Dominant Capital and the New Wars: Difference between revisions
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URL = https://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/jwsr/article/view/304 [https://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/2/040813BN_Dominant_Capital_&_the_New_Wars_(1PageView).pdf pdf] | URL = https://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/jwsr/article/view/304 [https://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/2/040813BN_Dominant_Capital_&_the_New_Wars_(1PageView).pdf pdf] | ||
See also the book by the same authors: [[Capital as Power]] | |||
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This paper offers a radical alternative that is both theoretically new and empirically grounded. We use the new wars as a stepping stone to understand a triple transformation that altered the nature of capital, the accumulation of capital and the unit of capital. Specifically, our argument builds on a power understanding of capital that emphasizes differential accumulation by dominant capital groups. Accumulation, we argue, has little to do with the amassment of material things measured in utils or abstract labor. Instead, accumulation, or capitalization, represents a commodification of power by leading groups in society. Over the past century, this power has been restructured and concentrated through two distinct regimes of differential accumulation breadth and depth. A breadth regime relies on proletarianization, on green-field investment and, particularly, on mergers and acquisitions. A depth regime builds on redistribution through stagflation that is, on differential inflation in the midst of stagnation. In contrast to breadth which presupposes some measure of growth and stability, depth thrives on accumulation through crisis. The past twenty years were dominated by breadth, buttressed by neoliberal rhetoric, globalization and capital mobility. This regime started to run into mounting difficulties in the late 1990s, and eventually collapsed in 2000. For differential accumulation to continue, dominant capital now needs inflation, and inflation requires instability and social crisis. It is within this broader dynamics of power accumulation that the new wars need to be understood." | This paper offers a radical alternative that is both theoretically new and empirically grounded. We use the new wars as a stepping stone to understand a triple transformation that altered the nature of capital, the accumulation of capital and the unit of capital. Specifically, our argument builds on a power understanding of capital that emphasizes differential accumulation by dominant capital groups. Accumulation, we argue, has little to do with the amassment of material things measured in utils or abstract labor. Instead, accumulation, or capitalization, represents a commodification of power by leading groups in society. Over the past century, this power has been restructured and concentrated through two distinct regimes of differential accumulation breadth and depth. A breadth regime relies on proletarianization, on green-field investment and, particularly, on mergers and acquisitions. A depth regime builds on redistribution through stagflation that is, on differential inflation in the midst of stagnation. In contrast to breadth which presupposes some measure of growth and stability, depth thrives on accumulation through crisis. The past twenty years were dominated by breadth, buttressed by neoliberal rhetoric, globalization and capital mobility. This regime started to run into mounting difficulties in the late 1990s, and eventually collapsed in 2000. For differential accumulation to continue, dominant capital now needs inflation, and inflation requires instability and social crisis. It is within this broader dynamics of power accumulation that the new wars need to be understood." | ||
=Excerpts= | |||
==The new characteristics of capital accumulation== | |||
By Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan: | |||
We need "an alternative conceptualization of capital, understood not as a material entity but as a power institution. What gets accumulated, we argue, is neither ‘utility’ nor ‘dead labor,’ but financial claims on expected future earnings. These expected earnings, in turn, | |||
represent neither the ‘marginal productivity’ of capital nor ‘surplus value,’ but | |||
the way capitalists view the future structure of power in society. | |||
A power understanding of accumulation leads to different units of analysis. | |||
Marx differentiated between three ‘types’ of capital owned by three corresponding ‘fractions’ of the capitalist class—‘industrial,’ ‘commercial’ and ‘fi nancial.’ | |||
This division is no longer tenable. All modern ownership is financial, and only | |||
financial. It is a claim on pecuniary earnings. And pecuniary earnings reflect | |||
not production or consumption, but power, and only power. Th is central role | |||
of power means that it is no longer enough to think in terms of capital ‘in general’ and ‘individual capitals’ in competition. Instead, the attention should be | |||
focused on dominant capital—namely, on the largest power coalitions at the | |||
centre of the political economy. Different coalitions within dominant capital | |||
sometimes are associated with different ‘types’ of business activity, such as oil, | |||
weapons, telecommunication or financial intermediation. But these differences | |||
are only partly, and sometimes not at all, related to the nature of ‘production’ | |||
per se. Business is a matter of profit, and profit comes not from production, but | |||
from power — the power to reshape the trajectory of social reproduction as a whole. | |||
Different segments within dominant capital are differentiated by the nature of | |||
their power. Production, narrowly defined, is merely an aspect of that power. | |||
Driven by the quest for power, the goal of these dominant capital groups is | |||
not absolute accumulation, but differential accumulation. They try not to maximize profit, but to beat the average and exceed the normal rate of return. Th ere | |||
is a big difference between these two goals. Profit maximizers focus on their | |||
own earnings. By contrast, differential accumulators also benefit, sometimes | |||
greatly, by lowering the earnings of others. | |||
This difference is reflected in the ‘mechanisms’ of accumulation. Traditional | |||
analysis of accumulation emphasizes the importance to accumulation of overall | |||
growth and price stability. But for dominant capital, differential accumulation | |||
works best through mergers and acquisitions and through the redistributional | |||
effects of stagflation (stagnation combined with inflation). And, indeed, during | |||
the twentieth century, with the progressive spread of dominant capital and differential accumulation, there emerged an almost stylized cycle of diff erential | |||
accumulation ‘regimes,’ oscillating between relatively long periods of corporate | |||
amalgamation and shorter periods of stagflation." | |||
(https://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/2/040813BN_Dominant_Capital_&_the_New_Wars_(1PageView).pdf) | |||
[[Category:Politics]] | [[Category:Politics]] | ||
[[Category:Bauwens Reading Notes Project]] | [[Category:Bauwens Reading Notes Project]] | ||
[[Category:Security]] | [[Category:Security]] | ||
Revision as of 07:33, 18 September 2021
* Article: Dominant Capital and the New Wars. By Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan. Journal of World-Systems Research, 10(2), 255-327, 2004. doi
URL = https://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/jwsr/article/view/304 pdf
See also the book by the same authors: Capital as Power
Contextual Quote
"The new wars of the early 2000s mark a significant turning point in world affairs. During the 1980s and 1990s, it was popular to talk about the return of ‘unregulated capitalism.’ It was the dawn of a new era, many said, the era of ‘neoliberal globalization.’ The hallmarks of this new-old order appeared unmistakable. Falling budget deficits, tight monetary policy, deregulation, free trade and capital decontrols became the new orthodoxy. Th e ideological rhetoric spoke of ‘democracy,’ ‘global villageism’ and ‘peace dividends.’ The welfarwarfare state was on its way out. Laissez faire was back in fashion. The trajectory seemed so obvious that some were even tempted to announce the ‘end of history.’
In the early 2000s, though, the tables suddenly turned. Fiscal and monetary policies were ‘loosened,’ ‘protectionist’ measures were reintroduced and the tidal wave of capital fl ow turned to a trickle. Talk of a ‘global village’ quickly disappeared and was replaced by a global ‘war on terror.’ Democracy has given way to Homeland Security. Expectations for peace dividends have dissipated in favor of ‘war profits.’ History was back with a vengeance."
- Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan [1]
Abstract
"The recent shift from global villageism to the new wars revealed a deep crisis in heterodox political economy. The popular belief in neoliberal globalization, peace dividends, fiscal conservatism and sound finance that dominated the 1980s and 1990s suddenly collapsed. The early 2000s brought rising xenophobia, growing military budgets and policy profligacy.
Radicals were the first to identify this transition, but their attempts to explain it have been bogged down by two major hurdles:
(1) most writers continue to apply nineteenth century theories and concepts to twenty-first century realities; and
(2) few seem to bother with empirical analysis.
This paper offers a radical alternative that is both theoretically new and empirically grounded. We use the new wars as a stepping stone to understand a triple transformation that altered the nature of capital, the accumulation of capital and the unit of capital. Specifically, our argument builds on a power understanding of capital that emphasizes differential accumulation by dominant capital groups. Accumulation, we argue, has little to do with the amassment of material things measured in utils or abstract labor. Instead, accumulation, or capitalization, represents a commodification of power by leading groups in society. Over the past century, this power has been restructured and concentrated through two distinct regimes of differential accumulation breadth and depth. A breadth regime relies on proletarianization, on green-field investment and, particularly, on mergers and acquisitions. A depth regime builds on redistribution through stagflation that is, on differential inflation in the midst of stagnation. In contrast to breadth which presupposes some measure of growth and stability, depth thrives on accumulation through crisis. The past twenty years were dominated by breadth, buttressed by neoliberal rhetoric, globalization and capital mobility. This regime started to run into mounting difficulties in the late 1990s, and eventually collapsed in 2000. For differential accumulation to continue, dominant capital now needs inflation, and inflation requires instability and social crisis. It is within this broader dynamics of power accumulation that the new wars need to be understood."
Excerpts
The new characteristics of capital accumulation
By Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan:
We need "an alternative conceptualization of capital, understood not as a material entity but as a power institution. What gets accumulated, we argue, is neither ‘utility’ nor ‘dead labor,’ but financial claims on expected future earnings. These expected earnings, in turn, represent neither the ‘marginal productivity’ of capital nor ‘surplus value,’ but the way capitalists view the future structure of power in society.
A power understanding of accumulation leads to different units of analysis. Marx differentiated between three ‘types’ of capital owned by three corresponding ‘fractions’ of the capitalist class—‘industrial,’ ‘commercial’ and ‘fi nancial.’ This division is no longer tenable. All modern ownership is financial, and only financial. It is a claim on pecuniary earnings. And pecuniary earnings reflect not production or consumption, but power, and only power. Th is central role of power means that it is no longer enough to think in terms of capital ‘in general’ and ‘individual capitals’ in competition. Instead, the attention should be focused on dominant capital—namely, on the largest power coalitions at the centre of the political economy. Different coalitions within dominant capital sometimes are associated with different ‘types’ of business activity, such as oil, weapons, telecommunication or financial intermediation. But these differences are only partly, and sometimes not at all, related to the nature of ‘production’ per se. Business is a matter of profit, and profit comes not from production, but from power — the power to reshape the trajectory of social reproduction as a whole.
Different segments within dominant capital are differentiated by the nature of their power. Production, narrowly defined, is merely an aspect of that power.
Driven by the quest for power, the goal of these dominant capital groups is not absolute accumulation, but differential accumulation. They try not to maximize profit, but to beat the average and exceed the normal rate of return. Th ere is a big difference between these two goals. Profit maximizers focus on their own earnings. By contrast, differential accumulators also benefit, sometimes greatly, by lowering the earnings of others.
This difference is reflected in the ‘mechanisms’ of accumulation. Traditional analysis of accumulation emphasizes the importance to accumulation of overall growth and price stability. But for dominant capital, differential accumulation works best through mergers and acquisitions and through the redistributional effects of stagflation (stagnation combined with inflation). And, indeed, during the twentieth century, with the progressive spread of dominant capital and differential accumulation, there emerged an almost stylized cycle of diff erential accumulation ‘regimes,’ oscillating between relatively long periods of corporate amalgamation and shorter periods of stagflation."
(https://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/2/040813BN_Dominant_Capital_&_the_New_Wars_(1PageView).pdf)