Post-Liberalism

Description

M.T. Steiner:

"Isolating a precise definition of post-liberal politics is difficult. Post-liberalism is a vague term that only denotes politics after liberalism—and after the “End of History“—without specifying what the content of this politics will be or clarifying how far this post-liberal withdrawal from liberal principles will go.

According to the political philosopher John Gray, these liberal principles assume that humans on a universal basis are individualistic creatures that are destined to experience progress along meliorist lines and create better, more egalitarian societies that value the equal worth of each person. As writers and thinkers from across the political spectrum start to look beyond these axioms, a number of commentators have attempted to identify and explain the core tenets of an emerging post-liberal politics. This new brand of post-liberal politics can be divided into three strands—one on the Left, one on the Right, and one in the Center—which are united by their shared divergence from the core tenets of liberalism to varying degrees." (https://quillette.com/2019/07/02/post-liberal-politics-left-right-and-center/?)

Typology

M.T. Steiner:

The Post-Liberal Right

Right-wing post-liberals believe that humans are, by nature, relational beings who are better suited to pursuing virtue within their own communities than falling prey to the false promise of universal progress. For this reason, right-wing post-liberals put duty and virtue ahead of rights and liberty, and they have a tendency to rely on state power to enforce these duties and virtues. Similarly, they reject the universal, individualist, meliorist, and egalitarian notions of liberalism because they believe that liberalism has failed to live up to these principles.

In a timely article about the New American Right, Matthew Continetti provides his conception of right-wing post-liberalism:

Post-liberals say that freedom has become a destructive end-in-itself. Economic freedom has brought about a global system of trade and finance that has outsourced jobs, shifted resources to the metropolitan coasts, and obscured its self-seeking under the veneer of social justice. Personal freedom has ended up in the mainstreaming of pornography, alcohol, drug, and gambling addiction, abortion, single-parent families, and the repression of orthodox religious practice and conscience.

Continetti then lists a wide array of conservative politicians, activists, and commentators that share this particular post-liberal outlook. Among these are Josh Hawley, who opposes liberalism’s “Pelagian vision”; Yoram Hazony, who finds virtue in nationalism; Rod Dreher, who promotes a Benedictine retreat from liberal modernity; Sohrab Ahmari, who critiques the “David French-ism” of mainstream American Republicans; and Patrick Deneen, who calls liberalism a failure—because it has succeeded.

These individuals share an antipathy toward liberalism and modernity and believe that virtue and duty precede freedom in society. As Josh Hawley puts it, “though [liberalism] proclaims liberty, it destroys the life that makes liberty possible.” By promoting virtue ahead of rights, these post-liberals hope to create a space where the duties and values of associational life enable freedom and the common good to flourish side-by-side—a valiant goal no matter their political inclinations.

According to Continetti, they also have an intriguing willingness to turn to the state for salvation:

Post-liberals say that the distinction between state and society is illusory. They argue that, even as conservatives defended the independence of civil society from state power, the Left took over Hollywood, the academy, the media, and the courts. What the post-liberals seem to call for is the use of government to recapture society from the Left.

This veiled statism is not an end in itself, as Continetti points out. While these right-wing post-liberals are skeptical of big government and recognize that individualism and statism go hand-in-hand, they have a tendency to employ state power as a moral instrument of right-wing causes in society—most recently, by punishing liberal universities with endowment tax “indulgences” at a time when college tuition is too expensive for most young people to afford. This view of state and society mirrors that of Aristotle, who did not draw a clear distinction between the political and social life of the polis. By fusing state and society, these right-wing post-liberals risk putting America—and the Western world—on an illiberal path that is more likely to generate an ultraliberal backlash than resolve liberalism’s underlying contradictions.

The Post-Liberal Center

Centrist post-liberals are less anti-liberal than those on the Right. They agree with their right-wing counterparts that liberalism has fallen short of its promises. However, they leave a larger space for individualism and egalitarianism by balancing rights and duties in society—even if they do not fully embrace either of these liberal principles. Centrist post-liberals also put society above the state and the market. For this reason, they depart from the universal and meliorist tenets of liberalism and believe that true social progress—if such a notion exists—emerges from one’s local context rather than one’s abstract principles or one’s faith in the government and the economy.

This centrist form of post-liberal politics is now emerging in the United Kingdom. What makes this brand of post-liberalism unique is its view of freedom. In the words of British political commentator Peter Franklin:

Post-liberals, like liberals, are pro-liberty; but unlike liberals they do not believe that the maximization of personal freedom is the be-all-and-end-all of politics. Other things are important too—like family, community, nation, fairness and beauty—and therefore there are balances to be struck and conflicts to be resolved as an essential part of the democratic process. Post-liberals therefore believe that individuals have rights and duties.

This emphasis on balancing liberty and responsibility in society echoes the social and political thought of Edmund Burke, who believed that humans inherit their rights and duties through their covenantal ties to those who came before them. Along with this emphasis, British post-liberalism also views society through a different lens. According to British political philosopher Adrian Pabst:

Post-liberalism, by contrast, signals a politics that priorities society over state and market. This means the embedding of state agencies and market mechanisms in intermediary [social] institutions: from local government via regional organisations to nation-wide professional bodies (employers’ associations and trade unions), manufacturing and trading guilds as well as universities.

By elevating society, centrist post-liberals inoculate themselves against the excesses of statist temptation and promote virtue through the values, rights, and duties tied to social institutions. In this sense, centrist post-liberals are less “trigger happy” with state authority and less likely to disrupt the balance between rights and duties in society—which makes them less right-wing than their conservative, American counterparts.

For this reason, these post-liberals occupy the political center. However, their political center is not “mushy middle” and does not follow Messrs. Macron and Trudeau in recycling old, Third Way themes. Instead, centrist post-liberals stand in a “hard centre” that acknowledges liberalism’s achievements—freedom for women, minorities, and marginalia; and affluence by historical standards for all—within the context of its shortcomings—economic inequality, social atomization, and political oligarchy. Similarly, they move beyond—rather than reject—the individualist tendencies at the heart of neoliberalism and blend economic justice with social solidarity.

By tacking to the middle, these centrist post-liberals have made inroads in both of Britain’s major political parties—even if the future of these parties is uncertain. Those in the Conservative Party call themselves Red Tories while those in the Labour Party refer to themselves as Blue Labour.

The Post-Liberal Left

Left-wing post-liberals reconcile themselves with liberalism to a greater degree than their centrist and right-wing counterparts. Unlike those on the Right, they do not reject individualism and egalitarianism altogether and instead believe that individualist, egalitarian societies based on rights and liberties can thrive—so long as these rights and liberties are guaranteed by the state and contribute to a shared notion of the common good. In this sense, left-wing post-liberals believe that rights precede duties—even if social duties are still essential for a vibrant society. Similarly, left-wing post-liberals acknowledge that humanity does have some universal and meliorist tendencies that expand wealth and freedom for all—provided that these tendencies do not outweigh the social and relational virtues that make us human.

This left-wing form of post-liberal politics is now surfacing in America’s Democratic presidential primary. The standard-bearer of this left-wing, post-liberal vision is Andrew Yang. According to Jacob Siegel, Yang is “the first genuinely post-liberal figure in American political life.” What makes Yang post-liberal—from Siegel’s perspective—is his desire to put “Humanity First” in the face of technological automation and his potential to be the “Asian-American reconciler” that transcends social divisions and unites the country.

Yang’s left-wing post-liberal vision revolves around the “Freedom Dividend”, a government proposal to give all American citizens $1,000 per month, regardless of their job status. For Yang, this proposal is not an individualist enterprise aimed at helping people pad their personal bank accounts and increase their individual liberty. Instead, Yang believes that the “Freedom Dividend” is inherently social because it promises to overcome economic inequality and restore social harmony across America. This perspective places Yang in similar political territory to other post-liberals.

However, Yang is not the only left-wing post-liberal candidate in the Democratic primary. Marianne Williamson’s presidential campaign also has post-liberal undertones. What makes Williamson’s politics post-liberal is her focus on love. For Williamson, this politics of love is part of the moral fabric of America and has inspired the country to overcome countless forms of social oppression. According to Williamson, this record of social achievement includes abolitionism, suffrage, civil rights, and gay marriage, among others. By pacifying these forms of injustice, America—in Williamson’s eyes—has lived up to its deepest values and has enabled its citizens to unify around a common social vision.

According to Williamson, this social vision is under threat from a new politics of division and fear on the Left and the Right that has conspired to destroy the communal bonds and social virtues that hold America together. In order to overcome this threat, America—in Williamson’s view—must launch a nationwide spiritual renewal that transcends social divisions and unites the country.

Williamson and Yang are both left-wing post-liberals because their presidential campaigns focus on unifying America by promoting the common good of all citizens in American society. However, their brand of left-wing post-liberalism is unique because it employs state power to elevate rights above duties and virtue in society. For Yang, these rights revolve around the “Freedom Dividend,” which he believes is essential to pacify social divisions generated by economic inequality; and for Williamson, they require a politics of love that inspires the country to find unity by overcoming social oppression. In this sense, Williamson and Yang recognize that humans are “social animals”—in the words of Thomas Aquinas—who naturally overcome profound, social differences and connect with one another to form vibrant societies based on a common set of values.

However, by putting rights ahead of duties, Williamson and Yang risk undermining their left-wing post-liberal projects altogether. While granting all Americans the right to a minimum income or the right to personal liberation is a valiant goal, these rights do not automatically translate into virtue. Furthermore, employing state power to enforce these rights has the potential to erode the social institutions that promote the common good of society." (https://quillette.com/2019/07/02/post-liberal-politics-left-right-and-center/?)

Discussion

Nick Dyrenfurth:

"Its ethos can be discerned in the post-Cold War "Third Way" politics of social democrats such as Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder and even Bill Clinton. Some call it communitarianism rebooted. Post-liberalism's central claims also echo the ancient traditions of civic republicanism, elegantly restated of late by Philip Pettit's book Just Freedom: A Moral Complex for a Complex World.

It is in post-global financial crisis Britain that post-liberalism has generated most interest, attracting supporters from across the party political divide. Philip Blond's "Red Toryism", a key influence upon David Cameron's "Big Society", is one expression.

Glasman and Jon Cruddas, head of British Labour's policy review, are unabashed post-liberals. A post-liberal ethic is evident in the writings of former British Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks.

What does post-liberalism have to say precisely? One high-profile advocate is David Goodhart, director of London's left-leaning Demos think-tank. He writes that post-liberalism wants to fix the unintended consequences of economic and social liberalism – the fact that despite being freer and richer, many of us seem to be less happy.

post-liberalism believes in individual rights and liberties but recognises that without secure, settled lives surrounded by love and recognition, occupied by purposeful activity, individuals cannot truly flourish as human beings. Stability, continuity and familiarity are instead its watchwords; a love of family, community and patriotism are not to be sneered at.

Goodhart's essay is based upon the British experience, where the GFC and immigration are more visceral political issues. But there are lessons for Australia, despite two decades of uninterrupted economic growth. And therein lies the rub. The two liberalisms have not necessarily made us happier. Witness the unprecedented reports of loneliness and depression, record rates of divorce and family breakdown. Sociability and neighbourliness are in serious decline. Australians are less trusting of their fellow citizens but also more sceptical of the ability of government to deliver services or solve complex problems. Nor have the twin liberalisms necessarily made the entire populace richer, certainly in relative terms. The richest one per cent of Australians now own the same wealth as the bottom 60 per cent.

In creating a society built upon abstract rights and freedoms, we have lost sight of what really matters. Too much of our economic debate occurs in a moral vacuum. For example, productivity is talked about as an end in of itself. There was something nihilistic about the manner in which the Abbott government effectively killed off the nation's car manufacturing industry – as if we could not afford to consider the impact on individuals, families and communities of mass job losses and the flow-on effect to the wider economy.

Ironically, as government retreats from the economy, power is increasingly centralised in Canberra – and it becomes even easier for vested interests to distort policy making. Consider, too, the power wielded by the supermarket duopoly of Coles and Woolworths, as Malcolm Knox revealed in the August edition of The Monthly.

Do not misunderstand my argument. The liberalisation of our society was generally a good thing. Few would want to turn the clock to an Australia of the six o'clock swill; inequality for women, ethnic minorities and gay people; cultural conformity and crude economic protectionism. There is no undoing globalisation. Nor is this an argument against the market economy. "The 1960s and the 1980s were not mistakes", Goodhart suggests. But "the big questions in politics today are less about individual rights and more about the nature of our institutions and the quality of our relationships."

How does post-liberalism transform into the real world of policy? Relationships are crucial. A post-liberal politics calls for a new grand compact between the market, state and civil society. This compact – call it an accord, if you like – needs to be built from the bottom-up by communities working in tandem with governments. We arguably need less government policy, better implemented. In general terms, what is called for is a shift away from the dominant economic model of today. An order based on short-term profits and pure price competition should be abandoned in favour of sustainable, profitable industries centred on quality, innovation and environmental obligations, and which in turn provides for fulfilling, secure and well-paid employment.

The key is to re-embed markets in social institutions. Take the jobs crisis. There is much talk today of a productivity emergency. For the most part this is a confected crisis designed to usher in a new round of workplace law deregulation, which can only exacerbate the real labour market crisis. Unemployment is at a 10 year high with 747,300 Australians out of work in July. Youth unemployment sits at 13 per cent. The underemployed are estimated to number 1.1 million, hardly surprising given that the formal measurement of employment requires one hour of work per week. Good jobs are increasingly being replaced by low-skill, low-wage insecure work that lacks dignity and meaningful career progression. Part-timers, casuals, outworkers and contractors make up 40 per cent of the workforce (and are thus denied non-wage benefits such as annual leave). These trends are eroding the security of family life and probably harming the holy grail of productivity.

What is needed is an Australian version of the German social market. One idea is making compulsory the appointment of employees on company boards to ensure a fairer distribution of rewards and imbuing management with vocational knowledge of what actually works on the shopfloor. We need to be thinking about the establishment of work council-style arrangements to boost productivity and actually tackle issues around childcare, transport and flexible work.

Instead of talking about the "minimum wage" the debate ought to be reframed in terms of a "living wage": a "fair day's pay" means time for parents to spend with their children and engage locally. Another solution to the jobs crisis is drastically increasing the volume and quality of vocational education, linked more closely to labour market entry in the form of subsided private sector apprenticeships. Such a strategy would partly obviate the need for the much-abused 457 visa scheme. Here, employers' groups and chambers of commerce could play a critical role. Instead of lobbying for Work Choices-style legislation, they could act as a conduit between government, vocational education providers, unions and business.

Outside of economics, a post-liberal politics would devolve the control of services to allow families and communities a real say. Education is ripe for devolution. The ultimate goal ought to be creating schools that are not merely tailored towards churning out more productive, high-income earning units, but which yield more rounded, resilient students and stronger, more cohesive communities.

There is no reason why this logic should not apply to community banking, or the provision of childcare, health and welfare. What may be required to accomplish this is a complete rethink of our political structures. While those colonial-era throwbacks, the states, are unlikely to be tossed into the ashtray of history, we could give greater powers to capital city and regional councils – a nod to Gough Whitlam's new federalism. Can post-liberalism prosper in Australia? It ostensibly cuts across the left/right divide and has won a hearing in segments of the British Tory party, but there is little reason to believe that the market fundamentalists, libertarians and "big 'C'" conservatives of the modern Coalition will seriously consider post-liberalism. The so-called conservative intelligentsia is obsessed with pursuing prosaic culture wars. The Greens may be attracted to aspects of its community-activist agenda and free-market scepticism, but its "messy" attitude to "doing" politics will likely prevent any serious embrace. Which leaves us with Labor. It should be a no-brainer. Post-liberalism is in Labor's DNA." http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/liberalism-is-alive-and-its-killing-us-why-postliberalism-is-the-answer-20140903-108v50.html)