Collective Action Theory
Discussion
Collective Action and the role of Community Norms
In a case study on Mexico, Prof. Bray makes interesting comments about the individualist 'rational actor' bias of collective action theory.
David Barton Bray:
"Collective action theory seeks to understand how groups of individuals are able to cooperate to overcome social dilemmas, assuming that being a self-interested, short-term maximizer is the default position. The behavioral approach to collective action begins with an evolutionary argument: human beings have evolved the capacity to learn cooperation norms and social regulations which have enhanced the success of groups. In this view, individual rational action is just one of a suite or a continuum of behaviors from the very individual to the very social which human beings exhibit and which can be adaptive in different circumstances. It further suggests that the default position may be cooperation, which can then be withdrawn if there is no reciprocity. Whether cooperation or individual actions dominate depends heavily on the social context. However, the need to build a universal theory of human collective action has lead to a continued emphasis on individual self-interest as the starting point of analysis even among theorists focused on the role of social norms. A major missing component even in behavioral collective action theory focused on common property dilemmas is “community” as a bearer of norms, as rich institutional environments. An exception is Singleton and Taylor, who have argued that communities, which they define as “communities of mutually vulnerable actors”, dramatically lower the transaction costs of collective action. In addition to reducing transaction costs, some communities show a remarkable and consistent capacity to control the “rational egoists” among them and enforce a strict norm of community service. In the reach for the most general principles, the term communities is seldom used analytically as the agent of collective action in formal studies, the starting point of analysis is always “groups” as in “groups of self-organized principals” or “forest user groups”, not communities as such. Yet, particularly in communities in rural areas of the lessdeveloped countries, the favorite field subject of students of common property, community is the overwhelming social reality and source of norms that defines what constitutes cooperative behavior. Community is by far the most important arena where mutual commitment and trust are developed, norms are created and enforced, and where group identity is formed. In laboratory studies based on experimental games, researchers have found that in the study populations (mostly university students) fall into behavioral categories that Ostrom calls “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers” , i.e. “norm-using players” who under the “sparse institutional environment” of the laboratory can assert cooperation norms that can convince “rational egoists” towards greater cooperation. Growing up and living in a relatively isolated rural community with millennial traditions is to play a game with extremely well-defined and time-tested rules. A strong culture of cooperation and reciprocity in traditional communities emerges, not as an inevitable tendency, but because they are also well aware of the problem of the “rational egoists” in their midst."
Source: Collective Action, Common Property Forests, Communities, and Markets. Summer 2008 edition of the (IASCP) Commons Digest