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| In the sandbox you can '''play''' with ''wiki syntax'' and more. | | In the sandbox you can '''play''' with ''wiki syntax'' and more. |
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| | You answered (11jan09): |
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| From Nation State, via Market State, to Rhizomatic State
| | "As free software moves from the margins to center stage, more and more |
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| | corporations adapt to the model, and pay programmers to do such parts of the |
| | free software as needed for themselves, but they use the open licenses. |
| | So these corporations compete, but also collaborate through the common |
| | platform of free software. |
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| | For Linux, 75% of programmers are now paid by such corporations, which means |
| | they have an increasing influence over the direction of development, have a |
| | seat in the Foundations etc; (...) |
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| the Nation-State | | The reality of the various projects is then strongly influenced by the governance model, |
| actors of globalization do not realize that rhizome terrorism is not fighting the policies of
| | which can be controlled primarily by a community-oriented foundation, or by |
| particular states, but that the source of conflict is the fundamental incompatibility of rhizome
| | a corporate-oriented format." |
| with the hierarchal nature of both globalization and the state.
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| The above quote is from an essay by Jeff Vail http://www.jeffvail.net/atheoryofpower.pdf, The New Map http://www.jeffvail.net/thenewmap.pdf : terrorism and the decline of the nation-state in the post-cartesian world
| | Some remarks about the existence of "hybrid forms" and about the dynamics of these forms. |
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| | The reality you describe is a hybrid social form of production, borrowing aspects from both systems, capitalism and P2P, or peer production. Using your definition of peer production (free and open input; free volunteering production; universally available output), one can say that there are hybrid aspects at the three moments of the process: 1. input, raw material is partly capitalistic as the computers, the offices, etc. are privately owned by the corporations (as IBM), but, for software production, free/open software is also a "raw material"; 2. production is not based on free volunteering, but some aspects of the production are new, non capitalistic, as the cooperation between programmers of antagonistic corporations; 3. the output can be oriented by corporations more towards their own needs (commercial management software, for example) but the output remains universally available. |
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| It is a very good intro to the transformation of state forms and the difficulties of both the nation state and the neoliberal market state.
| | The "social networking" also generates hybrid forms. If you take MySpace or YouTube: 1. the input is partly capitalistic (the infrastructures and the financing by advertising), but for the rest most of the input (videos, blogs, etc.) are free and open; 2. the production process is based partially on capitalist wage relations for the infrastructure management, but the rest is based on free volunteering; 3. the output is supposed to be universally available but corporations impose limits and try to extend these limits, provoking open conflicts with users/producers. (See for example: http://bang.calit2.net/tts/2008/12/31/why-i-am-deleting-my-myspace-account-and-you-should-too/) |
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| I do have some general remarks though, that make the approach insufficient in my own understanding of the topic.
| | Hybrid forms also developed in the past transitions between modes of production. Between the 6th and the 10h century, many landlords, including the Church, had simultaneously slaves and serfs (or "coloni" which were the first form of serfs). Between the 12th century and the 19th century many hybrid forms developed especially in the cities where capitalism developed within feudal relationships. |
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| 1) does it make sense to counterpose so radically the distributed and hierarchical formats? For example, Manuel De Landa insists that meshworks and hierarchies always mix http://p2pfoundation.net/Meshworks. I also miss the in my mind clear distinction between centralization (hierarchy), decentralisation (division of power in competing groups and institutions) and distribution (bottom up dynamics of free agents). If this is true, then we have to start formulating the issue in a different way, as in: which form of state or hierarchy is beneficial for peer to peer dynamics
| | The evolution of these forms has been often slow, with periods of acceleration but also periods of recession. The example of the Arsenal of Venice, which in the early 16th century employed some 16,000 people and could produce almost a ship per day using production-lines, something not seen again after until the industrial revolution, illustrates how non-linear this evolution can be. |
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| 2)Jeff's text seems to focus exclusively on what I would call the dark side of peer to peer, i.e. primary social groups, often authoritarian in character, who use peer to peer tactics and formats to win a struggle and organize themselves, but within a reactionary mindset. They exist and exert a powerful pressure, but what about the effect of positive social practices and forms of organization, who mix peer to peer formats with a peer to peer intent? Surely the resulting state form of both groups and endeavours would be sensible different?
| | The dynamic of that evolution depends on many factors. The evolution of technologies is one of them, but it is far from explaining everything, as the Venetian Arsenal example shows. Here the social consciousness, the social and political conflicts play a crucial role. The European wars of religion after the 16th century and the bourgeois revolutions where indirect or direct expressions of the conflict between the old feudal logic and the raising capitalistic one. |
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| 3) by doing this, it then focuses on state forms such as those of the hezbollah, al qaeda, etc... which are of course real and influential, but give a format to the rhizomatic state that may not at all be acceptable to the social forces that I'm observing. So I feel this is insufficiently theorized.
| | In the conflict you refer to about the management of Free/open software foundations, between "community-oriented" and "corporate-oriented" formats, we are witnessing the same kind of conflict between the old logic and the new. Its dynamic depends and will depend not only on material-technological realities but also on social and "political" struggles, at micro and macro scales. And things should become harsher when peer production will pretend to extend to the realm of material production. |
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| However, I have not read Jeff's major works such as a Theory of Power in which he may have addressed this.
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| Without further ado, an introduction to this important essay.
| | You also wrote: |
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| | "This is inevitable, as no free software project can survive in the long run |
| | without a core of developers being paid." |
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| 1. The Crisis of the Nation-State
| | Yes. As long as the material means of production (and thus the material means of consumption) remain under the capitalist logic governance, the peer production realities will be in a way or another limited. |
| | (At a certain level, the problems to finance the 4th Oekonux Conference, or your personal difficulties to keep working the P2P Foundation while being obliged to work in order too feed your family are also materializations of that reality). |
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| The steady decrease of the Nation-State’s ability to provide for the welfare of its nation | | The development of the present economic crisis should make more visible at a social scale the need to overcome the dominant logic. The "invisible hand" is paralyzing an increasing share of the material means of production while workers are made redundant and unsatisfied material needs explode. Let's hope that this evidence will help to develop the consciousness of the urgency to extend peer production principles to the material sphere. |
| serves to decrease the bond between nation and state, lowering the barriers to entry of alternate,
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| overlapping affinity networks. This results in either the reversion of marginalized populations to their primary loyalties, the adoption by that population of supra-national loyalties, or both.
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| Primary loyalties, the small scale, local or ethnic affinity networks that emerge in times of
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| chaos, are particularly effective at fomenting the breakdown of national cohesion.
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| The continual, hierarchal intensification of the process of globalization is steadily fueling
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| the worldwide emergence of competing networks of primary loyalties which are co-spatial and
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| contemporaneous to the national foundations of the Nation-State. These include networks based
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| on religious identity, economic caste, micro-cultural affiliation, and geographic locality.
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| Because these networks rarely coincide spatially with Nation-State borders, their very existence
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| contradicts the Cartesian notion of the constitutional nature of modern Nation-States.
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| Increasingly these networks of primary loyalties are blending—not behind a single ideological or
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| political platform, but behind a unifying, non-hierarchal organizational principle: rhizome. For
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| now this organizational principle is most visibly embodied by the phenomena of international
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| terrorism.
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| The rise in international terrorism is perhaps the final straw that, when combined with the
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| influences of multiculturalism and globalization, destroys the legitimacy of the Nation-State.
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| The Nation-State system is predicated upon the twin principles of sovereignty: a domestic
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| monopoly on the use of violence, and a singular focus for inter-state violence. Terrorism
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| invalidates both claims. Exacerbated by reactionary ideologies and the expanding economic
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| inequality brought by globalization, terrorism undermines the state’s role of security provider.
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| Additionally, as independent international actors, both terrorist organizations and multinational
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| corporations represent their own interests, unconstrained by either a Cartesian notion of
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| Nation-State borders or the prevailing interests of a national constituency. Terrorism represents
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| the merger of the military force of the state and the overlapping, non-Cartesian geography of
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| non-state networks. In a world freed of the rigid boundaries of the Nation-State system, and with
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| the substantial, overlapping web of affiliation and connectivity created by emerging, global
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| terrorist organizations, the stage is set for a defining conflict that will replace the last vestiges of
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| the Nation-State with the New Map.
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| 2. The Market State
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| Fueled by the breakdown of Cartesian order, the spread of multiculturalism, and
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| technological advancements in communication and transportation, the hierarchal process of
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| globalization is forcing the Nation-State to evolve or die. Those states that are evolving to
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| maintain viability are gradually taking the form of the Market-State, an awkward and
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| unfinished formulation where powerful market interests exert their influence on the state to
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| leverage the remnant allegiances of national populations to the benefit of their selfish interests.
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| While the Market-State is theoretically organized to maximize opportunity and total
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| wealth, its failure to account for median wealth and to support expected social safety nets such as
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| pensions and health care serves ultimately to polarize the Earth’s population. In the end, while
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| the Market-State may theoretically maximize wealth, it also maximizes disparity between an
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| increasingly rich and powerful few with the increasingly impoverished masses. Ultimately, this
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| “disparity and economic desperation is the fuel that supports the reactionary flame of
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| terrorism.” In the face of this growing disparity created by the emerging Market-State, a
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| rhizome countermovement is emerging.
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| 3. The emergence of rhizomatic opposition
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| At present, the phenomena of international terrorism is the most publicly visible example
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| of this rhizome opposition. The watershed innovation of today’s terrorism is not its military
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| efficacy, however, but its use of rhizome structure to confront the hierarchal establishment.
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| The global community is gradually becoming aware of this structural novelty, but they fail to | |
| perceive it as a larger, structural transition. As Foreign Policy Editor Moisés Naím keenly
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| observed, there is an increasing tendency for non-state power structures to:
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| move away from fixed hierarchies and toward decentralized networks; away from
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| controlling leaders and toward multiple, loosely linked, dispersed agents and
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| cells; away from rigid lines of control and exchange and toward constantly
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| shifting transactions as opportunities dictate. It is a mutation that [governments]
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| barely recognized and could not, in any case, hope to emulate.
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| In short, the watershed innovation of the New Map is the rise of this organizational principle of
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| rhizome, fueled by the changing pathways of a globalizing world, to present a direct challenge,
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| not merely to the existing Nation-State structure, but to the very principle of hierarchal
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| organization that underwrites today’s concept of global order. It is this fundamental, structural
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| nature of conflict within the New Map that is so grossly overlooked by today’s theorists and
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| policy makers. In order to truly understand the crisis of the New Map, in order to create
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| effective policy within this novel structural context, an examination of the polar structural
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| patterns of hierarchy and rhizome is necessary.
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| Rhizome, the opposing constitutional system of networks of
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| independent but interacting nodes, is the animating principle behind terrorism, emerging illicit
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| trade networks, and the more benign economic processes of localization and self-sufficiency that
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| stand in opposition to globalization.
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| The interaction of hierarchy and rhizome inherently generates conflict as hierarchy’s
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| attempts to create economic dependency through economies of place and scale are mutually
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| exclusive of rhizome’s tendency to devolve economic structures towards localized independence
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| and parity. In a world largely stuck in the mindset of the Nation-State and oblivious to the
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| emerging conflict of hierarchy versus rhizome, terrorism is the vanguard of a rhizome movement
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| that sits on the cusp of a dawning, non-Cartesian reality. It is what Antonio Negri has called a
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| “diagonal” that opposes hierarchy by confronting its weaknesses, rather than direct confrontation
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| with its strengths. Rhizome is out of phase with hierarchy while simultaneously occupying the
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| same point in history, the same territory on the Cartesian plane. Rhizome is an emergent
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| phenomenon, analogous to the emergent intelligence of the human brain, presenting radically
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| different, and often superior, information processing capability when compared to the machine
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| intelligence of hierarchy.
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| 4. Conclusions
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| On the most fundamental level, the challenges of the
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| New Map must be met with policy that embraces rhizome. Reducing the dominance of
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| hierarchal organization within our world economic and political system and working to affect a
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| smooth transition to a more decentralized, networked world will result in a world with less
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| disparity and a lower capacity for conflict.
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| Within the New Map there are two choices. Existing Nation-States can embrace
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| hierarchy, and transition to the market-state model, as envisioned by constitutional law professor
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| Phillip Bobbitt, or they can embrace rhizome and embark upon the same spirit of bold
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| adventure and constitutional invention that created America over two centuries ago. Those that
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| embrace hierarchy will increasingly face the emergent, rhizome forces of those who must, by
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| definition, reside at the base of hierarchy’s pyramid—“terrorists” and “freedom fighters” alike.
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| Those states that choose to transition to rhizome, however, might finally escape this structural
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| violence of hierarchy.
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| The New Map is a problem that requires a structural solution—that of rhizome.
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| Advocates of the perpetuation of hierarchy and the Market-State system will surely continue to
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| suggest legal solutions that merely address structural symptoms such as terrorism. It is my
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| opinion that they will meet with the same failure as past attempts to deny the reality of the
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| evolving global structure.
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| In light of the
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| emerging reality of the New Map, it would be more prudent to employ the law as a tool to
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| embrace rhizome, to affect a smooth transition to a world that has, on the ground, already begun
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| moving beyond the Nation-State. The embrace of rhizome is not a policy that must be affected
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| by expeditionary militaries or in far-off lands. It is a policy that must be affected in the heart of
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| Western powers—in their state-sponsored systems of wealth creation and distribution. These
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| systems are currently founded upon the hierarchal mode of ownership, and are the engine of
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| structural disparity.
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In the sandbox you can play with wiki syntax and more.
You answered (11jan09):
"As free software moves from the margins to center stage, more and more
corporations adapt to the model, and pay programmers to do such parts of the
free software as needed for themselves, but they use the open licenses.
So these corporations compete, but also collaborate through the common
platform of free software.
For Linux, 75% of programmers are now paid by such corporations, which means
they have an increasing influence over the direction of development, have a
seat in the Foundations etc; (...)
The reality of the various projects is then strongly influenced by the governance model,
which can be controlled primarily by a community-oriented foundation, or by
a corporate-oriented format."
Some remarks about the existence of "hybrid forms" and about the dynamics of these forms.
The reality you describe is a hybrid social form of production, borrowing aspects from both systems, capitalism and P2P, or peer production. Using your definition of peer production (free and open input; free volunteering production; universally available output), one can say that there are hybrid aspects at the three moments of the process: 1. input, raw material is partly capitalistic as the computers, the offices, etc. are privately owned by the corporations (as IBM), but, for software production, free/open software is also a "raw material"; 2. production is not based on free volunteering, but some aspects of the production are new, non capitalistic, as the cooperation between programmers of antagonistic corporations; 3. the output can be oriented by corporations more towards their own needs (commercial management software, for example) but the output remains universally available.
The "social networking" also generates hybrid forms. If you take MySpace or YouTube: 1. the input is partly capitalistic (the infrastructures and the financing by advertising), but for the rest most of the input (videos, blogs, etc.) are free and open; 2. the production process is based partially on capitalist wage relations for the infrastructure management, but the rest is based on free volunteering; 3. the output is supposed to be universally available but corporations impose limits and try to extend these limits, provoking open conflicts with users/producers. (See for example: http://bang.calit2.net/tts/2008/12/31/why-i-am-deleting-my-myspace-account-and-you-should-too/)
Hybrid forms also developed in the past transitions between modes of production. Between the 6th and the 10h century, many landlords, including the Church, had simultaneously slaves and serfs (or "coloni" which were the first form of serfs). Between the 12th century and the 19th century many hybrid forms developed especially in the cities where capitalism developed within feudal relationships.
The evolution of these forms has been often slow, with periods of acceleration but also periods of recession. The example of the Arsenal of Venice, which in the early 16th century employed some 16,000 people and could produce almost a ship per day using production-lines, something not seen again after until the industrial revolution, illustrates how non-linear this evolution can be.
The dynamic of that evolution depends on many factors. The evolution of technologies is one of them, but it is far from explaining everything, as the Venetian Arsenal example shows. Here the social consciousness, the social and political conflicts play a crucial role. The European wars of religion after the 16th century and the bourgeois revolutions where indirect or direct expressions of the conflict between the old feudal logic and the raising capitalistic one.
In the conflict you refer to about the management of Free/open software foundations, between "community-oriented" and "corporate-oriented" formats, we are witnessing the same kind of conflict between the old logic and the new. Its dynamic depends and will depend not only on material-technological realities but also on social and "political" struggles, at micro and macro scales. And things should become harsher when peer production will pretend to extend to the realm of material production.
You also wrote:
"This is inevitable, as no free software project can survive in the long run
without a core of developers being paid."
Yes. As long as the material means of production (and thus the material means of consumption) remain under the capitalist logic governance, the peer production realities will be in a way or another limited.
(At a certain level, the problems to finance the 4th Oekonux Conference, or your personal difficulties to keep working the P2P Foundation while being obliged to work in order too feed your family are also materializations of that reality).
The development of the present economic crisis should make more visible at a social scale the need to overcome the dominant logic. The "invisible hand" is paralyzing an increasing share of the material means of production while workers are made redundant and unsatisfied material needs explode. Let's hope that this evidence will help to develop the consciousness of the urgency to extend peer production principles to the material sphere.