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| P2P as Intersubjective Process:
| | Matthew Heskin : |
| Definition
| | |
| In this essay, the author will define “peer to peer” in
| | “Competition does not support sharing. Competition suggests that there is scarcity and supports a scarcity mindset. |
| relational terms, i.e. as any system which allows
| | |
| agents to freely and permissionlessly interact with
| | History has already proven that the “pie” is not a fixed size. Our “know how” changes the size of the pie even in the face of rapid population growth. |
| each other. Peer pro
| | We like to look at the world as one big house. We have a deal of chores that need to be done. If this was your home would you get all your kids to compete with each other or would you get them all to work together? Would you want them to share the best way of getting things done with their siblings or would you like them to keep their “know how” to themselves? |
| duction is then any process
| | |
| whereby people can freely aggregate around the
| | Buckminster Fuller identified and showed us that the world is going through a process called ephemeralization. This is the process of “doing more and more, with less and less”. He also created the counter intuitive statement “sharing is having more”. |
| creation of common value. The interpretations
| | |
| below are from the author only, but are based on a
| | If you agree that ephemeralization is happening then sharing of our “know how” will create “more” as it rapidly supports the doing more with less. |
| continuous dialogue with the research community
| | |
| through the P2P Foundation ecology o
| | It is a common misconception that competition creates innovation. Thinking and doing creates innovation, not competition. The question is does competition create optimal thinking and doing? Competition is an extrinsic motivator. People will only do so much for extrinsic reasons; they will do anything and everything for intrinsic reasons. |
| f resources.
| | |
| The R
| | If there were a sliding scale between competition and cooperation we would see that humanity is very close (maybe 95%) to the cooperation end of the scale. If you think of all that is required for you to have your breakfast, you will see that 99.999% of the work is performed by others (Your toaster, breakfast cereal, electricity, light bulbs etc.) If you were to try and make your $50 Kmart toaster from scratch, without cooperation, it would be your life’s work and I doubt it would be up to scratch. |
| elational
| | |
| G
| | Pushing that slider that last 5% is going to have a bigger impact on humanity and the planet than the previous 95%. Why is this? This is because the previous 95% occurred somewhat unconsciously and the last 5% is going to require conscious action. A holistic view of the world and the issues we face will be required by the global citizenry. Removal of sovereign fences, country divisions, transformation of educational theory and economics are all part of this final 5%. It is also going to require not only an acceptance of cultural and religious difference but a deep sense of gratitude for all diversity (both human and non-human). |
| rammar of
| | |
| P
| | It seems to us that competition is no longer the healthy option for our abundant world. When Buckminster Fuller showed us that “sharing is having more” he saw the earth as a whole with no boundaries and no divisions......... “ |
| eer
| | (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sharing-having-morewhy-compete-matthew-heskin) |
| P
| |
| roduction
| |
| Helpful in analysing the type of relationality that
| |
| emerges in p2p systems is the Relational Typology
| |
| developed by the anthropologist Alan Page Fiske
| |
| 1
| |
| .
| |
| Below, I will attempt to match the four
| |
| relational
| |
| logics as described by Fiske, with my own observ
| |
| a- | |
| tions.
| |
| Paraphrasing and shortening a longer quote from
| |
| Fiske, here are the four modes of intersubjectivity
| |
| that he recognizes, and which he claims, in his book
| |
| 'Structures of Social Life',
| |
| 2
| |
| are pr
| |
| esent in all cultures
| |
| and at all times (though some may appear later
| |
| than others in the development of social forms):
| |
| 1
| |
| Fiske, Alan P.: Human Sociality.
| |
| 2
| |
| Fiske
| |
| , Alan P: Structures of Social Life.
| |
|
| |
| Communal Sharing (CS) is a relationship in
| |
| which people treat some dyad or group as
| |
| equivalent and undifferentiated with respect
| |
| to the so | |
| cial domain in question. (Example:
| |
| people using a commons.)
| |
|
| |
| In Authority Ranking (AR) people have
| |
| asymmetric positions in a linear hierarchy in
| |
| which subordinates defer, respect, and
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| (perhaps) obey, while superiors take
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| precedence and take pastoral respons
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| ibility
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| for subordinates. (Example: military
| |
| hierarchies.)
| |
|
| |
| In Equality Matching (EM) relationships
| |
| people keep track of the balance or
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| difference among participants and know
| |
| what would be required to restore balance.
| |
| (Example: turn
| |
| -
| |
| taking.)
| |
|
| |
| Market Pricing
| |
| relationships are oriented to
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| socially meaningful ratios or rates such as
| |
| prices, wages, interest, rents, tithes, or
| |
| cost
| |
| -
| |
| benefit analyses (Example: property
| |
| that can be bought, sold, or treated as | |
| investment capital).
| |
| 3
| |
| Though Fiske does not make such inf
| |
| erence himself,
| |
| it is possible to posit a historical succession of
| |
| modes of dominance. In such a hypothesis, it could
| |
| be argued that early tribal society starts with a | |
| dominance of Communal Shareholding, augmented
| |
| with Equally Matching as soon as tribal so
| |
| ciety
| |
| becomes more complex, the subject of the well
| |
| -
| |
| known work of Marcel Mauss on the gift economy
| |
| 4
| |
| . | |
| With the birth of class society comes the dominance
| |
| of Authority Ranking, while Market Pricing becomes
| |
| the dominant modality only under capitalism. The
| |
| P2P
| |
| Foundation's main hypothesis is that there is a
| |
| social evolution towards Communal Shareholding
| |
| but this is outside of the scope of this paper.
| |
| It is important to state that all the different intersu
| |
| b-
| |
| jective modalties co
| |
| -
| |
| exist at any given time, but that
| |
| t
| |
| hey are generally influenced by the dominant
| |
| mode. An interesting take on the co
| |
| -
| |
| existence of
| |
| various modalities under capitalism is the work of
| |
| the neo | |
| -
| |
| institutional school.
| |
| 5
| |
| The crucial debate is
| |
| 3
| |
| Fiske,
| |
| Alan
| |
| P: Human sociality.
| |
| 4
| |
| Mauss
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| , M: The Gift: forms and functions of exchange in
| |
| archaic societies.
| |
| 5
| |
| For example, Colin Crouch writes:
| |
| “ ... a firm embedded in
| |
| community within a market economy is not engaged in a
| |
| subsistence economy, but reaches out through its community
| |
| IRIE
| |
| International Review of Information Ethics
| |
| Vol.
| |
| 15 (09/2011)
| |
| Michel Bauwens:
| |
| Understanding Peer to Peer as a Relational Dynamics
| |
| 43
| |
| whether Communal Shareholding, now existing
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| within the bro
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| ader institutional framework of the
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| capitalist economy, can only be subsumed to the
| |
| dominance of Market Pricing, or whether it can
| |
| become an autonomous and eventually even a
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| dominant mode, which can eventually subsume
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| Market Pricing at some future point in
| |
| time.
| |
| My own views on the possible subsumption of
| |
| Market Pricing under a regime of Communal Shar
| |
| e-
| |
| holding are expressed in the founding essay of the
| |
| P2P Foundation.
| |
| 6
| |
| A critical perspective on the incorporation of Co
| |
| m-
| |
| munal Shareholding under capitalism is o
| |
| ffered in
| |
| the work of Christian Fuchs. | |
| For example, Fuchs writes that:
| |
| "
| |
| Wikinomics
| |
| shows how mass collaboration and
| |
| digital gifts can be subsumed under capitalist
| |
| logic. The difference between my own approach
| |
| and the authors’ is that the latter welcomes this
| |
| development, whereas I consider it from a neo
| |
| -
| |
| Marxist perspective as the extens
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| ion and intens
| |
| i-
| |
| fication of alienation and exploitation , yet I re
| |
| c-
| |
| ognize that, at the same time, it bears certain
| |
| potentials for alternative developments.”
| |
| 7
| |
| This complex debate about the 'immanent' (within
| |
| the system) vs. transcendent (beyond the system) | |
| aspects of Communal Shareholding and commons
| |
| -
| |
| based peer production provides a crucial context for
| |
| any hypothesis about the present and future i
| |
| m-
| |
| portance of Communal Shareholding within the
| |
| relational mix. One of the aims of the first part of
| |
| the essay is t
| |
| o allow the readers to make a more
| |
| informed judgment about this issue by looking in
| |
| some more detail into the relational mix.
| |
| The Ethics
| |
| A
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| ssociated with P2P
| |
| 8
| |
| Each of the above intersubjective dynamics has its
| |
| own relational ethics. In Communal Shareholdin
| |
| g,
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| to a marke
| |
| t.“
| |
| Crouch, Colin:
| |
| Capi
| |
| talist Diversity and Change:
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| Recombinant Governance and Institutional Entrepreneurs.
| |
| 121
| |
| 6
| |
| Bauwens, Michel: The Political Economy of Peer Production.
| |
| 7
| |
| Fuchs, Christian: Wikinomics. See in particular his concept of
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| the Gift Commodity Internet Economy, at
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| http://p2pfoundation.net/Gift_Commodity_Internet_Economy
| |
| ,
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| retrieved July 25, 2011.
| |
| 8
| |
| Himanen, P. The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of the Info
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| r-
| |
| mation Age.
| |
| the individual is both receiving and gifting with a
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| community and he/she is judged by the level of
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| contributions to the common project, as well as
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| assistance to the maintenance and social reprodu
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| c-
| |
| tion of the project as a whole. In Authority Ranking,
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| a k
| |
| ey value is obedience and respect for authority as
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| the 'giver' of benefits, on which the individual is
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| dependent and the individual must ideally be seen
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| as showing loyalty. Market Pricing favours 'neutral'
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| human relationships, but nevertheless, values both
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| personal and impersonal trustworthiness. The key
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| value of Equality Matching is the capacity for rec
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| i-
| |
| procity.
| |
| Is it possible to posit any ethical hierarchy of prefe
| |
| r-
| |
| ence in these different modalities
| |
| —
| |
| a question also | |
| asked by Benkler and Nissenbaum
| |
| 9
| |
| and by
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| Julian
| |
| Fox
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| 10
| |
| ? Among the more popular answers to this
| |
| question are the ‘Emergent, Cyclical, Levels of
| |
| Existence’ point of view of Clare W. Graves
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| 11
| |
| , and its
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| popularisation in the system of Spiral Dynamics
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| 12
| |
| . | |
| Such a hierarchical and preferential ordering of
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| di
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| fferent ethical modalities would be consistent from
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| an increasing flow of literature interpreting the
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| history of nature and human civilisation as one
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| marked by increased levels of cooperation (Bar
| |
| -
| |
| Yam
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| 13
| |
| ; Stewart
| |
| 14
| |
| ) as well as with those proposing a
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| neurologi
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| cal (Olson
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| 15
| |
| ; de Waal
| |
| 16
| |
| ) or cultural
| |
| -
| |
| evolutionary basis (Henrich
| |
| 17
| |
| ).
| |
| Here is the argument and hypothesis that we use to
| |
| justify the preferential attention to peer to peer
| |
| dynamics:
| |
|
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| Authority Ranking is a win
| |
| -
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| lose exchange,
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| since the lower in the hierarchy, th
| |
| e less
| |
| you receive in the interaction with someone | |
| higher up. Inequality is the highest in the
| |
| AR mode. However, it is assumed to operate
| |
| 9
| |
| Benkler, Yochai. and Niss
| |
| enbaum, Helen: Commons
| |
| -
| |
| based
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| Peer Production and Virtue.
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| 10
| |
| Fox, Julian: Virtue.
| |
| 11
| |
| General documentation at
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| http://www.clarewgraves.com/
| |
| ;
| |
| retrieved July 25, 2011
| |
| 12
| |
| General documentation at
| |
| http://www.clarewgraves.com/
| |
| ;
| |
| Retrieved July 25, 2011
| |
| 13
| |
| Bar
| |
| -
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| Yam, Y. Complexity Rising.
| |
| 14
| |
| Stewart, John.: The Future Evolution of Consciousness.
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| 15
| |
| Olson, Gary: We Empathize, Therefore We Are.
| |
| 16
| |
| de Waal. The Age of Empathy.
| |
| 17
| |
| Henrich, Natalie and Joseph: Why Humans Cooperate.
| |
| IRIE
| |
| International Review of Information Ethics
| |
| Vol.
| |
| 15 (09/2011)
| |
| Michel Bauwens:
| |
| Understanding Peer to Peer
| |
| as a Relational Dynamics
| |
| 44
| |
| for the greater good, as hierarchy is
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| spiritually justified.
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| 18
| |
|
| |
| In the Market Pricing Mode, there is at least
| |
| in theory
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| a win
| |
| -
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| win model, since the
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| exchange is presumed to be one of equal
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| value. However, individuals engaged in MP
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| do not take into account the wider
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| community, exchanges are impersonal, and
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| at least under capitalism, are assumed to be
| |
| motivated by self
| |
| -
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| interest
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|
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| In the Equality Matching mode, there is a
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| stronger reciprocity, as well as generally
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| speaking a motivation that takes into
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| account the wider community, in the
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| context of a culture based on widespread
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| reciprocity. Self
| |
| -
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| interest is not culturally
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| assumed.
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| Furthermore, it is based on an
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| ethic of giving, actually a competition of
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| givers, in which prestige is obtained through
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| the gift.
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|
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| In the Communal Shareholding mode, the
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| individual gives to a whole, and indirectly
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| receives from the whole; independently of
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| t
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| he motivation of the individual, which may
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| be
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| selfish, the 'commons' itself makes this a
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| win
| |
| -
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| win
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| -
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| win mode of reciprocity, since the
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| commons is assumed to be of universal
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| benefit (the third win) in a direct way. It
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| could be argued that giving without the
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| ex
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| pectation of a clear and direct return, is
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| ethically superior to the three other
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| modalities. CS, as expressed in the
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| emerging digital commons based on peer
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| production, is a mode that aligns individual
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| and collective purpose towards mutual
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| alignment. See th
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| e contribution on the latter
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| by Atlee
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| 19
| |
| and Zubizaretta
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| 20
| |
| .
| |
| I conclude from the above that while there may not
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| be a universally agreed way to hierarchize the ethics
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| of the various modes, there is an argument that can
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| be made for the free engagement around com
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| mon
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| value, to be of a high ethical value, and that the CS
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| 18
| |
| A good explanation of such spiritual justifications is provided
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| by the 'primordial debt' theories, summarized at
| |
| http://p2pfoundation.net/
| |
| Primordial_Debt_Theory
| |
| . The e
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| x-
| |
| cerpts are from the draft manuscript of a forthcoming book
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| by David Graeber: Debt, The First 5,000 Years.
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| 19
| |
| Atlee, Tom: Strategic synergy between individual and
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| collective.
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| 20
| |
| Zubizarreta, Rosa: Primary vs
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| Secondary Individual
| |
| -
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| Group
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| Mentality.
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| mode is therefore worthy to be at least considered
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| as a preferable variant of human action.
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| P2P as P
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| rimarily
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| D
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| efined by
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| Communal Shareholding
| |
| What dynamic is at play in peer production?
| |
| Nick Dyer
| |
| -
| |
| Whiteford's definition of the cycle of
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| accumulation in peer production
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| 21
| |
| is useful here (he | |
| calls it the Circulation of the Common by analogy
| |
| with the Circulation of Capital). He distinguishes an
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| input phase necessitating freely given contributions
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| through
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| open and free raw material; participatory
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| governance which is the result of free association;
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| and a commons
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| -
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| oriented output which guarantees
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| the continuation of the process by constituting open
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| and free raw material to be used in next iterations.
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| The domin
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| ant process active in peer production is
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| undoubtedly what Fiske describes as Communal
| |
| Shareholding. Indeed, many of the licenses used by
| |
| the production of open knowledge, free software,
| |
| and shared design (i.e. the three main forms of peer | |
| production), such
| |
| as the GNU General Public L
| |
| i-
| |
| cense, ensure that anybody who respects the l
| |
| i-
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| cense can contribute knowledge, code and design to
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| the common project. On the input side, an individual
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| that contributes to such a common project, does not
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| exchange with a particula
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| r other person, does not
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| work in a command and control hierarchy, but adds
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| his/her contribution to the whole. Because of the
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| obligations imposed by the sharing license, once the
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| code is released, it can be used freely by other
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| users, even those who did not
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| contribute to the
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| project. This would certainly be the case in projects
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| that are entirely run by volunteer contributors.
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| However, in reality, the situation is a bit more
| |
| complicated.
| |
| Let's look on the input side.
| |
|
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| Contributors may be paid employees of a
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| co
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| rporation, in an Authority Ranking (AR)
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| relationship with their corporate hierarchy,
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| who may be giving them directives
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| concerning their contributions
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|
| |
| Contributors may be freelancers, who have
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| sold their work, and are therefore in a
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| Market Pricing (MP) rela
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| tionship with their
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| clients.
| |
| 21
| |
| Dyer
| |
| -
| |
| Witheford Nick: The Circulation of the Common.
| |
| IRIE
| |
| International Review of Information Ethics
| |
| Vol.
| |
| 15 (09/2011)
| |
| Michel Bauwens:
| |
| Understanding Peer to Peer as a Relational Dynamics
| |
| 45
| |
|
| |
| Some contributors may have an obligation
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| to other participants in the community, and
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| see their contribution in a Equality Matching
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| (EM) context towards them. Indeed, within
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| the core group of contributors, i.e. the
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| people who kn
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| ow each other and who judge
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| each other partially through their
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| contributions, interpersonal relations market
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| by Equality Matching dynamics are
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| important. For example, within the P2P
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| Foundation's own experience of building a
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| knowledge commons, the fact of a
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| ssisting
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| people often creates some type of ethical
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| obligation to return the favour by some
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| other contribution.
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|
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| The essential freedom to contribute may be
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| tempered by AR dynamics; for example, in
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| Linux, maintainers control the acceptance of
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| patches to the o
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| fficial version of Linux; in
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| Debian, there is a process of socialization
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| into the community, led by the more
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| experienced developers already active in the
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| community.
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| However, this hybridity does not in fact violate the
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| core logic of Communal Shareholding, a
| |
| s the license
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| does ensure that the contributions by both waged
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| employees and freelancers are still added to the
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| common code base and are available for general
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| usage. Similarly neither the AR nor the EM aspects
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| of the hybrid participatory peer governance pr
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| o-
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| cesses undoe the constituted commons.
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| On the output side, it is true that corporations can
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| sell the software itself (which in theory, could also
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| be freely copied, but perhaps without all the added
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| services and guarantees added by open source
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| companies). C
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| ompanies generally sell services that
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| enhance the common code base, and further insure
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| its workability in the enterprise. More often, the
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| associated corporations sell goods and services on
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| top of the commons. The greatest dangers to the
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| commons would be th
| |
| e enclosure and privatisation
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| of commonly produced material. However, such
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| total enclosure would also kill future value creation
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| by the commons.
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| There is real tension here between the rules and
| |
| norms of the community, motivated by a defense of
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| the common p
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| roduction, and the desire of corpor
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| a-
| |
| tions to enclose and capture value. However, in the
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| context of free software, full enclosures and privat
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| i-
| |
| sation's of previous code commons are quite rare;
| |
| rather, corporations create added layers of privately
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| produced an
| |
| d protected software, which may in
| |
| time make simple usage of the 'pure' commons
| |
| version of the code base problematic. But such
| |
| moves are always contested and fought by free
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| software communities.
| |
| Despite these contradictions and tensions, from the
| |
| point of
| |
| view of the common resource and its parti
| |
| c-
| |
| ipants, it can be said that all contributions, even by
| |
| people in an AR relationship within their emplo
| |
| y-
| |
| ment, are seen as voluntary and freely shared, as
| |
| enforced by the license rules. I could say that the
| |
| commoner
| |
| s 'are agnostic' on how precisely common
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| code has been added.
| |
| In conclusion, I would argue that the core value
| |
| creation takes place in the commons, i.e. by adding
| |
| to the common knowledge/code/design base, but
| |
| that both use and exchange value can be enhance
| |
| d
| |
| (but also 'exploited') by market
| |
| -
| |
| oriented products
| |
| and services.
| |