Harmony vs Ontological Division as the Key Difference Between China and the West

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Michel Bauwens asked ChatGPT to review the debate between the thesis by Shuchen Xiang in her book, Chinese Cosmopolitalism and Jean Goffin in his book 'Confucius and Aristote'.


Discussion

Confucius, Aristotle, and the Question of Harmony: Shuchen Xiang versus Jean Goffin

A revealing contrast exists between the interpretation of Chinese civilization proposed by Shuchen Xiang and that advanced by Jean Goffin in his book Confucius et Aristote. While Xiang emphasizes profound differences between the Chinese and Greek intellectual traditions, Goffin argues that Confucius and Aristotle share a common ethical foundation.

This debate concerns a broader question: are the world's major civilizational traditions fundamentally distinct, or do they converge around common principles despite their different historical trajectories?


Shuchen Xiang: Harmony versus Ontological Division

In her book Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The History and Philosophy of an Idea, Shuchen Xiang argues that Chinese civilization developed a distinctive way of understanding difference and alterity.

According to Xiang:

  • Chinese identity historically evolved through processes of assimilation and synthesis.
  • Difference is not treated as ontologically fixed.
  • The ideal is harmonization rather than domination.
  • Political efficacy is traditionally associated with attraction through virtue rather than coercion.
  • Chinese thought tends toward relational and processual understandings of reality.

By contrast, Xiang argues that many Western traditions have tended to define identity through distinction, opposition, and exclusion. Aristotle often appears in such accounts as a representative of a broader Greek intellectual orientation characterized by:

  • Classification and categorization.
  • Definition through genus and specific difference.
  • Logical distinction between entities.
  • Clear separation between self and other.

For this reason, some readers summarize Xiang's position as contrasting "Confucian harmony" with "Aristotelian exclusion", although this formulation simplifies her more nuanced argument.

A particularly important chapter in this regard is The Metaphysics of Harmony and the Metaphysics of Colonialism.

Several scholars have discussed and criticized aspects of Xiang's thesis in an "Author Meets Readers" symposium. Among the recurring criticisms are:

  • The contrast between "China" and "the West" may be drawn too sharply.
  • Western intellectual traditions may be treated too homogeneously.
  • Aristotelian thought may be reduced to its classificatory dimensions at the expense of its ethical teachings.

References


Jean Goffin: Confucius and Aristotle as Allies

Jean Goffin advances an almost opposite thesis in Confucius et Aristote. Rather than emphasizing differences between Chinese and Greek thought, he argues that Confucius and Aristotle share fundamental ethical assumptions.

Among the similarities often noted by comparative philosophers are:

  • Ethics centered on the cultivation of virtue.
  • The importance of practical wisdom.
  • The formative role of education.
  • Moral development through habituation and practice.
  • The primacy of community and social relations.
  • The pursuit of human flourishing through self-cultivation.

This perspective finds support in comparative studies of Confucian and Aristotelian ethics.

Comparative philosophers have often noted a number of striking parallels between Aristotelian and Confucian ethics.

  • Aristotle's concept of virtue (aretē) may be compared to the Confucian notion of virtue (de, 德). In both traditions, moral excellence is understood less as obedience to rules than as the cultivation of character.
  • Aristotle's practical wisdom (phronesis) resembles the Confucian emphasis on contextual judgment (zhi, 智). In both cases, ethical action requires discerning what is appropriate in particular circumstances rather than mechanically applying abstract principles.
  • Aristotle's doctrine of habituation parallels the Confucian practice of ritual cultivation (li, 禮). Both traditions stress that moral dispositions are acquired through repeated practice and participation in social forms.
  • Aristotle's ideal of human flourishing (eudaimonia) may be compared to the Confucian project of self-cultivation. In both traditions, the goal of ethics is the full realization of human potential within a social context.
  • Aristotle's doctrine of the mean shares important affinities with the Confucian concept of the Zhongyong (中庸), often translated as the "Doctrine of the Mean." Both seek a balanced response that avoids extremes while remaining sensitive to circumstances.

These parallels have led some scholars, including Jean Goffin, to argue that Confucius and Aristotle belong to a common family of virtue-centered ethical traditions, despite the profound differences separating their respective civilizations and metaphysical assumptions.

From this perspective, Aristotle appears less as a philosopher of exclusion than as a philosopher of virtue, while Confucius appears less as a theorist of harmony than as a teacher of ethical cultivation. At this level, the two traditions display striking convergences.


Toward a Synthesis

The apparent opposition between Xiang and Goffin may partly result from the fact that they operate at different levels of analysis.

Xiang's comparison is primarily civilizational and metaphysical. Her central question is:

How does a civilization conceptualize difference itself?

Her answer is that Chinese thought tends toward relational harmonization, whereas many Western traditions have tended toward categorical distinction.

Goffin's comparison is primarily ethical and anthropological. His central question is:

What kind of human being should we become?

At this level, Confucianism and Aristotelianism may be remarkably similar.

This suggests a possible reconciliation:

  • At the level of metaphysics, important differences may exist between Confucian and Aristotelian traditions.
  • At the level of ethics, both traditions may converge around virtue, education, self-cultivation, and communal life.

Many contemporary comparative philosophers therefore avoid framing the relationship as one of either complete opposition or complete identity. Instead, they emphasize a family resemblance between traditions that developed independently yet arrived at analogous visions of ethical life while grounding them in distinct metaphysical assumptions.


How this relates to our work on Distributed Commons-Based Hermeneutics and Universalism as Negotiation

Beyond Opposition and Identity: Universalism as Negotiation:

The contrast between Shuchen Xiang and Jean Goffin can be interpreted as illustrating two complementary dimensions of intercivilizational dialogue.

Xiang emphasizes differences in civilizational ontology. Chinese and Western traditions have developed distinct understandings of identity, alterity, order, and the relation between self and world. Her analysis suggests that genuine dialogue requires acknowledging these differences rather than prematurely subsuming them under a supposedly universal framework.

Goffin, by contrast, highlights convergences at the ethical level. Despite their differing metaphysical assumptions, Confucius and Aristotle both developed traditions centered on virtue, self-cultivation, practical wisdom, education, and the formation of character within communities.

The apparent contradiction between these positions may dissolve when viewed through the lens of distributed hermeneutics.

A distributed hermeneutic approach neither assumes a pre-existing universalism nor accepts the impossibility of mutual understanding. Instead, it sees universality as an ongoing process of interpretation and negotiation among diverse traditions.

From this perspective:

  • Xiang reminds us that civilizations often begin from different ontological premises.
  • Goffin reminds us that civilizations may nevertheless converge on analogous ethical insights.
  • Hermeneutic dialogue becomes the process through which differences are interpreted and commonalities discovered.

Universalism thus ceases to be a doctrine imposed from a single civilizational center. It becomes a negotiated achievement emerging from encounters among multiple traditions.

In such a framework, neither Confucianism nor Aristotelianism possesses a monopoly on universality. Each constitutes a partial perspective capable of contributing to a broader planetary conversation.

The task is therefore not to determine whether Confucius and Aristotle are identical or opposed, but to understand how distinct traditions can enter into a productive hermeneutic relationship. What emerges from this process is not a universalism of sameness but a universalism of translation, reciprocity, and mutual transformation.

Such a conception aligns with the broader project of a distributed hermeneutics of the commons, in which shared meanings are not centrally defined but continuously co-created through dialogue among communities, cultures, and civilizations.

In this sense, universalism is neither discovered nor imposed; it is negotiated.

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