View source for Reduction of State Sovereign Powers as a Voluntary Process


'''* Article: State Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization: Will it Survive? Leonid E. Grinin. In: GLOBALISTICS AND GLOBALIZATION STUDIES. Edited by Leonid E. Grinin, Ilya V. Ilyin, and Andrey V. Korotayev. Volgograd: ‘Uchitel’ Publishing House, 2012. – 400 pp.'''   

URL = http://www.sociostudies.org/books/files/globalistics_and_globalization_studies/211-237.pdf

''"I ... discuss an important and interesting problem: why states lose their sovereignty, and furthermore, why they voluntary renounce their sovereign prerogatives."''


=Excerpts=

"A brief glance at the spheres where sovereignty was voluntarily reduced as described above. These voluntary reductions include: the right to impose duties and taxation and define their rate; to forbid and reward import and export of goods (capitals) and some types of activity; to issue currency; to borrow; to set the rules of keeping the imprisoned and usage of their labor; to use the capital punishment; to proclaim these or those politic liberties or restrict them; to define fundamental rules of elections (and to hold them proper) and electoral qualification, and also a great number of other more or less important points, including smoking rules. The state has stopped to define them solely by itself. Not so long ago the Europeans refused the sanctum sanctorum – their own national currencies that had been developed for centuries for the sake of a common currency (euro). Finally, what has always been regarded the major thing in sovereignty – the right of war and peace – is under international control. It was only 50 years ago when Russell and Einstein in their famous manifesto wrote: ‘The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations of national sovereignty’ (see Adamovich and Shakhnazarov 1988: 185). Today such control no longer hurts national pride. World wars and totalitarianism showed that absolute sovereignty including also the right to unleash wars and repressions is dangerous.14 Hence it is possible to make an important and on the whole obvious conclusion: the range of the state's internal affairs where nobody intervenes and which are regulated only by national law and traditions, are contracting and international law or law of a definite community (of collective participation) is expanding (Grinin 2005, 2007c, 2008b, 2009a, 2009d).15 Thus, one can summarize that the voluntary reduction of sovereignty means in practice and from the juridical point of view: a) the expansion in national practice of norms of some international agreements, declarations, conventions etc.; b) the recognition of these or those norms of international law as dominant over the national ones; c) the recognition of these or those decisions of a definite international agency (e.g., the court) as the dominant over the decisions of national bodies; d) finally, the voluntary delegation of the authorities to the supranational, regional or world associations, which seems to me an especially important contemporary phenomenon.   On the whole, the process of voluntary sovereignty reduction, to my mind, also signifies a profound transformation of the world political system which sooner or later will demand a formation of a definite supranational political order. Besides, this means that since today many economic and other forces act as the ones undermining national states, the new order will be created to a great degree just for the sake of getting control over weakly controllable actors.  Undoubtedly, in history one can find many cases of voluntary obligations and pacts, which significantly restricted the sovereignty of sovereigns and countries. Take for example the Holy Union and its interventions into the revolutionary countries in the first half of the 19th century (Male 1938), or the customs union of the German States of the first half of the 19th century (Deni and Sayo 1938: 78–80). The processes of internationalization have already been going on for centuries, constantly accelerating. But as we have already mentioned (Grinin 1999a; 2005: 16–17), the prevalence and power of these processes in the past and at present are incomparable, in other words nowadays they have obtained a qualitatively different level in comparison with past epochs. First, they have embraced the whole world. Second, economic alliances were uncommon before and now they have become the most typical form of associations. Some of the economic organizations (such as the WTO, IMF).

encompass the majority of countries of the world. The scale and aims of political associations have also changed. Third, the intensity and regularity of state leaders' contacts have grown enormously. In addition, the problems they solve have changed greatly. Fourth, only a few countries are able to carry out an isolationist policy today and avoid any associations (like the policy of ‘brilliant isolation’ that Great Britain carried out in the 19th century).  To emphasize the above-said, one might note that (though it may sound strange) today maximum sovereignty (i.e., the minimum restrictions of sovereign rights) is possessed by the countries that are closed ideologically (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and some other Muslim countries) and also at the same time economically (such as North Korea, or Cuba), and exactly because of their ‘sovereign rights’ (in particular to create nuclear weapons) sharp conflicts tend to occur. But on the whole even these countries' sovereignty starts to diminish.16 As for sufficiently open and developed countries, the tendency to delegate their powers to the international, regional and world organizations and associations is obvious. The only exception is the USA which at times allows itself to act, regardless of the opinion of other countries, openly putting their national interests above that of the world and their allies  (see, e.g., Kissinger 2002: 2; Brzezinski 2004). But it seems that just in this confrontation between the USA and other countries who express a certain collective opinion, probably are the roots of the main intrigues that will affect future changes of the world as well as the transformation of the content of international relations principles (see Grinin 1999а: 28–29; 2005: 9, 25–26; see also Todd 2003). Yet recently, especially due to the financial and budget crisis, the USA does not oppose its interests to those the other countries as openly as before.  There is completely no doubt that today, in comparison with the past, the sovereignty of completely free and independent countries has diminished significantly. As emphasized, it is extremely important to note that many countries quite often give away some of their sovereign powers voluntarily (on the situation in some Asian countries see below). I think that such ‘altruism’ can be seriously explained only by the fact that such a restriction becomes profitable as countries expect to gain quite real advantages (see, e.g., Zlokazova 2004: 68). It is quite natural that such an ‘exchange’ has become possible in principle only because of the powerful influence of the processes described above (and many unmentioned but implicit). In my view, world public opinion must be mentioned as an important cause of sovereignty reduction: the wider is the circle of countries voluntarily limiting their sovereignty, the more inferior appear those states that do not make such restrictions.  As has been mentioned above in political science it is realized to a certain degree that the doctrine of national sovereignty has become old-fashioned (Kissinger 2002: 296), moreover, the UN Secretaries General Butros Butros-Ghali and Kofi Annan touched on these problems in their speeches and articles (see, e.g., Annan 1999; see the analysis of his ideas in ICISS 2001). However it seems that most researchers still underestimate the gravity of sovereignty changes and the necessity to re-think this notion itself in the context of modern processes as well as a great number of others, connected with it. At the same time I agree that the state still remains (and will endure for quite a long time) principally the superior unit of historical and political life.  However, the scope of sovereign rights in the modern world has been greatly redistributed. In particular, a number of quite important authorities are transferred immediately from states to supranational associations and institutes. The sovereignty is more often distributed between supranational, national, subnational, and sometimes regional and municipal units (Yan 1996: 49). Consequently, as has been mentioned above, new powerful factors have appeared and in the long run these factors will gradually deprive the state of the principal sovereign position and will give this place to larger supranational formations and structures. I believe this tendency will increase.  On the other hand, without fail I would like to add that this is not a one-sided and univocal but a many-sided process: sovereignty will reduce somehow (e.g., in the matters concerning economic strategy) but still in some way, it will become stronger and even grow. Thus, Egbert Yan, for example, considers that the state's ethnical-linguistic, cultural and social functions will increase (Yan 1996: 49). That is why it is dangerous to be in too much of a hurry to bury the nation-state, for a long time it will remain the leading player in international affairs (as on the whole one should be cautious enough while forecasting the global political changes see, e.g., Bobrow 1999; Doran 1999). Besides, as some scholars fairly point out, the abrupt reduction of sovereignty and traditional functions of a state may cause chaos (Utkin 2000: 41–42). Though sovereignty is contracting, I find this principle significant itself (more exactly – the appeal to it in certain cases), and it will probably long remain one of the most important in the international affairs. That is why its open disrespect will continue to provoke condemnation. When old ideas are still alive and the new ones have not become firmly established, the collisions may obtain a form of opposition of principles and this can hide their historical significance. In that case it is difficult to understand who is right, who is wrong. For instance, if one bases oneself on the right of the strong to openly trample on the sovereignty principle even with respect to a dictatorial regime, the sympathy may appear on the per se reactionary side. The war in Iraq in 2003 proves this. That is why it appears that in the legal and moral aspects really irreproachable arguments are desirable which would be based on the world organizations decisions (the UNO in the first place).17 That is why the sanctions of exactly this kind are important to support the actions against the regimes-disturbers (see, e.g., Arbatov 2004: 77).18  Therefore, as has been shown above, since the end of World War II the tendency is more clearly revealed that countries gradually delegate a part of their sovereignty to the world international organizations. Even a large portion of sovereignty passes to regional associations. And the integration of states in suprastate economic associations is becoming a more important part of globalization. Such supranational formations are present on almost all continents and in some cases a transformation of economic alliances into political ones is outlined. Of course, the process of creating some formed, systematically and profoundly integrated suprastate formations cannot be quick. Neither will it be smooth in my opinion, since all its members cannot ignore their own interests and in this or that way they will defend their interests against the others. Besides, within the countries themselves different political powers interpret national goals quite differently. In other words, the adjustment of the supra- and intrastate interests is a difficult problem, and different confrontations are inevitable here. Besides, common aims also may be interpreted in a different way. In this sense, a very significant example is that of the USA which is able to bring together into a tight knot its purely national narrow political problems (such as the coming elections or the necessity to increase the president's popularity) with world interests. 



=Description=

"The process of globalization undoubtedly contributes to the change and reduction of the scope of state sovereign powers. The list of threats to state sovereignty often includes global financial flows, multinational corporations, global media empires, and the Internet etc. At the same time (note that this point is debated surprisingly little and occasionally), since the end of World War II, increasingly more states have been willingly and consciously limiting their sovereign rights. And what is extremely important, many countries quite often give away some of their sovereign powers voluntarily. In the article, it is argued that the factor of voluntariness in reducing one's own authority is, no doubt, the most important in understanding the future of the state.  There are several reasons for such voluntariness and ‘altruism’, including the fact that such a restriction becomes profitable, as in return the countries expect to gain quite real advantages especially as members of regional and interregional unions. The transformation of sovereignty proceeds somehow almost in all countries. However, it is more characteristic of Western countries." 


=Excerpts=

==[[Why is the Notion of Sovereignty Difficult and Ambiguous]]?==

Leonid Grinin:

"In political science sovereignty is usually defined as the most essential attribute of the state in the form of its complete self-sufficiency, that is its supremacy in domestic policy and independence in the foreign one (see, e.g., Jary and Jary 1999: 311; Averyanov 1993: 367; Held 2003: 162–163). This notion became widespread in the 19th century. But already at the beginning of the Modern Age it received quite definite interpretations in works by Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes and others (see, e.g., Held 2003: 162–163; Hinsley 1989; Shinoda 2000; Ilyin 1993a, 1993b, 2001). Within the Westphalian system of international relations (formed after the Thirty Year War and 1648 Peace Treaties of Westphalia, see, e.g., Gross 1948) the principles of state sovereignty gradually obtained a Europe-wide and later a universal appreciation (about these principles see Held et al. 1999: 37–38). However, it is important to note that this ‘normative trajectory’ of international law was fully described only by the end of the 18th – early 19th century (Ibid.: 37), this was especially connected to the events of the Great French Revolution, and also with Napoleon Wars and a new order established after the Vienna Congress in 1815 (on this see, e.g., Gelber 1997: 4; Barkin and Cronin 1994: 115; Shinoda 2000). At present, the UNO Charter and some other international agreements contain regulations on the states' sovereign equality and nations' right to self-determination which together with the increasing degree of external security of most countries, in our view has sufficiently contributed to the consolidation of the idea of national sovereignty in international affairs in the second half of the 20th century. Indeed, as we will see further, the tendency toward the recognition of the sovereign rights combines with the tendency toward their voluntarily constraint by the sovereigns themselves.  

However, the notion of sovereignty is one of the most difficult and ambiguous to agree on (see, e.g., Maritain 1950; Stankiewicz 1969: 291; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Krasner 2001: 134) as its content has constantly changed and continues changing in connection with the transformations of international relations and characteristics of the states themselves. Thus, the notion of sovereignty is not straightforward because of complexity of the notion of state (see, e.g., Kratochwil 1986; Mitchell 1991; Barkin and Cronin 1994; see also Grinin 2006a, 2007e; 2012: ch. 1.5; about the cradle of European state sovereignty see de Mesquita 2000; see also Ruggie 1993). This content also changes depending on who is implied as the supreme sovereign: a feudal monarch with the right to ‘grant or split states when sharing the inheritance’, an enlightened absolute monarch who acts on behalf of people, or a nation itself (see, e.g., Yan 1996). Besides, the sovereignty that is absolute in the theory of states was always strongly and even fatally limited by different factors (see, e.g., Garner 1925; Shinoda 2000). Sovereignty can be regarded positive and negative sovereignty (see Jackson 1990) and there are other varieties stemming there from. In other words, the notion of sovereignty is not univocal and indisputable but provokes numerous debates and, thus, demands a considerable elaboration, including various approaches to the classification of the states themselves possessing sovereignty. Giddens, for example, distinguishes state-nations and nation-states correspondingly as typologically earlier and later (Giddens 1985, 1990, 1991; Giddens and Pierson 1998; see also Barkin and Cronin 1994). There is a multitude of other theories, for example, of quasi-states (Jackson 1990), not to mention the theories of failed states (Rotberg 2004), fragile states (Hagesteijn 2008) etc.3  In political science one gradually becomes aware of the necessity of re-interpretation and re-appraisal of the notion of ‘sovereignty’ in connection with the emergence of the world political community, defining boundaries of private sovereignty, principles of their combination with each other and building their hierarchy, and also taking into consideration actions of other different subjects: MNC, numerous non-governmental organizations, multinational structures and arrangements, also considering the development of various global ideologies, for example, Global Civil Society (see, e.g., Averyanov 1993: 368; Utkin 2000: 41–42; Luneev 2005: 114–115; Vincent 1986; Walker and Mendlovitz 1990b; Camilleri 1990; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Thomson 1995; Daniels and Alarie 2003; Johnson and Mayrand 2003; Keane 2003; Laxer and Halperin 2003; Tekin 2005). 

One can agree with Harry Gelber's conclusion that the last decade of the 20th century showed the national state's incapacity to solve an increasing complexity of problems (Gelber 1997: 12). In particular, the 1990s witnessed the appearance of numerous works on different aspects of the sovereignty notion because of the events connected with direct interference and military intervention (including the ones sanctioned by the UN) with respect to particular countries such as Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and others (see, e.g., Mayall 1991; Roberts 1991: 519–520; Helman and Ratner 1992–1993; Rosas 1994; Tesón 1996; Acevedo and Grossman 1996; Diamond 1996; Regan 1996)."

(http://www.sociostudies.org/books/files/globalistics_and_globalization_studies/211-237.pdf)



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