimoniainstitute.org/post/integrative-responses-to-the-global-metacrisis)