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This is the P2PF Wiki page on '''Governance'''


The [[:Category:Governance | Governance Category page]] has the listing of all pages in the Governance Category.
=Description=


==Introduction==
By Andrej Zwitter and Jilles Hazenberg:


This guide covers both
"Governance itself is an elusive concept, highly complex and contested in literature (Kooiman, 2003; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004; Levi-Faur, 2012; Colombi-Ciacchi, 2014). In our study, we use a unifying conception of governance based on Levi-Faur (2012). Levi-Faur (2012, p. 7–8) defines governance as “signifier of change” in policy-making. By signifying different changes in policy-making, governance opens up “new ways, new concepts, and new issues for research” (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 7–8). This conception of governance as a signifier of change offers a comprehensive perspective on policy-making as subject to “continuous change of patterns of interaction and relations among actors” (Sand, 2004).
# the organizational microscale formats or methods used to govern peer production, FLOSS, and other non-coercive methods of governance;
# the evolution on a macro-scale towards the dominance of collaborative networks


It is maintained by Michel Bauwens and adheres to [[Connective Hypothesis]], i.e. '''The key organizing pattern of our global culture is shifting from a top-down hierarchical pyramid to a distributed, self-organizing network.''' [http://theconnective.org/what-is-the-connective/]
Governance is often depicted by distinguishing between “old” and “new” governance (Rhodes, 1996, 1997; Mayntz, 2003; Bevir, 2010; Lobel, 2012). “Old” refers to hierarchical structures, mostly of state institutions. “New” refers to the emergence of more horizontal modes of policy-making, which have arisen due to the pressures of globalization and the functional differentiation of sectors of society. However, given that neither old nor new types exclude each other, they often co-exist in practice and a clear temporal distinction between them cannot be located. We refer to these types of governance as Mode 1 and Mode 2 governance. The current assessment focuses on two aspects of Mode 1 and Mode 2 governance: roles and power relationships. Governance roles are understood as the ability to participate in policy-making at any stage. Power relationships refer to the relative power that an actor, or a certain role, has over other actors within policy-making and its enforcement. Within different modes of governance, different aspects of power relationships are deemed relevant. A useful analogy of this is the power that a policeman has standing at an intersection commanding traffic: power can be derived from his uniform, the perception of the drivers, or of him blocking the road (Dahl, 1957). Similarly, modes of governance regulate or coordinate different aspects of power relationships based on what is deemed the relevant aspect of power."


For an understanding of the specificities of [[Peer Governance]], we strongly recommend the following book: '''[[Cyberchiefs]]. Autonomy and Authority in Online Tribes.''' Mathieu O’Neil. Macmillan/Pluto Press, 2009.  
(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/blockchain/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012/full)


For the governance of the Global Commons of humanity, we advocate replacing the scarcity-engineering of neoliberal markets by the abundance engineering of the [[Commons]]: see the [[Abundance - Typology]] and the [[Wealth Typology]]. Policy concepts and proposals are maintained [http://p2pfoundation.net/Category:Policy here].


'''For the approach of the P2P Foundation''', see: Michel Bauwens: [http://p2pfoundation.net/4.1.C._Peer_Governance_as_a_third_mode_of_governance Peer Governance as a Third Mode of Governance]


[[Image:P2P_Governance_Visualization_2large.png|900px]]
=Typology=
<center>
[http://p2pfoundation.net/images/P2P_Governance_Visualization_2large.png Higher resolution version]
</center>


#Please read the following excerpts of [[David Ronfeldt on the Evolution of Governance]]
By Andrej Zwitter and Jilles Hazenberg:
#You may want to read this important discussion document by Erik Douglas, '''[[Peer to Peer and the Four Pillars of Democracy]]''', which examines '''the relationship between [[Peer Governance]] and representative democracy'''.
#Henry Mintzberg's [http://web.archive.org/web/20070403165132/http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~fmb/articles/mintzberg/ Taxonomy of Organizational Forms], is good as backgrounder.
#Billy Matheson's graphical representation on [http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/towards-the-co-created-society/2007/12/23 how relationality may or will affect governance]
#Felix Stadler insists: The [[Governance of Peer Production is Meritocratic, not Egalitarian]]
#In a P2P context, we may want to replace or augment [[Personality Driven Governance Systems]] by [[Governance Systems Based on Idea and Action Amplification]] (i.e. [[Governance by User Groups]]). More from Heather Marsh at: [[How a Stigmergy of Actions Replaces Representation of Persons]]


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==19 Transitional Institutions for the P2P Civilisation==
==Mode 1 Governance: "governance carried out primarily via the hierarchical command-and-control structures of the state and other public hierarchies"==


'''1.'''


According to Dave Pollard:
Mode 1 governance, or “old” governance in the literature, refers to governance carried out primarily via the hierarchical command-and-control structures of the state and other public hierarchies. This means that it relies on authoritative institutions to make policies through the enforcement of hard law. Rooted in Westphalian notions of nation-states, this mode of governance is often legitimized through justificatory strategies resting on public sovereignty and public input in political decision-making (Scharpf, 1999). Therefore, Mode 1 governance is inherently political and institutional.


"Joanna Macy's book Coming Back to Life has the following list (the last six items are my own additions):" [http://blogs.salon.com/0002007/2009/12/02.html?]
''Hierarchical command-and-control policy-making via the state. Within Mode 1, the state is sovereign and legitimate in commanding and controlling societal actors (both public and private; among private actors, for example, social groups and small and medium enterprises, SMEs). The identity of actors is perceived as the relevant aspect of power. Power relationships are vertical because they base themselves on the identity of the state as sovereign and legitimate.''


#teach-ins and peer study groups
Furthermore, this mode of governance can be interpreted as identity-based. Within identity-based governance, roles are assigned to and/or performed by actors based on who these actors are, i.e., their identity. For example, Mode 1 governance locates the authority to perform tasks of policy-making, or the delegation thereof, with state organs because of who the state is. This means that the state’s identity is seen as being an authoritative and legitimate public body, acting as sovereign over a territory and as the source of law and policy. Intermediary institutions perform governance roles only through delegated authority by the state.
#think tanks and Gaian learning institutions (where you would learn improvisation, story-telling, and some of the other critical life skills in the graphic above)
#groups that would maintain measures of genuine well-being to replace GDP, stock markets, phony inflation & unemployment numbers as the gauges of our society's health
#consensus and conflict resolution services, to replace lawyers
#non-violence 'genuine defense' institutions, to replace the military
#renewable energy 'transition' co-ops
#land trusts and conservancies, replacing land ownership with community stewardship
#community-based co-ops for gardening/permaculture, CSA, tool-sharing, skills banks
#community-based repair, recycling, composting and re-use programs
#holistic health institutions based on self-management and prevention
#local currencies and gift economy programs
#unschooling (natural/self-directed learning)
#collective, independent, non-commercial information sharing and communications media
#clothing co-ops (like Mondragon's)
#community theatre
#community-based scientific research, idea and innovation centres
#facilitation 'collaboratories' (where skilled facilitators would help you resolve challenges both local and global)
#well-being centres for personal growth, relationship management and self-learning
#artist and crafts co-ops


Given the relative clarity of governance structures within Mode 1, the relevant aspects of power relations are equally clear. The authority to make, implement, and enforce policies lies with the state or those that it delegates to do so. Power is static because authority is permanently assigned to an actor, based on its identity. The relevant aspect of a power relationship is thus the identity of the actor capable of commanding others. Moreover, power relationships are governed via structured governance mechanisms, by predominantly assigning rights to weaker parties and duties to stronger parties. The static nature of power and structured conception of power relationships are explained by the fact that relationships between individuals, organizations, societal actors, corporations, etc. are mediated and governed via the state as the dominant hierarchical authority in policy-making. A good example of this is the relationship between human rights and the duty of the state to protect them.


'''2.'''


Jim Spohrer has an ordering of systems into three levels:
==Mode 2 Governance: "a move away from the vertical command-and-control structures of the state toward more horizontal modes of policy-making==


#systems that move, store, harvest, process;  
Mode 2 governance, or “new” governance, contrasts with these distinct Westphalian structures of policy-making. It represents a move away from the vertical command-and-control structures of the state toward more horizontal modes of policy-making. This approach creates a more level playing field between societal actors, both private and public. Authority is not necessarily acquired by identity but rather through performance, knowledge, and expertise. Public–private partnerships, policy networks, and private governance all reflect the nature of a world in which the state is arguably no longer the central governing authority (Rhodes, 1997; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). Examples of Mode 2 governance are diverse, but include public–private partnerships working toward the achievement of policy goals that private sector agents are trying to realize more effectively and efficiently through self-regulation. Other examples of areas where Mode 2 governance mechanisms apply are soft law, negotiation, compromise, competition, codes of conduct, and other corporate sectoral agreements on standards of production or quality. As such, Mode 2 governance changes the roles and power relationships of and between actors involved in policy-making or subject to these policies. While not being necessarily unified, different forms of Mode 2 governance are role-based in the distribution of governance tasks, as opposed to identity-based.
#systems that enable healthy, wealthy and wise people; and  
#systems that govern.  


''Horizontal policy-making in which societal actors have greater independence in commanding their spheres of influence and/or making and implementing policies. Coinciding with this, the state takes on a role of “steering” rather than “rowing.” The state regulates societal actors by incorporating them into the policy-making process. The role they can play therefore becomes the relevant aspect of power, and the power relationships become the relevant focus of governance. Oversight is performed by non-majoritarian institutions such as central banks that guard the boundaries set by the state.''


See [[Smarter Planet Service Systems]]
Role-based governance implies that governance tasks and mechanisms are assigned to and/or performed by actors because of the role they can perform, to achieve a desired policy goal within a specific domain. Policy goals and corresponding benchmarks become prominent tools in steering policy-making in specific directions. For instance, a public institution sets goals in a specific policy domain and delegates the achievement thereof to private or corporate actors. These actors are perceived as being more capable of efficiently and expertly delivering the desired goal in this domain. In other domains, the roles of the same private and corporate actors might be completely different. This explains why Mode 2 is not identity but role-based, as the examples below illustrate:


==Institutional Proposals for Global Governance==
It should be noted that the distinction between Modes 1 and 2 governance is not always clear in practice. Many hybrid forms exist that borrow elements from both modes. The most prominent is multi-level governance, predominantly employed to describe policy-making within the European Union. It relies on both Mode 1, i.e., hierarchical commands from a public authority, and Mode 2, policy networks and the involvement of private actors (Mayntz, 1998). Mode 1 governance is increasingly dismantled at the level of the state, while simultaneously reconstructed at the regional and international level in combination with Mode 2 governance (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004).


* [[Concert of Democracies]]
With a view to Mode 2 governance, one can see that actors who are frequently engaged in the field of blockchain and DLT take on a variety of different roles. An interesting case that illustrates this is the call for regulation of initial coin offerings (ICOs) and similar crypto-securities. These ICOs can be described as cryptographically secured tokens that represent a token owner’s bundle of rights and obligations vis-à-vis a token provider. They are issued by a token provider and registered on the blockchain as a source of income for their projects. In the last few years, such ICOs have come under increasing public scrutiny as concerning their role as financial securities under US and EU regulations. There have also been frequent fraudulent uses of ICOs, and these have become a contested issue in policy and academic debates (Hacker and Thomale, 2018). In terms of our typology, this shifted the debate around ICOs from being an unregulated space into the realm of Mode 2 governance, with governance ranging from moderate self-regulation to non-autonomous self-governance. It remains to be seen whether states deem it necessary to enforce governance in the field of crypto-securities, even by means of Mode 1 governance.
* [[International Simultaneous Policy Organization]]
* [[World Future Council]]


==Citations==


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==Mode 3: Decentralized Network Governance and Blockchain Technology==
   
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===Long Citations===
Constructing the governance of the digital domain requires conceptualizing the relevant aspects of power relationships within this domain vis-à-vis Mode 1 and 2 governance. It is not surprising that the digital domain, and especially blockchain technology, cannot be effectively governed through either mode of governance. This is firstly because the emergent new roles and power relationships in the digital domain are neither hierarchical nor horizontal. Instead, they are fluid, with different roles and power relationships often residing in a single, anonymous, actor. Secondly, blockchain technology enables trustlessness, whereas trust is fundamental to the functioning of both Mode 1 and 2 governance. This section will address the first consequence briefly, before providing the stepping stones for the conceptualization of decentralized network governance (Mode 3).


Modes of governance rely on conceptions of the relevant aspects of power relationships to be governed. In relation to the digital domain and blockchain in particular, power must be conceptualized as fluid, as different actors perform different governance roles within different contexts. Also, there are times when the networks through which roles are distributed operate as governance actors themselves. As identities and roles are no longer central to the exertion of power in social coordination, their place has been taken by new forms of power and hence require new forms of governance. Castells’s writing on network power (mentioned previously) notes that there are four forms of power specifically related to networks: networking power, network power, networked power, and network-making power.


'''Peter Suber: From Profit-Maximization and Market-Orientation to Mission-Focused'''


Profit maximizing limits access to knowledge, by limiting it to paying customers. If anyone thinks this is just a side-effect of today's market incentives, then we can put the situation differently: Profit maximizing doesn't always limit access to knowledge, but is always ready to do so if it pays better. This proposition has a darker corollary: Profit maximizing doesn't always favor untruth, but is always ready to do so if it would pay better. '''...''' Instead of hypnotically granting the primacy of markets in all sectors, as if there were no exceptions, we should remember that many organizations compromise profits or relinquish revenues in order to foster their missions, and that we all benefit from their dedication. Which institutions and sectors ought to do so, and how should we protect and support them to pursue their missions? Instead of smothering these questions for offending the religion of markets, we should open them for wider discussion.
We can see that these relate closely to the digital domain and blockchain technology (Castells, 2011) :
(http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/newsletter/03-02-10.htm#missions)


• Networking power: the power that actors and organizations have that constitutes the core of the network. This power pertains to the ability to include and exclude others, and thereby controls the makeup of the network.


'''E.F. Schumacher against the professional cooptation of community''':
• Network power: the power that results from the standards required to coordinate interactions. This primarily concerns the imposition of rules within a network.


"The professional co-option of community efforts to invent appropriate techniques for citizens to care in community has been pervasive. Therefore, we need to identify the characteristics of those social forms that are resistant to colonization by service technologies while enabling communities to cultivate and care. These authentic social forms are characterized by three basic dimensions: they tend to be uncommodified, unmanaged, and uncurricularized. The tools of the bereavement counselor make grief into a commodity rather than an opportunity for community. Service technologies convert conditions into commodities and care into service.
• Networked power: the power that actors have over one another within a network. This power mimics traditional conceptions of power but the way in which it is exerted differs per network.


The tools of the manager convert communality into hierarchy, replacing consent with control. Where once there was a commons, the manager creates a corporation. The tools of the pedagogue create monopolies in the place of cultures. By making a school of every-day life, community definitions and citizen action are degraded and finally expelled. It is this hard-working team—the service professional, the manager, and the pedagogue—that pulls the tools of "community busting" through the modern social landscape. If we are to recultivate community, we will need to return this team to the stable, abjuring their use."
• Network-making power: the power of an actor or organization to constitute or re-program a network according to its values and specific interests.
([http://web.archive.org/web/20050207124554/http://www.smallisbeautiful.org/lec-mck.html http://www.smallisbeautiful.org/lec-mck.html])


The employment of traditional modes of governance threatens to undermine the benefits of technological innovations such as blockchain and DLT. In particular, overregulation or the application of inadequate mechanisms often reduces the potential benefits of digital technologies. Consequently, this might produce more negative outcomes than positive ones, seeing as a mismatch between regulations and intended governance norms of technological solutions could produce the appearance of regulation without actually having adequate substance. Alternatively, overregulation might be obsolete when trust is not an issue, as is the case with blockchain-enforced governance."


'''Kevin Werbach on Abundance as a Policy Goal:'''
(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/blockchain/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012/full)


“The cyber-solution to this governance dilemma is to fight the constraint that produces all the tensions: scarcity. Abundance trumps governance. There is no need to worry about resource allocation when there are more than enough resources to go around. And those who find their norms ill-served can choose a more suitable environment, because the costs of forming new groups and institutions are so low.


The good news is that cyberspace – if we let it – can be the greatest engine of abundance the world has ever known. From the billions of search clicks that Google pairs with targeted text ads to the millions of WiFi devices using shared wireless spectrum to the hundreds of thousands of books along Amazon.com’s long tail, abundance is the driving force of the Internet economy. It should be an abiding goal of Internet governance as well. Furthering the historical analogy, it was territorial expansion, to the Western edge of the continent and beyond, that channeled and checked the tensions of the nascent American constitutional republic.
=More information=
 
If cyberspace is to be well-governed, therefore, it must grow. We must resist the temptation to look back nostalgically to the frontier homesteading days, when norms dominated because so many of them were shared. Let us, as David urges, embrace the Internet’s wondrous chaos. At the same time, though, let us sing the praises of its well-designed rules. The shared enemy is not structure, but exclusivity and other barriers to choice and connectivity.“
(http://publius.cc/2008/05/13/kevin-werbach-steering-to-the-edge-of-trust/)
 
 
'''Iqbal Quadir, founder of Grameenphone of Bangladesh:'''
 
"If concentration of power has contributed to poor governance, the solution must lie in dispersing power… ICTs empower from below while devolving power from above, resulting in a two-pronged attack on abuse of state power that has left so much of the world’s population languishing in poverty… ICTs can be the means to both freedom and development by blindsiding obstacles to both."
(http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/profile/TomCrowl)
 
 
'''Rosabeth Moss Kanter on the new 'horizontal' influentials'''
 
"Today, people with power and influence derive their power from their centrality within self-organizing networks that might or might not correspond to any plan on the part of designated leaders. Organization structure in vanguard companies involves multi-directional responsibilities, with an increasing emphasis on horizontal relationships rather than vertical reporting as the center of action that shapes daily tasks and one’s portfolio of projects, in order to focus on serving customers and society. Circles of influence replace chains of command, as in the councils and boards at Cisco which draw from many levels to drive new strategies. Distributed leadership — consisting of many ears to the ground in many places — is more effective than centralized or concentrated leadership."
(http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/kanter/2009/11/power-to-the-connectors.html)
 
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=== The Era of the Globalisation of People ===
 
“Globalisation is not a new phenomenon. As analysed by Thomas Friedman in
The World Is Not Flat, in the 16th and 17th centuries empires became global, whereas
in the 20th century it was companies that became global, and the differential factor
is that since the end of the millennium, ten years ago, it is people who are
becoming global. And again it is a third technological revolution that is promoting
the transformation: the revolution promoted by new information and
communication technologies, of which the internet is the most transformative
expression.”
 
- Josu Jon Imaz [http://deugarte.com/gomi/Nations.pdf]
 
 
 
===Short Citations===
 
*The trust is to the commons as the corporation is to the market - Peter Barnes [http://onthecommons.org/node/1170]
 
*There are already plenty of existing examples to show that stakeholder trusts can achieve things that neither government nor markets can: responsible and equitable long-term management of a shared resource. - David Bollier [http://onthecommons.org/node/1170]
 
*The industrial Age of modernization brings the Secularization of authority, whereas the postindustrial stage brings emancipation from authority. - Alan Moore [http://communities-dominate.blogs.com/brands/2007/08/talking-about-1.html]
 
*The single most fundamental impact from all of these new capabilities may be felt in connection with the way in which we form the middle tier of the social fabric — organized, persistent, collaborating (non–governmental) groups. - David Johnson [http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_11/noveck/#note215]
 
*If we want to create an environment in which users have refined control, political control, you have to deal with two obstacles -- making code subject to political control, and making it possible for the group to own their own environment. - adapted from Clay Shirky [http://www.shirky.com/writings/nomic.html]
 
*Wikipedia’s success dramatizes instead a change in the nature of authority, moving from trust inhering in guarantees offered by institutions to probabilities created by processes. - Clay Shirky [http://www.techliberation.com/archives/040722.php]
 
*Self-organization and strong central control are (not) incompatible: individual projects self-organize because the participants choose to be there--they select themselves, and they  choose to follow the project's benevolent dictator (or else they leave). - Eric Raymond [http://www.softpanorama.org/OSS/webliography.shtml]
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==Typology==
The entries in the directory below covers different aspects which should be distinguished from each other.
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#'''The forms of peer governance of open/free communities and peer production groups.''' See A [[Model of a Mature Open Source Project]] for a case study of the Plone community.
## Informal leadership models that are pragmatically used to govern such projects: what is the nature of leadership and hierarchy in peer production?
##* See [[Hierarchy]], [[Leadership]], [[Benevolent Dictator]], and search for these concepts as well as "Authority" in the wiki's search box.
## The use of formal management models.
##* See [[Chaordic Organizations - Characteristics]] , [[Consensus]] , [[Consent vs. Consensus]] , [[Coordination Format]] , [[Council Ceremony]] , [[Harmonization Governance]] , [[Heterarchy]] , [[Holacracy]] , [[Horizontal Accountablity]] , [[Leaderless Organizations]] , [[Open Organization]] , [[Sociocracy]]
## The use of legal formats such as Foundations to formalize leadership of the infrastructure that enables the common production to occur.
##* See [[Burning Man - Governance]] , [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Software_Foundation Free Software Foundation] , [[FLOSS - Governance]] , [[FLOSS Foundations]] , [[GNOME Foundation]] , [[Mozilla Foundation]], [[OpenBSD Foundation]]
## Formal legislative process in government and political parties. Apart from non-representational self-governance models in the small teams responsible for peer production, whenever the allocation of scarce resources need to takes place, 'peer-informed' representational models will arise.
##* See for an example, the [[Green Party Integrated Consensus-Consent-Voting Model]]
# '''The methods of production used in peer production: how is the work actually done?'''
##The tools used in the production process (ie. Bitkeeper, CVS, etc.)
##The design of interactions at the level of the product/technological architecture (modularity, encapsulation, information hiding)
 
|style="background: #F4FDF6;border: 1px solid black;padding-left:1em;padding-right:0.5em;" width="50%"|
#'''Governance of the infrastructures needed by the [[Online Creation Communities]]'''
##According to Mayo Fuster Morell, five main models of online infrastructure provision can be distinguished: 1) Corporation services, 2) mission enterprises, 3) university networks, 4) representational foundations and 5) assemblearian collective self-provision
# '''The forms of governance/ownership/income distribution for the derived and monetizable service and market-oriented production models that derive from commons-related projects'''
##Modes of capital organization
##* [[Trusts]] ; [[Capital Commons Trusts]] , [[Cooperative Capital]] , [[Limited Liability Partnership]] , [[Mutual Home Ownership]], [[Venture Communism]]. Concepts: [[Blended Value]], [[Good Capital]], [[Open Capital]], [[Open Organization]], [[Patient Capital]]
##Modes of property organization
##* [[General Public License]] , [[Creative Commons]]
## Modes of revenue sharing with commercial partners (includes netarchical and vectoralist partners)
# '''Political governance models for the whole of society that are inspired by peer to peer models or principles'''
#*[[Citizen Dialogue and Deliberation]] , [[Commons]] , [[Community Assets]] , [[Coordination Format]] , [[Council Ceremony]] , [[Delegative Democracy]] , [[Deliberative Democracy]] , [[Deliberative Development]] , [[Democracy 2.1]] , [[Disaggregated Democracy]] , [[Extreme Democracy]] , [[Gaian Democracies]] , [[Global Microstructures]] , [[Global Villages]] , [[Glocalized Networks]] , [[Inclusive Democracy]] , [[Inclusive Sovereignty]] ,  [[Megacommunities]] , [[Participatory Democracy Networks]]
# '''Political philosophies and governance proposals inspired by peer to peer (egalitarian) ideals.'''
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==Resources==
 
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===Key Blog Entries===
 
Check out the [http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/?cat=20 Archive] of the P2P Foundation blog on P2P Hierarchy Theory, for a full record on our articles.
 
===Key Delicious Tags===
 
*[http://del.icio.us/mbauwens/P2P-Governance P2P Governance]
*[http://del.icio.us/mbauwens/P2P-Commons P2P Commons]
*[http://del.icio.us/mbauwens/Internet-Governance Internet Governance]
*[http://del.icio.us/mbauwens/P2P-Hierarchy-Theory P2P Hierarchy Theory]
 
===Key Articles===
 
* Tim O'Reilly, "The [http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/06/the-four-pillars-of-an-open-ci.html Four Pillars of an Open Civic System]" (this typology of [[Open Civic Systems]] includes: Government to Citizen, Citizen to Government, Citizen to Citizen, and Government to Government)
 
* '''Report: [[Rapid Decision Making for Complex Issues]]. HOW TECHNOLOGIES OF COOPERATION CAN HELP. Andrea Saveri and Howard Rheingold. INSTITUTE FOR THE FUTURE, 2005.'''
 
* The [[Politics of Code in Web 2.0]]. 'Essay: Mapping Commercial Web 2.0 Worlds: Towards a New Critical Ontogenesis. By Ganaele Langlois, Fenwick McKelvey, Greg Elmer, and Kenneth Werbin. Fibreculture Journal, Issue 14. [http://journal.fibreculture.org/issue14/issue14_langlois_et_al.html]
 
* Marjorie Kelly: [http://www.strategy-business.com/press/article/09105?gko=106fd-1876-27599815 Not Just For Profit]: Emerging alternatives to the shareholder-centric model could help companies avoid ethical mishaps and contribute more to the world at large. Explores three new-style corporate designs: 1. stakeholder-owned companies; 2. mission-controlled companies; and 3. public-private hybrids.
 
* The [[State, the Market, and some Preliminary Question about the Commons]]. Ugo Mattei. [http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=ugo_mattei] An absolutely crucial text by Ugo Mattei on how the Western legal tradition needs to be fundamentally overturned in order for the common and the commons to emerge as core principle of a new legal-institutional system.
 
* The [[Rise of Organizational Complexity]], see: Y. Bar-Yam, Complexity rising: From human beings to human civilization, a complexity profile, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS UNESCO Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2002); also NECSI Report 1997-12-01 (1997). [http://www.necsi.edu/projects/yaneer/EOLSSComplexityRising.pdf]
 
 
Also:
 
*A must read: The [http://www.metamute.org/en/Immaterial-Aristocracy-of-the-Internet Immaterial Aristocracy of the Internet]], a meditation on the humans behind [[Protocollary Power]], by Harry Halpin.
*[http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/itgg.2007.2.3.27 Collapsing Geography]: on Second Life, Innovation, and the Future of National Power. By Cory Ondrejka.
*[http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/itgg.2007.2.3.68 What Second Life teaches us about sovereignty]. Paul Verkuil on the challenges of virtual citizenship.
*Manuel De Landa: [[Hierarchies and Meshworks are always mixed]] ; [http://t0.or.at/delanda/meshwork.htm Full article]
*Be aware of the [http://architectures.danlockton.co.uk/architectures-of-control-in-the-digital-environment/ Architectures of Control in the Digital Environment], such as [[DRM]] and [[Trusted Computing]].
*[http://publius.cc/2008/05/12/david-weinberger-tacit-governance/ Tacit vs. Explicit Governance]: David Weinberger argues that the tacit governance model of the internet is a sign of its strength, not a weakness
*Pierre de Vries on [[Governance through Principles]] instead of rules [http://publius.cc/2008/05/14/pierre-de-vries-internet-forestry-a-principles-approach-to-governan/]
*Interview: [[Clay Shirky on the New Style of Peer Leadership]]
*[[Three Levels of FOSS Governance]]
*The [[Power of Statelessness]]. By Jakub Grygiel: The withering appeal of the state [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/41708942.html]
*[[Bradley Kuhn of Free Software Communities vs. Open Source Companies]]
*Christopher Allen: The numbers that matter for governing communities: [[Personal Circle]]; [[Group Tresholds]] and [[Power Law]]s
 
 
 
Theoretical essays:
 
#'''The [[Corporation as a Collaborative Community]].''' Charles Heckscher & Paul Adler. Absolutely remarkable history of organizational forms as distinct coordination mechanisms. [http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~padler/research/01-Heckscher-chap01%20copy-1.pdf]
#[http://paulbhartzog.org/2009/11/26/panarchy-governance-network-age-html Panarchy: Governance in the Network Age]: towards a state that isn't a state?
 
 
'''Special topic: Governance and conflict in free culture communities'''
 
#[[Play Struggle]], excerpts of the book [[Hacking Capitalism]] by Johan Soderbergh.
#[http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/special11_9/taylor/index.html Considering Participatory Design and Governance in Player Culture] by T.L. Taylor: Players are central productive agents in game culture and more progressive models are needed for understanding and integrating their work in these spaces. ''Drawing on the long tradition of participatory design this piece explores some alternative frameworks for understanding the designer/player relationship''.
#The [http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/special11_9/malaby/index.html Governance of Virtual Worlds]. Thomas M. Malaby (focuses on [[Second Life]] as case study)
#[http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/special11_9/castronova/index.html Inequality in Synthetic Worlds]. Edward Castronova.
#Klang, Mathias, "[[Avatar]]: From Deity to Corporate Property - A Philosophical '''Inquiry into Digital Property in Online Games'''
#[http://www.osbr.ca/ojs/index.php/osbr/article/view/736/702 Contrasting Proprietary and Free/Open Source Game Development], Alessandro Rossi & Marco Zamarian
#Moore, Christopher. 2005. "[http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00004332/01/V3N2-4-Moore.pdf Commonising The Enclosure]: Online Games And Reforming Intellectual Property Regimes." Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 3(2): examine the potential for computer game studies to contribute to an understanding of an alternative intellectual property regime known as the commons
#[http://playability.de/pub/drafts/precarious.pdf Virtual Worlds and their Discontents]: precarious sovereignty, governmentality, and the ideology of play. Essay by Julian Kucklich to be published in: games & culture (special issue on virtual worlds, edited by thomas malaby and dan hunter).
#[[Authorization and Governance in Virtual Worlds]]. by Dan L. Burk. [http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/2967/2527]
#[[Who Owns the Mods]]? by Yong Ming Kow and Bonnie Nardi. First Monday, Volume 15, Number 5 - 3 May 2010 [http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/2971/2529]
#The rewards of non–commercial production: [[Distinctions and Status in the Anime Music Video Scene]]. by Mizuko Ito. First Monday, Volume 15, Number 5 - 3 May 2010 [http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/2968/2528]
 
 
|style="background: #F4FDF6;border: 1px solid black;padding-left:1em;padding-right:0.5em;" width="50%"|
 
===Key Books===
 
*[[Protocol]] by Alexander Galloway, discusses the nature of power in distributed networks.
*The [[Success of Open Source]], by Steve Webber, discusses the governance of free software and open sorce software projects in detail.
*The [[Future of the Internet]] - and how to stop it. Jonathan Zittrain on an open [[Internet Governance]] that protects a free and [[Generative Internet]]
*Shirky, C. (2008). [[Here Comes Everybody]]: '''The power of organizing without organizations'''. New York: The Penguin Press.
*[[Cyberchiefs]]. Autonomy and Authority in Online Tribes. Mathieu O’Neil. Macmillan/Pluto Press, 2009.
** [[Networks and States]]. The Global Politics of Internet Governance. Milton L. Mueller. MIT Press, 2010''' [http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=12265]
 
Also:
 
#[[Ruling the Root]]. Milton L. Mueller. Excellent review of technical issues related to the technical governance of the internet, but I have to question a book which says that the internet is dead as a locus for innovation. (MB)
 
===Key Graphical Representations===
 
* '''Characteristics of [[Participatory Leadership]]''': graphic overview by Chris Corrigan
 
Compiled by David Ronfeldt [http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2009/05/organizational-forms-compared-my.html]:
 
#The [[Four TIMN Forms Compared]]: model from David Ronfeldt
#William Ouchi: [[Organizational Failures Framework]]
#Walter Powell: [[Forms of Economic Organization]]
#Jessica Lipnack and Jeffrey Stamps: [[Four Ages of Organization]]
#Bob Jessop: [[Typology of Forms of Governance]]
#Mark Considine and Jenny Lewis: [[Governance Types]]
#Federico Iannacci and Eve Mitleton–Kelly: [[Triarchy of Organizational Forms]]
#Paul Adler and Charles Heckscher: [[Three Principles of Social Organization]]
 
===Key Resources===
 
* Steven Clift monitors e-democracy initiatives, at http://www.publicus.net/e-government/
 
* Paul Hartzog on Panarchy, at http://www.panarchy.com
 
* Tom Atlee is founder of '''The Co-Intelligence Institute''', at http://www.co-intelligence.org
Read his summary: '''A Spectrum of Politics and Governance Grounded in Empowered Citizen Dialogue and Deliberation''',  [http://www.communicationagents.com/tom_atlee/2005/07/04/a_spectrum_of_politics_and_governance_grounded_in_empowered_citizen_dialogue_and_deliberation.htm]
 
* There is an extraordinary collection of concrete research on the governance of peer production communities (Debian, Apache), accessible from here [http://ses.enst.fr/enstcommed/index.htm], which leads to two seminar pages here [http://ses.enst.fr/enstcommed/vote.htm] and here
[http://e.darmon.free.fr/workcommed/program.html]. If you know French, this is highly recommended.
 
* [http://technologyandsocialaction.org/node/190 Josef Davies-Coates] maintains a directory of online and offline [[Decision-Making Tools]], which he keeps updated through this [http://del.icio.us/qopi/decision_making bookmark]
 
* [[Net Dialogue]] is the key resource site on [[Internet Governance]]
 
* The [http://metagovernment.org/ Metagovernment Project] keeps track of [[Collaborative Governance Projects]] and [[Collaborative Governance Software]] [http://metagovernment.org/wiki/Related_projects]
 
 
|}
{{:Governance Category Multimedia}}<!--For other editors- this transcludes (pastes in?) the content of the Governance Category Multimedia article.  You can edit the contents or the number of lists or the layout on that page.-->
 
==More Information==
* [[Peer Governance]]
 
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governance Wikipedia Entry]


* see: [[Introduction to Governance from a P2P Perspective]]


[[Category:Governance]]
[[Category:Governance]]

Latest revision as of 01:53, 23 September 2024

Description

By Andrej Zwitter and Jilles Hazenberg:

"Governance itself is an elusive concept, highly complex and contested in literature (Kooiman, 2003; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004; Levi-Faur, 2012; Colombi-Ciacchi, 2014). In our study, we use a unifying conception of governance based on Levi-Faur (2012). Levi-Faur (2012, p. 7–8) defines governance as “signifier of change” in policy-making. By signifying different changes in policy-making, governance opens up “new ways, new concepts, and new issues for research” (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 7–8). This conception of governance as a signifier of change offers a comprehensive perspective on policy-making as subject to “continuous change of patterns of interaction and relations among actors” (Sand, 2004).

Governance is often depicted by distinguishing between “old” and “new” governance (Rhodes, 1996, 1997; Mayntz, 2003; Bevir, 2010; Lobel, 2012). “Old” refers to hierarchical structures, mostly of state institutions. “New” refers to the emergence of more horizontal modes of policy-making, which have arisen due to the pressures of globalization and the functional differentiation of sectors of society. However, given that neither old nor new types exclude each other, they often co-exist in practice and a clear temporal distinction between them cannot be located. We refer to these types of governance as Mode 1 and Mode 2 governance. The current assessment focuses on two aspects of Mode 1 and Mode 2 governance: roles and power relationships. Governance roles are understood as the ability to participate in policy-making at any stage. Power relationships refer to the relative power that an actor, or a certain role, has over other actors within policy-making and its enforcement. Within different modes of governance, different aspects of power relationships are deemed relevant. A useful analogy of this is the power that a policeman has standing at an intersection commanding traffic: power can be derived from his uniform, the perception of the drivers, or of him blocking the road (Dahl, 1957). Similarly, modes of governance regulate or coordinate different aspects of power relationships based on what is deemed the relevant aspect of power."

(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/blockchain/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012/full)


Typology

By Andrej Zwitter and Jilles Hazenberg:


Mode 1 Governance: "governance carried out primarily via the hierarchical command-and-control structures of the state and other public hierarchies"

Mode 1 governance, or “old” governance in the literature, refers to governance carried out primarily via the hierarchical command-and-control structures of the state and other public hierarchies. This means that it relies on authoritative institutions to make policies through the enforcement of hard law. Rooted in Westphalian notions of nation-states, this mode of governance is often legitimized through justificatory strategies resting on public sovereignty and public input in political decision-making (Scharpf, 1999). Therefore, Mode 1 governance is inherently political and institutional.

Hierarchical command-and-control policy-making via the state. Within Mode 1, the state is sovereign and legitimate in commanding and controlling societal actors (both public and private; among private actors, for example, social groups and small and medium enterprises, SMEs). The identity of actors is perceived as the relevant aspect of power. Power relationships are vertical because they base themselves on the identity of the state as sovereign and legitimate.

Furthermore, this mode of governance can be interpreted as identity-based. Within identity-based governance, roles are assigned to and/or performed by actors based on who these actors are, i.e., their identity. For example, Mode 1 governance locates the authority to perform tasks of policy-making, or the delegation thereof, with state organs because of who the state is. This means that the state’s identity is seen as being an authoritative and legitimate public body, acting as sovereign over a territory and as the source of law and policy. Intermediary institutions perform governance roles only through delegated authority by the state.

Given the relative clarity of governance structures within Mode 1, the relevant aspects of power relations are equally clear. The authority to make, implement, and enforce policies lies with the state or those that it delegates to do so. Power is static because authority is permanently assigned to an actor, based on its identity. The relevant aspect of a power relationship is thus the identity of the actor capable of commanding others. Moreover, power relationships are governed via structured governance mechanisms, by predominantly assigning rights to weaker parties and duties to stronger parties. The static nature of power and structured conception of power relationships are explained by the fact that relationships between individuals, organizations, societal actors, corporations, etc. are mediated and governed via the state as the dominant hierarchical authority in policy-making. A good example of this is the relationship between human rights and the duty of the state to protect them.


Mode 2 Governance: "a move away from the vertical command-and-control structures of the state toward more horizontal modes of policy-making

Mode 2 governance, or “new” governance, contrasts with these distinct Westphalian structures of policy-making. It represents a move away from the vertical command-and-control structures of the state toward more horizontal modes of policy-making. This approach creates a more level playing field between societal actors, both private and public. Authority is not necessarily acquired by identity but rather through performance, knowledge, and expertise. Public–private partnerships, policy networks, and private governance all reflect the nature of a world in which the state is arguably no longer the central governing authority (Rhodes, 1997; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). Examples of Mode 2 governance are diverse, but include public–private partnerships working toward the achievement of policy goals that private sector agents are trying to realize more effectively and efficiently through self-regulation. Other examples of areas where Mode 2 governance mechanisms apply are soft law, negotiation, compromise, competition, codes of conduct, and other corporate sectoral agreements on standards of production or quality. As such, Mode 2 governance changes the roles and power relationships of and between actors involved in policy-making or subject to these policies. While not being necessarily unified, different forms of Mode 2 governance are role-based in the distribution of governance tasks, as opposed to identity-based.

Horizontal policy-making in which societal actors have greater independence in commanding their spheres of influence and/or making and implementing policies. Coinciding with this, the state takes on a role of “steering” rather than “rowing.” The state regulates societal actors by incorporating them into the policy-making process. The role they can play therefore becomes the relevant aspect of power, and the power relationships become the relevant focus of governance. Oversight is performed by non-majoritarian institutions such as central banks that guard the boundaries set by the state.

Role-based governance implies that governance tasks and mechanisms are assigned to and/or performed by actors because of the role they can perform, to achieve a desired policy goal within a specific domain. Policy goals and corresponding benchmarks become prominent tools in steering policy-making in specific directions. For instance, a public institution sets goals in a specific policy domain and delegates the achievement thereof to private or corporate actors. These actors are perceived as being more capable of efficiently and expertly delivering the desired goal in this domain. In other domains, the roles of the same private and corporate actors might be completely different. This explains why Mode 2 is not identity but role-based, as the examples below illustrate:

It should be noted that the distinction between Modes 1 and 2 governance is not always clear in practice. Many hybrid forms exist that borrow elements from both modes. The most prominent is multi-level governance, predominantly employed to describe policy-making within the European Union. It relies on both Mode 1, i.e., hierarchical commands from a public authority, and Mode 2, policy networks and the involvement of private actors (Mayntz, 1998). Mode 1 governance is increasingly dismantled at the level of the state, while simultaneously reconstructed at the regional and international level in combination with Mode 2 governance (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004).

With a view to Mode 2 governance, one can see that actors who are frequently engaged in the field of blockchain and DLT take on a variety of different roles. An interesting case that illustrates this is the call for regulation of initial coin offerings (ICOs) and similar crypto-securities. These ICOs can be described as cryptographically secured tokens that represent a token owner’s bundle of rights and obligations vis-à-vis a token provider. They are issued by a token provider and registered on the blockchain as a source of income for their projects. In the last few years, such ICOs have come under increasing public scrutiny as concerning their role as financial securities under US and EU regulations. There have also been frequent fraudulent uses of ICOs, and these have become a contested issue in policy and academic debates (Hacker and Thomale, 2018). In terms of our typology, this shifted the debate around ICOs from being an unregulated space into the realm of Mode 2 governance, with governance ranging from moderate self-regulation to non-autonomous self-governance. It remains to be seen whether states deem it necessary to enforce governance in the field of crypto-securities, even by means of Mode 1 governance.


Mode 3: Decentralized Network Governance and Blockchain Technology

Constructing the governance of the digital domain requires conceptualizing the relevant aspects of power relationships within this domain vis-à-vis Mode 1 and 2 governance. It is not surprising that the digital domain, and especially blockchain technology, cannot be effectively governed through either mode of governance. This is firstly because the emergent new roles and power relationships in the digital domain are neither hierarchical nor horizontal. Instead, they are fluid, with different roles and power relationships often residing in a single, anonymous, actor. Secondly, blockchain technology enables trustlessness, whereas trust is fundamental to the functioning of both Mode 1 and 2 governance. This section will address the first consequence briefly, before providing the stepping stones for the conceptualization of decentralized network governance (Mode 3).

Modes of governance rely on conceptions of the relevant aspects of power relationships to be governed. In relation to the digital domain and blockchain in particular, power must be conceptualized as fluid, as different actors perform different governance roles within different contexts. Also, there are times when the networks through which roles are distributed operate as governance actors themselves. As identities and roles are no longer central to the exertion of power in social coordination, their place has been taken by new forms of power and hence require new forms of governance. Castells’s writing on network power (mentioned previously) notes that there are four forms of power specifically related to networks: networking power, network power, networked power, and network-making power.


We can see that these relate closely to the digital domain and blockchain technology (Castells, 2011) :

• Networking power: the power that actors and organizations have that constitutes the core of the network. This power pertains to the ability to include and exclude others, and thereby controls the makeup of the network.

• Network power: the power that results from the standards required to coordinate interactions. This primarily concerns the imposition of rules within a network.

• Networked power: the power that actors have over one another within a network. This power mimics traditional conceptions of power but the way in which it is exerted differs per network.

• Network-making power: the power of an actor or organization to constitute or re-program a network according to its values and specific interests.

The employment of traditional modes of governance threatens to undermine the benefits of technological innovations such as blockchain and DLT. In particular, overregulation or the application of inadequate mechanisms often reduces the potential benefits of digital technologies. Consequently, this might produce more negative outcomes than positive ones, seeing as a mismatch between regulations and intended governance norms of technological solutions could produce the appearance of regulation without actually having adequate substance. Alternatively, overregulation might be obsolete when trust is not an issue, as is the case with blockchain-enforced governance."

(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/blockchain/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012/full)


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